City of Seattle v. State
| Citation | 103 Wn.2d 663,694 P.2d 641 |
| Decision Date | 11 January 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 50629-9,50629-9 |
| Parties | CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. STATE of Washington, and John D. Spellman, Governor, Marion Crawford; George Childers; James Curtis; Roger M. Haag; Walter B. Hale; Agnes Stone; Mary S. Taylor; Earle M. Jorgensen Company; and the Boeing Company, Respondents. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Douglas N. Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Gordon F. Crandall, Asst. City Atty., Seattle, for appellant.
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Richard A. McCartan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for State.
Edmund J. Wood, Seattle, for Crawford, et al.
Perkins, Coie, Stone, Olsen & Williams, Charles C. Gordon, Bruce W. Williams, Seattle, for Boeing.
This case concerns a constitutional challenge by the City of Seattle (City) to two statutes governing the annexation of territory by municipalities. RCW 35.13.165 was challenged under the state and federal equal protection clauses. Both RCW 35.13.165 and RCW 36.93.180(10) were challenged as special legislation. The trial court dismissed the City's claims, holding that the statutes were not special legislation and that the City did not have standing to raise the equal protection claim. We reverse.
The City's claim arises out of its attempts to annex an unincorporated part of the South Park/Duwamish area. The approximately one and one-half square mile area proposed for annexation includes both residential and industrial/commercial property.
There is no dispute concerning the facts in this case. In January 1978 the City took initial steps toward annexing the South Park/Duwamish area, utilizing the annexation procedure provided for under RCW 35.13.015, which allowed for a resolution by the municipality, with final approval by vote of the residents in the area proposed for annexation. However, that attempt to annex the area was abandoned after the 1979 Legislature passed RCW 36.93.180(10), which required a boundary review board to provide
reasonable assurance that the extension of municipal services and the additional payments to be made by the property owners of the area to be annexed in the form of taxes bear a reasonable relation to the value of the additional municipal services to be received.
Laws of 1979, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 142, § 2 (amended 1981). This additional criterion applies only to annexations by cities with a population of over 400,000 and only when an annexation is initiated by city resolution. Seattle is the only city in the state with a population of over 400,000.
Fifteen voters in the South Park/Duwamish area then petitioned for annexation of the area utilizing the annexation procedure provided for under the then existing statute, RCW 35.13.020, which required signatures equal in number to 20 percent of those voting in the last election, with final approval by vote of the residents in the area proposed for annexation. The Seattle City Council approved the voters' petition and submitted the proposal to the King County Boundary Review Board (Board) in October 1980.
The 1980 attempt to annex the South Park/Duwamish area was also thwarted. The 1981 Legislature enacted RCW 35.13.165 1 which terminates annexation proceedings upon either of two methods of filing with the relevant boundary review board. The first method requires signatures of the individual or corporate owners of at least 75 percent of the real property (as determined by its assessed valuation) in the area proposed for annexation. The second method requires signatures of 75 percent of the real property owners in the area proposed for annexation. Either method in effect grants veto power on the basis of property ownership. In the same act the Legislature tightened the criterion in RCW 36.93.180(10) to require that additional taxes will "remain reasonably equal to the value of the additional municipal services to be received during a period of ten years following the effective date of the proposed annexation" for cities over 400,000.
On July 24, 1981, the City filed this suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that RCW 36.93.180(10) and RCW 35.13.165 are unconstitutional. While this suit was pending, the City issued a comprehensive plan for the area and held public hearings on the annexation.
On October 7, 1982, the annexation proposal came before the Board. On the same day, petitions signed by owners of more than 90 percent of the real property in the area proposed for annexation were filed opposing the annexation. On October 21, 1982, the Board determined that RCW 35.13.165 required that all annexation proceedings be terminated with the receipt of these petitions.
On cross motions for summary judgment in the City's action for declaratory relief, the trial court dismissed the City's suit. This appeal was certified for direct appeal by the Court of Appeals.
We initially address the City's standing to bring this suit. Const. art. 11, § 10 specifically protects cities from special legislation. Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wash.2d 211, 216-17, 163 P.2d 594 (1945). Thus, the interest asserted by the City in challenging RCW 36.93.180 and RCW 35.13.165 as special legislation falls directly within the zone of interests protected by Const. art. 11, § 10. Respondents claim that the City lacks standing to raise this issue because it is a political subdivision of the State and therefore not an adverse party. We reject this argument. See Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 490, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). The City has standing to challenge a state statute as special legislation.
Respondents also argue that the City does not have standing to challenge RCW 35.13.165 on the basis of the state and federal equal protection clauses because these constitutional protections extend to individuals, not to the City. We disagree.
Standing is not an insurmountable barrier to municipal corporations challenging the constitutionality of a legislative act. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, at 493, 585 P.2d 71. Where a controversy is of serious public importance the requirements for standing are applied more liberally. Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Public Util. Dist. 1 of Snohomish Cy., 77 Wash.2d 94, 96, 459 P.2d 633 (1969). The basic test for standing is "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question". Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 90 Wash.2d at 493, 585 P.2d 71 citing Association of Data Proc. Serv. Org'n v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).
The City does not itself have rights under the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The primary purpose of the equal protection clause is the protection of individuals' rights, including the right to vote. However, in cases involving the right to vote, the courts have also expressed a concern as to the effects of the denial of the right to vote on the integrity of the democratic process. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1378, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Protection for the integrity of the political process, as well as individuals' rights, is within the zone of interests protected by the equal protection clause. The City does have a direct interest in the fairness and constitutionality of the process by which it annexes territory.
In the past we have found standing to challenge a state statute for a public agency which was required to act under a statute which was arguably unconstitutional. Snohomish Bd. of Equalization v. Department of Revenue, 80 Wash.2d 262, 264, 493 P.2d 1012 (1972). We have also found standing for the Seattle School District to challenge unconstitutional action by the Legislature which placed financial constraints on the District's ability to meet the State's constitutional obligation to fund public education. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 90 Wash.2d at 493-94, 585 P.2d 71.
If the City wishes to annex territory, it is constrained by the procedures established by the State. The fact that the City may choose not to annex territory does not diminish its interest in the fairness and constitutionality of the annexation procedures.
In addition, a party may have standing in either a personal or a representative capacity. Vovos v. Grant, 87 Wash.2d 697, 700, 555 P.2d 1343 (1976). It is undisputed that the residents of the area proposed for annexation would have standing to raise the equal protection claim. When the annexation process is initiated, residents of an area proposed for annexation become potential city residents. Once the City has initiated or approved an annexation petition, it has a duty to represent the interests of area residents, as well as its own interests in further proceedings. E.g. RCW 35.13.173. Thus, the City has standing to raise the equal protection claims of its potential residents.
We next consider the validity of RCW 35.13.165, which allows the property owners in an area to block an election on annexation of the area by filing a petition opposing the annexation with the boundary review board. (See note 1, supra, for entire text.) The City argues that this statute violates the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions. We agree.
Municipalities are political subdivisions of the State and the State has wide discretion in establishing their boundaries. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79, 28 S.Ct. 40, 46-47, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907). Residents of a municipality have no constitutional right to vote on annexation decisions. Hunter, at 179, 28 S.Ct. at 46. However, in exercising its authority over municipal boundaries, the State is subject to the limitations of the federal constitution. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960). In elections of general interest, the equal protection clause requires that any restrictions on the right to vote in that election, on grounds...
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