City of St. Joseph v. St. Joseph Riverboat

Decision Date31 August 2004
Docket NumberNo. WD 63276.,WD 63276.
Citation141 S.W.3d 513
PartiesCITY OF ST. JOSEPH, MISSOURI and, Buchanan County, Missouri, Respondents, v. ST. JOSEPH RIVERBOAT PARTNERS, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Circuit Court, Buchanan County, Daniel Fred Kellogg, J Stephen James Briggs, St. Joseph, for Appellant.

Theodore Stephen Leo, Dwight K. Scroggins, Jr., St. Joseph, for Respondent.

RONALD R. HOLLIGER, Judge.

St. Joseph Riverboat Partners ("Partners") appeal the judgment of the trial court upon the declaratory judgment action brought by the City of St. Joseph, Missouri, and Buchanan County, Missouri, ("Lessors"). Partners claim that the trial court erred in finding that the construction of the City's proposed "riverfront trail" on property leased to Partners did not violate an express covenant of quiet enjoyment under the lease, as that issue was not properly before the trial court. We agree, and reverse the judgment below in part, to the extent that the trial court made findings regarding that issue.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The present controversy arose from a declaratory judgment action filed by Lessors to determine whether a lease of real property with Partners included a particular tract of land known as the "Weaver Tract." Because the lease contained a right of first refusal to develop the land under the lease the Lessors also sought a declaration of whether a "riverfront trail" would trigger Partners' right. That trail would traverse two tracts of land, including the "Weaver Tract." The Weaver Tract is a strip of land bordering the Missouri River, located to the north of the "Riverfront Park" which was the location of the former mooring site of the riverboat casino. The second tract of land, the "Wetlands Tract," is an adjoining tract of land bordering the river that lies to the north of the Weaver Tract, lying between that tract and a parking lot situated south of the tract of land where the casino is presently located. This second tract of land is not involved in the present litigation.

Partners leased certain property, including the Weaver Tract, from the City and Buchanan County, for the purpose of developing the land in support of their casino operations. Under the original lease, Partners were under the obligation to develop the Weaver Tract for casino support services. In 1996, Partners decided to move the casino to another parcel of land further to the north. Around that time, the lease agreement was amended to provide for the reversion of certain tracts of land back to the Lessors. The parties subsequently disagreed as to whether the Weaver Tract was excluded from the land that reverted back to the Lessors. The lease did, however, remove the preexisting requirement that Partners make certain infrastructure improvements to the Weaver Tract. Lessors claim that, in the intervening years, Partners have made no effort to utilize or develop that tract of land.

Subsequently, the City decided to construct a riverfront trail, a substantial portion of which would traverse the Weaver Tract. Partners objected to the construction of the trail, arguing that it still held a lease to the property and that it was entitled to a right of first refusal to develop the property under the lease. The City contended that the Weaver Tract was no longer covered by the lease, and, even if the lease still applied to the property, that construction of the trail did not constitute "development" of the land sufficient to trigger Partners' right to first refusal.

Unable to resolve the dispute, City brought the present declaratory judgment action seeking to resolve those two questions. As Buchanan County was also a joint lessor of the property, they were subsequently joined as a plaintiff in the proceedings below.

The matter proceeded to trial on a stipulation of facts. The trial court found that Partners' lease included the Weaver Tract. It concluded, however, that the proposed riverfront trail did not constitute "development" of the land within the meaning of the lease agreement and did not, therefore, trigger the Partners' right of first refusal. It also found that the Lessors had the authority to make improvements to the property, provided that the improvements would not interfere with Partners' use of the property or frustrate the purpose of the property. It also found that the riverfront trail would not disrupt or interfere with Partners' use of the Weaver Tract and that the trail would not breach the express covenant of quiet enjoyment contained within the lease agreement.

Partners now appeal the trial court's judgment. They do not contest the trial court's findings with regard to whether the construction of the trail triggered Partners' right of first refusal to develop. Instead, they challenge only the trial court's determination that the construction of the trail would not violate the express covenant of quiet enjoyment contained within the lease.

DISCUSSION

Our review of a declaratory judgment applies the same standard as that used in any other court-tried case. Levinson v. State, 104 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Mo. banc 2003). We will affirm the judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously applies or declares the law. Id.

Partners raise two points on appeal. In their first point, they contend that the trial court erred by finding that a "riverfront trail" would not violate its covenant of quiet enjoyment, because it did not have jurisdiction to consider that issue because it was not submitted to the court for determination. Second, Partners argue that the trial court erred in its finding that a "riverfront trail" would not violate the covenant of quiet enjoyment because there was no...

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14 cases
  • Smith v. City of St. Louis
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • April 9, 2013
    ...limit and define the issues to be tried in a case and [to] put the adversary on notice thereof.” City of St. Joseph, Mo. v. St. Joseph Riverboat Partners, 141 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo.App.2004). “To the extent that [a] judgment goes beyond the pleadings, it is void.” Residential & Resort Assocs.......
  • Heritage Roofing, LLC v. Fischer
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • May 24, 2005
    ...breach of contract claim and not to any other issue that was already before the trial court. See City of St. Joseph v. St. Joseph Riverboat Partners, 141 S.W.3d 513, 516-17 (Mo.App. W.D.2004). The petition indicated only that the action was a suit on account, and there was no responsive ple......
  • McKenna v. McKenna (In re Estate of McKenna)
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 30, 2016
    ...on the new issue.” Allen Quarries, Inc. v. Auge, 244 S.W.3d 781, 784 (Mo.App.S.D.2008) (citing City of St. Joseph v. St. Joseph Riverboat Partners, 141 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo.App.W.D.2004) ). Accordingly, because Widow did not assert undue influence until after the trial was over, we find that......
  • Smith v. City of St. Louis
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 19, 2012
    ...to limit and define the issues to be tried in a case and put the adversary on notice thereof." City of St. Joseph, Mo., v. St. Joseph Riverboat Partners, 141 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). However, according to the doctrine of implied consent, issues not raised by the pleadings but t......
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