City of Sebring v. Avant
| Decision Date | 22 May 1928 |
| Parties | CITY OF SEBRING v. AVANT. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Highlands County; W. J. Barker, Judge.
Action by Edward Avant against the City of Sebring. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed on condition of a remittitur.
Syllabus by the Court
Municipality engaged in hazardous occupation cannot interpose plea of assumption of risk therein (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 4971 4974). A municipality engaged in a hazardous occupation as defined by the law of this state cannot interpose the plea of assumption of risk. Section 4974, Revised General Statutes of Florida 1920.
Experienced lineman assumes risk of breaking of any pole he is called on to climb in employment, if defect causing break was not of original construction. An experienced lineman assumes the risk of the breaking of any pole he is called on to climb in the course of his employment, if the defect which caused the pole to break was not of original construction.
Rule that experienced lineman assumes risk of breaking of pole caused by defect not of original construction refers to cases where line is already constructed and lineman proceeds on own responsibility; lineman climbing pole recently set up by other city employees who had duty to inspect held not to have assumed risk, in absence of showing defect causing break was latent and undiscoverable by reasonable precaution (Rev. Gen St. 1920, §§ 4971, 4974). This rule has reference to cases where the line is already constructed and in operation, and where the lineman proceeds on his own responsibility to the performance of his duty for the city. It has no application to a case like this where the pole has only recently been set up by other employees of plaintiff in error whose duty it was to inspect it, and there is no showing that the defect which caused the pole to break was latent and undiscoverable by any reasonable precaution.
$16,250 for breaking several bones in each foot of electric lineman making him permanent cripple, held excessive by $4,000. Verdict of $16,250 for injury, breaking several bones in each foot of electric lineman, rendering him permanent cripple held excessive by $4,000.
Shackleford & Brown and H. C. Tillman, all of Tampa, for plaintiff in error.
M. R. McDonald and Kline, Kline & Dickson, all of Sebring, for defendant in error.
On the 10th of February, A. D. 1926, while in the employ of the city of Sebring, Edward Avant, defendant in error, was injured by the fall of an electric light pole. The pole was of cedar, about 30 feet long, had been used for about 3 years, but had been taken up some time before, and was again set up by employees of plaintiff in error immediately preceding the accident in which Avant was hurt. Avant, in performance of his duty, climbed the pole, buckled his safety belt around it, and was attempting to fasten a cross-arm on which to string electric wires, when it broke off at the ground, throwing Avant to the pavement, the pole falling on him, inflicting numerous bruises on his body, and breaking several bones in each foot, thereby rendering him a permanent cripple.
A suit for damages resulted in a verdict and judgment for $16,250 in favor of defendant in error. A new trial was denied, and the cause was brought here on writ of error.
It is contended that the judgment below should be reversed because: (1) The declaration is insufficient, in that it does not allege gross negligence on the part of defendant; (2) the city of Sebring was not engaged in one of the hazardous occupations as known to the law of this state, consequently it was erroneously deprived of the plea of assumption of risk; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.
On the first question raised, that is, as to the degree of negligence the city of Sebring may be charged within an action of this kind, it is not out of place to state that the terms 'gross,' 'ordinary,' and 'slight,' negligence are known to the law. When they are observed gross negligence is said to be the want of slight care; and ordinary negligence is the want of ordinary care; and slight negligence is the want of great care. Sherman and Redfield on Negligence (6th Ed.) 93. Some of the municipalities in this state have charter provisions limiting their liability in actions of this kind to gross negligence but we are...
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State v. City of Miami
... ... city's taxing powers such as would ordinarily be done for ... customary municipal borrowing ... [ 4 ] For example, in City of Sebring v ... Avant, 95 Fla. 960, 117 So. 383, the hazardous ... occupation statute was applied to cities engaged in the ... 'business' of producing and ... ...
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Williams v. City of Jacksonville
... ... State v. Johns, 92 Fla. 187, 109 So ... 228, Brown v. Lakeland, 61 Fla. 508, 54 So. 716 ... In the ... case of City of Sebring v. Avant, 95 Fla. 960, 117 ... So. 383, Mr. Justice Terrell observed that the terms ... 'gross,' 'ordinary,' and 'slight' ... negligence are ... ...
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Orr v. United States
...covered. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida has extended the coverage of the Act to governmental units. See City of Sebring v. Avant, 1928, 95 Fla. 960, 117 So. 383. Profit motive is plainly Florida's Hazardous Occupations Statute provides that "the persons mentioned in § 769.01 shal......
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...See Parker v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.1955, 82 So.2d 131; City of Lakeland v. Amos, 106 Fla. 873, 143 So. 744. In City of Sebring v. Avant, 95 Fla. 960, 117 So. 383, we held the municipality within the contemplation of the word 'person' in a statute regulating persons engaged in hazardous......