City of St. Joseph v. St. Joseph Terminal Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1916
• Parties: CITY OF ST. JOSEPH v. ST. JOSEPH TERMINAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

186 S.W. 1080

268 Mo. 47

CITY OF ST. JOSEPH v. ST. JOSEPH TERMINAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 2, 1916

Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court. -- Hon. William D. Rusk, Judge.

Reversed and remanded (with directions).

Robert A. Brown and Richard L. Douglas for appellant.

Under the law and the evidence the respondent is estopped to deny the abandonment of that portion of Seventh Street occupied by appellant and is estopped to deny appellant the right to occupy and use said street. The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to municipalities the same in all respects as it applies to individuals when facts and circumstances warrant its application. Knight v. Railroad, 70 Mo 231; Hovelman v. Railroad, 79 Mo. 632; Senter v Lumber Co., 255 Mo. 590; Wilson v. Drainage District, 257 Mo. 266; Railroad v. Marion County, 36 Mo. 294; Edwards v. Kirkwood, 147 Mo.App. 599; Depot Co. v. St. Louis, 76 Mo. 393; Simpson v. Stoddard County, 173 Mo. 421; State v. Dent, 18 Mo. 313; O'Leary v. Met. St. Ry Co., 87 Kan. 22; Leavenworth v. Douglas, 56 Kan. 416; City Ry. Co. v. Railroad, 166 U.S. 558; Sanitary Dist. v. Railroad, 89 N.E. 800; Chicago v. Railroad, 244 Ill. 220; Lumber Co. v. Oshkosh, 89 Wis. 449; Colorado Springs v. Colorado City, 42 Colo. 75; Sioux City v. Railroad, 129 Iowa 694; In re Melon St., 192 Pa. St. 331; Baldwin v. Trimble, 85 Md. 396, 36 L. R. A. 489; Simplot v. Railroad, 16 F. 350; Davies v. Huebner, 45 Iowa 574; Hella v. Scholte, 24 Iowa 298; Lee v. Mound Station, 118 Ill. 304; Railroad v. Joliet, 79 Ill. 26; Gregory v. Knight, 50 Mich. 61; State v. Carr, 191 F. 257; Meltzer v. Chicago, 152 Ill.App. 334.

Charles L. Faust and Merrill E. Otis for respondent.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies generally to a municipality in its private capacity, yet the doctrine that a municipality can be estopped to assert the rights of the people to the public streets and highways of the State which the municipality holds as a trustee for the public has received the attention of the courts in a great number of cases. The decisions differ according to the policy of the different States in regard to the rights of the public to such highways. We think Missouri has vigorously denied this doctrine, and that estoppel cannot be successfully relied upon in this State to retain the possession of a street unlawfully obtained, and that out of nonuser or lapse of time estoppel does not arise. Dunklin County v. Chouteau, 120 Mo. 595; Wright v. Doniphan, 169 Mo. 601; Gaskins v. Williams, 235 Mo. 563; St. Louis v. Railroad, 114 Mo. 23; State ex rel. v. Cape Girardeau, 207 Mo. 85; Tracy v. Bittie, 213 Mo. 302; Clay Products Co. v. St. Louis, 246 Mo. 446; Wolfe v. Sullivan, 133 Ind. 331; Sims v. Frankford, 79 Ind. 446; Tainter v. Morristown, 19 N.J.Eq. 46; Commission v. Morehead, 118 Pa. 344; Webb v. Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116.

GRAVES J. Bond and Walker, JJ., dissent in an opinion by Bond, J.

OPINION

In Banc.

GRAVES, J.

-- The petition herein is in two counts: (1) an action to enjoin the defendant for obstructing a certain described portion of Seventh Street in the city of St. Joseph, and (2) an action in ejectment to recover the possession of that portion of said street. In the trial nisi the plaintiff had judgment upon both counts of the petition, and from such judgment the defendant has appealed. The first count charged the unlawful use and obstruction of said street by the defendant in that:

"The defendant has constructed and now maintains thereon its railroad tracks, turntables, roundhouses and water tanks and has erected and now maintains across said Seventh Street, as herein described, a fence by which all of said portion of said Seventh Street has been wholly appropriated to its own use and benefit, and is now used by said defendant as its railroad yards."

By its prayer said count thus concluded:

"Wherefore, plaintiff prays that the defendant, its agents, servants, and employees, be perpetually restrained and enjoined from entering upon or exercising any right or authority over said portion of said Seventh Street hereinbefore described, or doing any other act in said street tending to obstruct, in any way, the free and common use thereof, as a highway in the city of St. Joseph, and that it be enjoined and restrained from maintaining any obstruction on said street which will in any manner interfere with the use of said street, as it was laid out and established for the use of the public generally, and for its costs in this behalf expended."

The second count, as stated, is one in ejectment. The answer sets up an equitable estoppel, in this language:

"Comes now the defendant in the above entitled cause, and for its amended answer to plaintiff's petition filed therein, admits that it is a corporation and admits that it does occupy the particular strip of land in plaintiff's petition described, in the manner and for the uses and purposes therein stated.

"Further answering the defendant states that said strip of land is not now nor has it ever been used as a public street or highway by the city of St. Joseph or the inhabitants thereof; that it is inaccessible and wholly unfit for street or highway purposes and would not serve any purpose as a street if opened; that it has been occupied by the defendant in the manner and for the purposes stated in plaintiff's petition for more than twenty-five years; that the defendant has erected upon said strip of land valuable and expensive improvements which are now and have been used in connection with its railroad shops and other facilities adjacent thereto for more than twenty-five years; that the defendant has during the entire period it has occupied said strip of land claimed to own the same as its absolute property, openly and adversely to plaintiff and all others; that its occupancy of said strip of land for the purposes stated has been with the knowledge, consent and approval of plaintiff.

"Defendant states that plaintiff stood by and invited it to expend and saw it expend large sums of money in erecting roundhouses, machine shops, terminal facilities and in making other improvements on said strip of ground and the grounds adjacent thereto, and that all of said facilities will be useless and defendant will be damaged in a sum in excess of five hundred thousand dollars if it is denied the use of said strip of ground; that plaintiff knew when said improvements were made that they would be useless unless said strip of ground could be occupied by defendant; that both plaintiff and defendant treated said portion of Seventh Street the same as though it had been vacated when other streets in that immediate vicinity were vacated for the use of the defendant, and it is apparent that it was a mere oversight that said street was not formally vacated.

"Defendant states that if said strip of land was ever dedicated for public use as a street it has been abandoned by plaintiff as such street or highway, and plaintiff is now estopped to claim title to said strip of land as a public street or highway or for other purposes, and is estopped from complaining of or in any wise interfering with defendant's occupancy of said strip of ground."

The evidence introduced shows that South St. Joseph Addition to the city of St. Joseph was platted in 1858. That among the several streets in said addition were Sixth, Seventh and Eight Streets running north and south, said Sixth being to the west of Seventh Street. Running east and west, among other streets, were Duncan, Doniphan, Jackson, Scott, Pacific, Sycamore. In naming these streets we have begun with the one on the north and followed them in order to the south. Next north of Duncan Street is Monteray Street and next south of Sycamore is Hickory Street.

In January, 1887, the city of St. Joseph by ordinance duly vacated certain parts of Duncan, Doniphan, Jackson and Scott Streets and this ordinance reads in conclusion as follows:

"Section 5. The city reserves the right to repeal this ordinance and, without cost to the city, take possession of and reopen said street in case the St. Joseph Terminal Railroad Company shall fail to commence the construction of a roundhouse and machine shops upon said streets and the grounds adjoining the same within six months and complete the same in a condition for operation within two years after the date of the approval of this ordinance, or shall fail to maintain or operate a roundhouse and machine shops on said grounds."

These vacations left a clear field for defendant's terminals, from Monteray Street on the north to Pacific Street on the south. It is clear from the concluding section of this ordinance that the vacations were made for the purpose of having these terminals located in the city.

It would appear that Seventh Street was only platted as far north as Pacific Street. The defendant constructed its terminals between Monteray Street on the north to Hickory Street on the south, and between Sixth and Eighth streets, although not running as far east as Eighth Street. In doing so the roundhouse was made to front on Pacific Street just east of Sixth Street and in front of the northern terminus of Seventh Street. A portion of the turntable in this roundhouse projected into Pacific Street. Tracks cross Seventh Street and Pacific Street in getting into this roundhouse. In Seventh Street, in addition to the tracks, there was constructed an ash pit and water tank, as a part of these terminals.

The cost of the plant was something like $ 600,000 and it has been bonded for $ 500,000, which bonds are secured by mortgage on this property, including these streets, both Pacific and Seventh, as well as the regularly vacated streets. This construction and this expenditure were shortly after...