City of Seattle v. Rothweiler

• Decision Date: 29 April 1918
• Docket Number: 14547.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF SEATTLE v. ROTHWEILER.

172 P. 825

101 Wash. 680

CITY OF SEATTLE v. ROTHWEILER.

No. 14547.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 29, 1918

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Kenneth Mackintosh, Judge.

H. N Rothweiler was convicted in the police court of violating a speed ordinance. On appeal to the superior court the complaint was dismissed, and the city appeals. Affirmed.

Hugh M Caldwell, Patrick M. Tammany, and George A. Meagher, all of Seattle, for appellant.

Roberts Wilson & Skeel, Alfred H. Lundin, and Everett C. Ellis, all of Seattle, for respondent.

FULLERTON J.

The respondent was accused, by a complaint filed in the police court of the city of Seattle, of having driven an automobile over one of the city streets in excess of the speed limit fixed by an ordinance of the city. On being brought before the police judge he interposed an objection to the jurisdiction of the court based on the ground that the ordinance on which the complaint was founded was invalid. His objection was overruled, whereupon he admitted the facts and was adjudged guilty and sentenced to pay a fine. From the judgment entered he appealed to the superior court, where he renewed the objection made in the police court. The objection was there sustained, and the complaint dismissed. The city appeals to this court.

The ordinance of the city of Seattle under which the respondent is charged reads as follows:

'Sec. 66. No person shall drive or operate any motor vehicle at a rate of speed faster than twelve miles per hour at any crossing within the main, thickly settled, or business portion of the city, nor within 100 yards of any schoolhouse on school days between eight o'clock in the morning and five o'clock in the evening, nor in any portion of the city, faster than twenty miles per hour.'

The statute held by the superior court to invalidate the ordinance is found in the Laws of 1917, at page 640, and reads:

'Sec. 34. The local authorities shall have no power to pass or enforce any ordinance, rule or regulations governing the speed of any motor vehicle, or requiring of the owner or operator of any motor vehicle, any license other than an occupation license or a tax which may be levied in only one city or town when such motor vehicle is engaged in intercity service, or permitted to use the public highways except as herein provided or to exclude or to prohibit any motor vehicle whose owner has complied with the provisions of this act from the free use of the public highways, and all such rules, ordinances, and regulations now in force are hereby declared to be of no validity or effect: Provided, however that nothing herein shall be construed as limiting the power of the county commissioners or local authorities to make, enforce, and maintain ordinances, rules and regulations governing traffic in addition to the provisions of this act affecting motor vehicles, but not in conflict

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