City of St. Joseph v. Blakley
| Decision Date | 02 October 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. KCD,KCD |
| Citation | 486 S.W.2d 511 |
| Parties | CITY OF ST. JOSEPH, Respondent, v. Ronald James BLAKLEY, Appellant. 25769. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Louis Kranitz, Theodore M. Kranitz, St. Joseph, for appellant.
Ronald E. Taylor, John A. Swearingen, St. Joseph, for respondent.
Defendant appeals his conviction for resisting arrest. The conviction is affirmed.
Defendant's brief asserts as a 'point' that the verdict is 'against the evidence and the credible evidence in the case.' This raises nothing for appellate review. Neavill v. Klemp, 427 S.W.2d 446 (Mo.Sup.1968); Schoene v. Hickam, 397 S.W.2d 596 (Mo.Sup.1965).
The defendant's 'point' that the verdict is 'against the law applicable to this case' likewise preserves nothing for review.
The only matter possibly preserved for review is defendant's contention that the information 'fails to state any offense cognizable by the ordinance' and is fatally defective.
The latter point as contained in his brief is in substance as set forth above. In and of itself, it may not be sufficient to satisfy the rule because it does not specifically state in what manner the information is defective. Sup.Ct. Rule 84.04(d), V.A.M.R. Taken with the argument portion of the brief, it may be that the thrust of defendant's contention can be determined, and if so, the point will be considered. State v. Norman, 380 S.W.2d 406 (Mo.Sup.1964), l.c. 408; Duke v. Thomas, 343 S.W.2d 656 (Mo.App.1961), l.c. 657.
The information in relevant part is as follows:
'On information, the undersigned assistant city attorney within and for the City of St. Joseph and the State of Missouri, complains and informs the Court that on or about the 29 day of Aug., 1970 within the corporate limits of the City of St. Joseph, at or near Belt Drive In Super Market parking lot above-named defendant did then and there unlawfully pushed Officer Hibbs and resisted arrest physically and had to be subdued by four officers: Hibbs, Harris, Shellenburger and Murphy in violation of Section 16--135--16 of the Code of Ordinance of 1969 as amended of said city.'
The ordinance referred to in the information is as follows:
'* * * Code of Ordinances of the City of St. Joseph, Missouri, Section 16--135, OBSTRUCTING, RESISTING POLICE OFFICER * * * 'No person shall hinder, obstruct, resist or otherwise interfere with any city officer or member of the police force of the city in the discharge of his official duties or shall attempt to prevent any member of such police force from arresting any person, or shall attempt to rescue from such member of the police force, or from anyone called to his aid, any person in his custody.'
Defendant concedes that the ordinance in question embraces the offense of 'resisting an officer in the discharge of his official duties'. The further concession is made that the test of the validity of the information is that it be a sufficiently clear statement of the offense charged to inform the defendant of the nature of the offense and to constitute a bar to another action. Kansas City v. Martin, 369 S.W.2d 602 (Mo.App.1963), l.c. 606.
Taking the argument position of the brief as the essential statement of the manner in which the information is claimed to be invalid, the defendant asserts that 'six cardinal and indispensable elements are necessary from the information'. To eliminate the redundancy of defendant's listing, they are combined to assert his basic three-pronged attack on the information.
The first of these relates to the question of intent.
Defendant argues that the information contains no allegations that the defendant intended to violate the law, intended to resist arrest, or that Hibbs intended an arrest. The assumption is made with respect to the defendant's intent that a specific intent need be charged. Such a specific intent is not a necessary part of the information when the statute or ordinance defining the crime does not require a specific intent. State v. Connor, 318 Mo. 592, 300 S.W. 685 (1927), l.c. 686; State v. Granger, 199 S.W.2d 896 (Mo.App.1947). Kansas City v. Mathis, 409 S.W.2d 280 (Mo.App.1966) cited by defendant holds that 'intent' must be a part of information where a specific intent is a part of the ordinance defining the offense.
The last portion of defendant's argument with respect to intent is awkwardly phrased but is intended to assert that defendant could not have an 'intent' to resist unless he knew of Hibbs' 'intent' to arrest. It has been noted such specific intent is not a necessary part of the charge and however phrased, it does not vitiate the charge.
The second portion of the attack on the information is that it does not charge that Hibbs was a police officer of the City of St. Joseph or in the discharge of his lawful duties. First, on the issue of 'performance of official duties'. Hibbs is described as an 'officer' making an 'arrest'. The Charter of St. Joseph cited as City of St. Joseph Charter, Section 5.2, and of which judicial notice is taken, makes 'arrest' a part of the official duties of a police officer. The contention then resolves itself into an argument that the omission of the word 'police' qualifying 'officer' makes the information invalid. Looking to the purpose of the information, Kansas City v. Martin, supra, it is abundantly clear that defendant must have known from the charge that he was being accused of resisting arrest by a police officer and that the charge would bar a subsequent charge for an arrest by Hibbs...
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State v. Vineyard
...wholly insufficient as a point for consideration on appeal. State v. Jackson, 477 S.W.2d 47, 53(11) (Mo.1972); City of St. Joseph v. Blakley, 486 S.W.2d 511, 513(1) (Mo.App.1972). Nevertheless, to consider whether the evidence supports a verdict of defendant's guilt, defendant spotlights th......
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