City of Seattle v. Columbia & P.S.R. Co.
Decision Date | 24 May 1893 |
Citation | 6 Wash. 379,33 P. 1048 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | CITY OF SEATTLE v. COLUMBIA & P. S. R. CO. ET AL. |
Appeal from superior court, King county; I. J. Litchtenberg, Judge.
Suit by the city of Seattle against the Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad Company and the Northern Pacific & Puget Sound Shore Railroad Company to enjoin defendants from building their tracks across Columbia street, in said city. Injunction denied. The city appeals. Affirmed.
George Donworth, (Burke, Shepard & Woods, of counsel,) for appellant.
Ashton & Chapman and Andrew F. Burleigh, for respondents.
On the 14th day of March, 1882, the city of Seattle passed an ordinance purporting to grant a right of way to the Oregon & Transcontinental Railroad Company and the Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad Company to lay a single or double track along and upon certain streets therein described. The first section, describing the route, was amended October 29, 1883. The second section, omitting the seventh subdivision, which provided for the joint use of such tracks by any other railroad company constructing a railroad to Seattle, and provided a method of determining compensation therefor, is as follows: In the latter part of 1883, the Puget Sound Shore Railroad Company, which was the predecessor of the Northern Pacific & Puget Sound Shore Railroad Company, and which claimed to have succeeded to the rights of the Oregon & Transcontinental Railroad Company, aforesaid, constructed a railroad of standard gauge from Seattle to Stuck Junction, a point on the Northern Pacific Railroad Company's line, thereby connecting the city of Seattle with eastern Washington, then via Portland, Ore., with a continuous line of railroad. This road was constructed within the time specified. It started from a point within the southern limits of said city of Seattle, but did not cover any part of the right of way described in said ordinance. This road was operated for about one month after completion, but thenceforth for a year and a half no trains were run thereover. A three-rail track (the Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad being a narrow-gauge road) was also constructed by the Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad Company and the Puget Sound Shore Railroad Company along the right of way described in said ordinance, which is now in controversy, but a gap of one rail's length was left at the point where the standard-gauge track was designed to connect with the line constructed as aforesaid. After the expiration of this period of one year and a half, during which the road aforesaid was not operated, the connection was made, and a continuous line was thenceforth operated continuously for several years, until June 6, 1889, when a great fire destroyed the railroad on said right of way, together with a vest amount of other property in the vicinity. The railroad companies at once set about restoring the wharves and warehouses, etc., and the railroad tracks on said right of way. When they reached Columbia street, building north, they found that the city had raised the grade of that street at the point of crossing about two feet, and had filled in the street to conform therewith. On August 21, 1889, when the railroad companies were proceeding to build across the street on the wharf-level grade as before, and were cutting the embankment the city had placed in front of them, this action was commenced, and a temporary restraining order was issued and served, restraining them from prosecuting the reconstruction of their tracks across Columbia street. Various attempts were made to dissolve this order, but without success, so that the respondents have not been able to reconstruct said tracks north of the south line of Columbia street by reason of these proceedings. Upon the final trial, the court below decided the cause in favor of the defendants, but ordered that the respondents should gain no advantage of the decision, provided the city should within 30 days prosecute an appeal, which it has done. Therefore all matters remain in statu quo as of August 21, 1889.
The right of way in controversy is located upon tide and shore lands, a part of it being within the meander line, and a part without. The first five propositions contended for by appellant relate to the right of the city to maintain and control a public street on the shore land prior to the erection of the territory of Washington into a state, to extend the streets in question thereon, and to the enactment of the ordinance establishing the higher grade of Columbia street after the destruction of the railroad at such point by fire as aforesaid. For the purposes of this case, these propositions will be taken as established. The remaining points contended for by appellant are as follows:
The order in which the points have been stated will not be...
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