City of Seattle v. Barto

• Decision Date: 25 February 1903
• Citation: 31 Wash. 141,71 P. 735
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF SEATTLE v. BARTO.

71 P. 735

31 Wash. 141

CITY OF SEATTLE v. BARTO.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 25, 1903

Appeal from superior court, King county; Arthur E. Griffin, Judge.

R. W Barto was convicted of engaging in the business of a pawnbroker without a license, contrary to an ordinance of the city of Seattle, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Tucker & Hyland, for appellant.

Ellis De Bruler, for respondent.

FULLERTON C.J.

The appellant was convicted of the offense of engaging in the business of a pawnbroker in the city of Seattle without first having procured a license therefor, as required by an ordinance of the city, and from the judgment of conviction appeals. The question presented by the record is the validity of the ordinance under which the conviction was had. The several objections made we shall notice in order.

It is said first that the ordinance contains more than one object. The charter of the city of Seattle contains the following provision: 'Every legislative act of this city shall be by ordinance. Every ordinance shall be clearly entitled and shall contain but one object, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.' The ordinance in question is entitled as follows: 'An ordinance to license and regulate certain trades and occupations in the city of Seattle, providing penalties for the violation thereof, and repealing all ordinances inconsistent therewith.' The body of the ordinance contains provisions relating to the licensing and regulation of various trades and occupations among which are auctioneers, secondhand dealers, billposters hotel runners, persons engaged in the temporary sale of goods, and the business engaged in by the appellant, that of a pawnbroker. The contention is that these several trades and occupations are so far distinct as to require that legislation governing and regulating them be by several and distinct ordinances, and that they cannot be joined in one ordinance, no matter how specific the title of that ordinance may be made. But it was not intended by the requirement contained in the charter that the city council should not pass an ordinance having a general object, and bring within its terms all matters pertaining to that object, whether it embrace a number of persons or a variety of trades and occupations. The term 'object' was not used in the sense of 'number' or 'variety,' nor was it intended to require a distinct legislative act for each particular matter legislated upon. It was intended to prevent the union in one act of diverse, incongruous, and disconnected matters, having no relation to or connection with each other, but was not intended to prevent the lawmaking power from enacting under a general title provisions affecting a variety of matters, so long as there is a natural connection between the several matters and the object named in the title. As was said by this court in Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. St. 267, 28 P. 520, when speaking of the use of the words 'subject' and 'object' as used in constitutions with reference to legislative enactments 'There are two ways in which the words thus used can be interpreted. One is to hold that the word 'subject is not capable of further reduction; the other is to hold that it means a single subject in a more enlarged sense, in which may be included a large number of sub-subjects. To hold that the constitution makers intended the first interpretation would be to convict them of an intention to so tie the hands of the Legislature as to make legislation extremely difficult, if not impossible; while the other construction will substantially subserve the object which they had in view, and at the same time leave the Legislature free to legislate in a reasonable manner. I am of the opinion that the Legislature must be the judge of the scope which they will give to the word 'subject,' and that, so long as the title embraces but one subject, it is not inimical to such constitutional provision, even although the subject as thus used contains any number of sub-subjects. As I have suggested, any other rule would make legislation practically impossible. I do not suppose it will be contended that a title would be void which...