City of Seattle v. Cadigan
| Citation | 55 Wn.App. 30,776 P.2d 727 |
| Decision Date | 31 July 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 20352-5-I,20352-5-I |
| Parties | CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. James J. CADIGAN, Petitioner. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Washington |
Douglas Jewett, City Atty., Betty Ngan, Albert Raines, Kathryn McLoed, Asst. City Attys., Seattle, for respondent.
James Cadigan appeals his conviction for resisting arrest, a violation of Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 12A.16.050.
Cadigan was initially charged with disorderly conduct, assault, and resisting arrest. The disorderly conduct charge was apparently dismissed on the City's motion prior to trial. The City's evidence suggested that Cadigan was arrested for obstructing a public officer, but this offense was never charged.
On April 9, 1986, at 12th and Madison in Seattle, Seattle police officers Shirey, O'Quinn, and Cotter were engaging in a routine arrest of an individual who had been stopped for having studded tires on his car, and the officer who stopped him discovered an outstanding warrant.
Cadigan was traveling eastbound on Madison in his yellow Mustang. When he stopped at the traffic light at the Although the light turned green, Cadigan did not move through the intersection. He remained where he was, blocking traffic, and yelling. The vehicles behind Cadigan went into the westbound lane to go around his car. 1 Officer Cotter went over to Cadigan and told him three or four times to move his car, and that he was risking being cited for blocking traffic. Cadigan's response was, " 'No, no[,] you pigs are out of line.' " Cadigan refused to either move on or move his car over to the curb, so Officer Cotter informed Cadigan that he was under arrest. 2 Officer Cotter opened Cadigan's door for him, and Cadigan got out of the car, heading for the front of the car. Officer Cotter reached over to Cadigan and said, " 'No, over here.' " Cadigan said, " '[G]et your ... hands off me,' " and hit Officer Cotter in the mouth.
intersection, he began to yell at the arrestee, shouting, " 'I'll be your witness. They can't treat you like this. They're harassing you.' " Cadigan also addressed his remarks to the officers, saying, " 'You ... pigs. Your [sic ] out of line.' "
The other officers came over to assist at that point, and all three were holding Cadigan, who bit Officer Cotter on the hand. As the officers were attempting to get Cadigan away from the street, someone lost his balance, and the group tumbled to the ground. Officer Cotter tore a ligament in his right ankle, and Cadigan injured his shoulder and received abrasions on his face.
Cadigan's version of the incident was that as he was on his way home from a cocktail lounge where he had consumed three vodka and grapefruits, he observed the officers "getting a little rough" in their arrest, and that he (Cadigan) told the officers to "take it easy". According to Cadigan, Officer Cotter told him to "move on", but Cadigan was Defense counsel moved to dismiss both the assault charge and the resisting arrest charge. Both motions were denied. Although all of the discussion concerning proposed jury instructions was not transcribed, the report of proceedings indicates that defense counsel requested that the trial court instruct the jury that the City was required to prove the absence of self-defense on the resisting arrest charge. The trial court rejected the defense-proposed self-defense instruction, which set forth a subjective standard for evaluating the use of force in resisting arrest, and also contained "no duty to retreat" language. However, the trial court did instruct the jury that:
unable to do so because there were cars in front of him and on his right side. Cadigan testified that he got out of the car, and Officer Cotter circled around him and slipped and fell, and then Cadigan was grabbed from behind and thrown on the ground, and that one of the officers smashed his face against the ground. Cadigan testified that he was never told by any of the officers that he was under arrest. He also denied that he hit Officer Cotter in the mouth.
A person illegally arrested by an officer may resist the arrest; the means used to resist an unlawful arrest must be reasonable and proportioned to the injury attempted upon the party sought to be arrested.
The City must prove the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt.
Instruction 8, in part.
The jury returned a "not guilty" verdict on the assault charge, and a "guilty" verdict on the resisting arrest charge. This appeal timely followed.
Cadigan argues that the City's evidence failed to prove the elements of the charge of obstructing a public officer, and therefore, the resisting arrest conviction cannot stand. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict cannot be sustained if, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the crime charged beyond The Seattle city ordinances pertinent to this case read as follows:
a reasonable doubt. State v. Baeza, 100 Wash.2d 487, 670 P.2d 646 (1983); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
12A.16.010 Obstructing a public officer.
A. A person is guilty of obstructing a public officer if, with knowledge that the person obstructed is a public officer, he:
1. Intentionally and physically interferes with a public officer; or
2. Intentionally hinders or delays a public officer by disobeying an order to stop given by such officer; or
3. Intentionally refuses to cease an activity or behavior that creates a risk of injury to any person when ordered to do by a public officer; or
4. Intentionally destroys, conceals or alters or attempts to destroy, conceal or alter any material which he knows the public officer is attempting to obtain, secure or preserve during an investigation, search or arrest; or
5. Intentionally refuses to leave the scene of an investigation of a crime while an investigation is in progress after being requested to leave by a public officer.
B. No person shall be convicted of violating this section if the Judge determines, with respect to the person charged with violating this section, that the public officer was not acting lawfully in a governmental function.
C. For purposes of this section, a "public officer" means those individuals responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of the Seattle Municipal Code and empowered to make arrests for offenses under the Seattle Municipal Code or those individuals responsible for the enforcement of the criminal laws of the state.
[Former] 12A.12.010 Disorderly conduct
A. A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if he or she intentionally and maliciously:
. . . . .
2. Obstructs pedestrian or vehicular traffic in a public place by walking, standing, sitting, lying, or placing an object, in such a manner as to directly block passage by another person, or to require a person approaching to take evasive action to avoid physical contact.
12A.16.050 Resisting arrest.
A person is guilty of resisting arrest if he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from lawfully arresting him.
Both parties to this appeal acknowledge that the trial court applied SMC 12A.16.010(A)(3) to Cadigan's conduct in evaluating the defense motion to dismiss. Cadigan argues that his conduct did not create a risk of injury, that it was no different from that of a driver who stops to make a left-hand turn, and that his right to make comments to police officers is protected by the First Amendment.
We need not decide whether Cadigan's arrest for the crime of obstructing a public officer was valid based on his conduct "creat[ing] a risk of injury to any person". SMC 12A.16.010(A)(3). Cadigan's conduct falls squarely within the definition of disorderly conduct set forth in former SMC 12A.12.010(A)(2), and thus, his arrest was valid.
An arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant may only be made if the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the offense is being committed in his presence. Tacoma v. Harris, 73 Wash.2d 123, 436 P.2d 770 (1968). See also RCW 10.31.100. 3 Probable cause exists for a warrantless arrest where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed. State v. Fricks, 91 Wash.2d 391, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979). The absence of probable cause to believe that a person committed a particular crime for which a person was arrested does not create an invalid arrest if, at the time of the arrest, the police had sufficient information to support an arrest of the person on a different charge. See State v. Stebbins, 47 Wash.App. 482, 735 P.2d 1353 (1987).
Based on the trial testimony, it is clear that at the time of his arrest, Cadigan was obstructing vehicular traffic, and he refused to cease doing so when Officer Cotter requested that he move on. Probable cause existed for Officer Cotter
to arrest Cadigan for disorderly conduct, pursuant to former SMC 12A.12.010(A)(2). Cadigan's argument that his conviction for resisting arrest should be reversed because the State failed to prove that he was lawfully arrested for obstructing a public officer cannot be sustained.
Cadigan argues that because he had the right to resist an arrest if he was in danger of serious injury, he had the right to have the jury instructed on self-defense.
Parties are entitled to instructions on each theory of the case that is supported by the evidence. State v. Theroff, 95 Wash.2d 385, 622 P.2d 1240 (1980). A jury instruction is sufficient if it states the law correctly, is not misleading, and allows the parties to argue their theories of the case. State v. Mark, 94 Wash.2d 520, 618 P.2d 73 (1980).
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