City of Seattle v. Pearson

• Decision Date: 18 November 1896
• Citation: 15 Wash. 575,46 P. 1053
• Parties: CITY OF SEATTLE v. PEARSON.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

46 P. 1053

15 Wash. 575

CITY OF SEATTLE v. PEARSON.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 18, 1896

Appeal from superior court, King county; R. Osborn, Judge.

Complaint was made in the municipal court of the city of Seattle against Charles Pearson for violating an ordinance. From an order discharging defendant, the city brought certiorari to the superior court. From a judgment in the latter court in favor of the city, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Melvin G. Winstock, for appellant.

John K Brown, F. B. Tipton, and Z. B. Rawson, for respondent.

DUNBAR, J.

The defendant (appellant in this case) was complained against in the municipal court of the city of Seattle for the violation of Ordinance No. 4151 of the said city of Seattle, which was an ordinance prescribing the limits of time within which intoxicating, malt, vinous, mixed, or fermented liquors might be sold, and saloons and drinking places kept open, in the city of Seattle, and providing penalties for the violation thereof. Under the provisions of this ordinance its violation is punished by a fine of not less than $25 nor exceeding $150, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 30 days or by both such fine and imprisonment. And there is also a provision in the ordinance that any license for the sale of any such liquors, granted by the city of Seattle to any person convicted of violating any of the provisions of section 1 (which section prescribes the time of closing) shall be forfeited and annulled by such conviction, without further action or proceeding of the city council, or any other officer or department of the city. The defendant was arrested, and demurred to the complaint upon statutory grounds, particularly contending that the ordinance under which he was complained against was invalid. The demurrer was sustained, and the defendant discharged whereupon the plaintiff, the city of Seattle, petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the superior court for King county state of Washington. A motion to quash was introduced and overruled. Upon the argument of the question upon its merits as to the validity of the ordinance, the court held the ordinance to be valid in so far as the infliction of a fine and imprisonment was concerned, but invalid as to that portion which provides for forfeiture of the license. Judgment was rendered, and an appeal taken to this court.

Respondent complains, and with some reason, we think, that the assignments of error are not clearly set forth in appellant's brief; but, as no motion was made to strike the brief for that reason, we will consider it upon its merits.

The first contention of appellant is that certiorari does not lie in a case of this kind; that the ordinance, being quasi civil in its nature, the respondent, the city of Seattle, had a remedy by appeal. We think, under the best authorities, this is not a quasi civil action, but that it is either criminal or quasi criminal. This view is sustained by 1 Dill. Mun. Corp (4th Ed.) § 411, although there seems to be some conflict in the authorities cited. But, under the provisions of chapter 64, Laws 1891, and of section 4, c. 65, Laws 1895, and under the authority of Woodbury v. Henningsen, 11 Wash. 12, 39 [15 Wash. 579] P. 243, we think it is clear that the writ was properly issued in this case.

The second contention of appellant, that the ordinance was not properly pleaded, is also answered by 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 413, to the effect that it is not necessary to plead the ordinance. We think, also, that there was nothing in the further contention that this ordinance was in conflict with the subsequent ordinance. The subject-matter of one was the licensing of saloons, and that of the other was the regulation of the hours during which they should be closed. They had no necessary relation to each other.

The most strenuous contention of the appellant is, however, that the lower court erred in holding that portion of section 2 of Ordinance No. 4151 which provides a forfeiture of the license...