City of Spartanburg v. Laprinakos, 20315

• Citation: 267 S.C. 589,230 S.E.2d 443
• Decision Date: 01 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 20315,20315
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: The CITY OF SPARTANBURG, Appellant, v. Martha B. LAPRINAKOS et al., Respondents.

Page 443

230 S.E.2d 443

267 S.C. 589

The CITY OF SPARTANBURG, Appellant, v. Martha B. LAPRINAKOS et al., Respondents.

No. 20315.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 1, 1976.

T. E. Walsh and Marshall T. Walsh, of Gaines & Walsh, Spartanburg, for appellant.

Matthew A. Henderson, of Henderson & Lister, Spartanburg, for respondents.

RHODES, Justice:

This is an appeal by the City of Spartanburg from a jury verdict of $70,000 returned for the landowners, Martha B. Laprinakos and Joanna B. Zanetakos, in a condemnation case. In seeking a new trial, the City asserts trial errors in a number of particulars. We reverse and remand.

The property in question is located on Dunbar Street in the heart of downtown Spartanburg and consists of a two-story masonry building approximately 70 years old. The parcel of land contains 2,800 square feet, and the building covers the entirety of this land area. At the time of the condemnation the first floor was occupied by two finance companies under written leases. The second floor of the building was vacant and had not been rented for about 15 years.

The city contends first that it was error for the trial judge to admit the testimony of one Elmer Mitchell Harvey as to the value of the condemned property. At the outset of the case, and out of the presence of the jury, the City examined this witness with regard to his qualifications to testify as an expert on behalf of the landowners. After such questioning the trial judge ruled that the witness was disqualified as an expert 'in the field of real estate', but the court permitted Harvey to give his opinion as to the fair market value of the property based on two methods: (1) the cost of replacement less depreciation approach, and (2) the capitalization of income approach. In his testimony before the jury, Harvey described his trade as follows:

'A. Well, I do building, repair work, and I do a lot of insurance work--remodeling and repairing--building new houses--some residential--well, mostly residential, some commercial building.'

The witness further testified that he had been engaged in such work for approximately thirty years.

In the application of the cost of replacement less depreciation approach, Harvey's testimony was to the effect that the building in question was so old that under no circumstances would similar construction be employed today. Consequently, he based the reproduction cost on a modern building with drastically different specifications from the building condemned. Allowing this testimony was manifest error.

With regard to the capitalization of income approach, Harvey used an annual income figure which was $1,800 in excess of what the landowners were at that time receiving from the property. He obtained this larger figure from the testimony of one of the landowners to the effect that she intended to ask for the additional $1,800 for rental of the property upon the expiration of the current leases. This testimony was unilateral and speculative. Admitting it was clearly erroneous. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Copeland, 258 S.C. 206, 188 S.E.2d 188 (1972); City of Chicago v. Giedraitis, 14 Ill.2d 45, 150 N.E.2d 577 (1958).

There is no presumption that a witness is competent to give an opinion as to the value of real property; his competency must be shown. In making such a showing, however, it is not required of the witness that he be expert or skilled in the strict sense of those terms. It is universally recognized that opinion testimony of a non-expert who has sufficient knowledge of the value of the property in question, or who has had ample opportunity for forming a correct opinion of it, is admissible. If he is one other than the owner of the property in question, it must be demonstrated that he has some source of knowledge of the value of the property in order to remove his opinion from the realm of mere conjecture. A bare declaration that he knows the value is insufficient. Whether a witness is properly qualified is a question primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling will not be reversed in the absence of a showing that he has abused that discretion. It is not necessary that a witness have the status of a professional appraiser or dealer in the class of property in question. One who has bought and sold similar property is competent to give an opinion as to the value of the property, provided, of course, that he is familiar with...