City of Seattle v. Hinckley

• Decision Date: 13 November 1905
• Citation: 82 P. 747,40 Wash. 468
• Parties: CITY OF SEATTLE v. HINCKLEY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

82 P. 747

40 Wash. 468

CITY OF SEATTLE v. HINCKLEY.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 13, 1905

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; A. E. Griffin, Judge.

Criminal action by the city of Seattle against T. D. Hinckley. From a judgment of acquittal rendered by the superior court on appeal from the police court, the city appeals. Reversed.

Ellis De Bruler, for appellant.

Fred H Peterson and H. C. Force, for respondent.

DUNBAR J.

The city of Seattle, appellant in this case, instituted a criminal action against the defendant and respondent for the violation of a certain ordinance of the said city of Seattle. The respondent was tried and convicted in a police court, and fined in the sum of $50. Upon appeal to the superior court the case being submitted upon a statement of facts, the respondent was acquitted. The essential part of the ordinance, the violation of which is charged, is as follows 'That all hotels, office buildings, factories, tenements, and lodging houses more than three stories in height shall have at the ends of each main hallway, on outside of building, a fireproof stairway leading from within nine feet of the grade line of the street or alley to top of roof.' Then follows a more minute description of the fire escape required. Section 126 is as follows: 'That any owner, builder, contractor, or other person who shall construct, alter, repair, or cause to be constructed, altered, or repaired, and any architect having charge of the same, who shall permit to be constructed, altered, or repaired any building or other structure in violation of any provision of this ordinance, or who shall violate any provision thereof, unless other penalty for such violation be provided herein, shall be subject to a fine,' etc. The statement of facts upon which the case was submitted showed that the respondent was the owner of a four-story brick building described in the complaint; that it was being used for office purposes, and located in the city of Seattle. It is admitted that respondent refused to erect and place at the north end of the main hallway of the said building, as required by ordinance, the fire escape required by said ordinance. It was also admitted that in the year 1898 he had erected on the north side of said building, being at the north end of the main hallway described in the complaint, a fire escape, which was then erected under the supervision and direction of the fire chief of the said city of Seattle, and in compliance with the ordinances then regulating fire escapes; that the fire escape which he had erected was at the time of its construction a good and sufficient fire escape, and that it was in practically the same condition as when the same was erected; but that said fire escape and appurtenances do not comply with the ordinance of the city above mentioned. It was also admitted that said fire escape, together with said platform and appurtenances, is sound and serviceable, and fit for use, but that the same is not as serviceable, and not as convenient, and not as safe as the iron stairways provided for under said ordinance.

The contention of the respondent is that the ordinance was not retrospective in its scope, and that the city council did not intend in its passage that houses erected before the passage of the ordinance should be subject to its provisions; that it was not intended to interfere with fire escapes then existing, and that, if such ordinance should be so construed it would be unconstitutional, as depriving respondent of existing rights. The trial court took this view, and the respondent was acquitted and discharged from custody. We think the court erred in its construction of this ordinance. It may be conceded that the fundamental rule of construction of statutes is that they shall not be construed to be retrospective unless the retrospective intention is expressed or can be plainly gathered from the provisions of the act. But it seems to us that the language of this ordinance is plain and unequivocal. When it is said that all hotels, office buildings, factories, tenements, and lodging houses more than three stories in height shall have a certain described fire escape, it seems to us it was the plain intention of the city council that all buildings described should have such appurtenances, and, that, if it had been the intention to except any buildings from its provisions, such exception would have been expressed. The language is as broad and comprehensive as could well have been used. In reason, too, it would seem that if the city council, from observation or investigation, had determined that a certain character of fire escape was necessary for...