City of St. Louis v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 58527

Decision Date16 December 1974
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 58527,58527,1
Citation517 S.W.2d 65
Parties16 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 434, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9848 CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Missouri, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Respondents, v. MISSOURI COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Appellants
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Jack L. Koehr, City Counselor, Charles W. Kunderer, Asst. City Counselor, St. Louis, for respondents.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Charles A. Blackmar, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for defendants.

ROBERT R. WELBORN, Special Judge.

Action for declaratory judgment. The City of St. Louis and various of its officials sought a judgment holding Chapter 296, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., dealing with discrimination in employment, unconstitutional as applied to the City of St. Louis. The trial court entered judgment as prayed for by City. The defendants, Missouri Commission on Human Rights and its members and officials, appealed.

On November 20, 1968, Ina Boon, on behalf of the 'St. Louis Branch, NAACP for Negro Firemen of the St. Louis Fire Dept.,' filed a complaint against the St. Louis Fire Department with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, the agency charged with enforcement of the discriminatory employment practices law (§ 296.030, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.), charging discriminatory treatment by reason of race or color: 'Racial imbalance and discrimination in upgrading procedures and hiring practices.'

On September 9, 1971, an amended complaint from the same source was filed against the St. Louis Fire Department and its chief, the St. Louis Civil Service Commission, the Director of Personnel and the Director of the Department of Public Safety of St. Louis. The amended complaint charged discriminatory treatment by reason of race or color: 'Continuing racial imbalance and discrimination in upgrading procedures and in hiring practices and racially discriminatory practices in firehouse living conditions.'

On September 30, 1971, the Commission on Human Rights issued a subpoena to R. Elliott Scearce, Director of Personnel for the City of St. Louis. The subpoena was the result of the NAACP complaint and directed the production before a representative of the commission of examinations used or to be used for fire fighter, fire captain and battalion fire chief, St. Louis Fire Department.

Following service of the subpoena, the respondents named in the complaint filed a motion before the commission to dismiss the complaint and quash the subpoena, charging that Chapter 296 as applied to the City of St. Louis is unconstitutional.

The commission took no action on the motion and on January 11, 1972, the director of conciliation for the commission wrote the city counselor, informing him that the chairman of the commission had investigated the complaint and found probable cause to credit the allegations of the complaint. The letter requested a meeting with city officials to discuss terms of conciliation. The city rejected the offer of conciliation on the grounds that the commission lacked jurisdiction over the respondents and the subject matter of the complaint.

On March 3, 1972, the commission issued a notice of public hearing to be held on the complaint on March 22, 1972.

On March 10, 1972, the city and its officers filed their petition for declaratory judgment in the Cole County Circuit Court. The cause was submitted on the pleadings and the trial court entered judgment as follows:

'IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that application of Chapter 296, RSMo 1969, to related racial grievances of employees in the classified Civil Service of the constitutional charter City of St. Louis is unconstitutional and void by reason of Article VI, Section 22 of the Missouri Constitution, 1945, as an affirmative action of the General Assembly to determine hiring, promotions, wages and working conditions of such employees and interferes with the duties of City officers charged with duties and responsibilities related to such personnel matters.'

This appeal followed.

For purposes of the statutes on discriminatory employment practices, § 296.010(2), RSMo Supp.1973, V.A.M.S., defines an 'employer' as including 'the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof, or any person employing six or more persons within the state, * * *.'

§ 296.020 provides, in part:

'It shall be an unlawful employment practice:

'(1) For an employer, because of the race, creed, color, religion, national origin, sex or ancestry of any individual:

'(a) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, creed, color, religion, national origin, sex, or ancestry; or

'(b) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, creed, color, religion, national origin, sex, or ancestry; * * *.'

By § 296.030, the Missouri Commission on Human Rights is '(1) To seek to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment because of race, * * *; (2) To effectuate the purposes of this chapter first by conference, conciliation and persuasion so that persons may be guaranteed their civil rights and good will be fostered; (3) To formulate policies to effectuate the purposes of this chapter and to make recommendations to agencies and officers of the state or local subdivisions of government in aid of such policies and purposes; * * *.'

Under § 296.040, the commission, acting through one of its members, investigates complaints and if the investigator concludes 'that probable cause exists for crediting the allegations of the complaint, he shall immediately endeavor to eliminate the unlawful employment practice complained of by conference, conciliation, and persuasion, * * *.'

In case such efforts fail, the complaint may be set for hearing before members of the commission. Subparagraph 6 of § 296.040 provides, in part:

'If, upon all the evidence at the hearing the commission shall find that a respondent has engaged in any unlawful employment practice as defined in this chapter, the commission shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful employment practice and to take affirmative action to require reinstatement or upgrading of employees with or without back pay, to require hiring or restoration to membership in any respondent labor organization, as in the judgment of the commission will effectuate the purposes of this chapter, and including a requirement for report of the manner of compliance. * * *'

These statutes establish a state-wide program for avoiding racial discrimination in employment in both the public and private sector. The trial court found that the provisions of Chapter 296 could not be made applicable to the City of St. Louis as a special charter city because of § 22 of Article VI, Constitution of Missouri, V.A.M.S., which provides:

'No law shall be enacted creating or fixing the powers, duties or compensation of any municipal office or employment, for any city framing or adopting its own charter under this or any previous constitution, and all such offices or employments heretofore created shall cease at the end of the terms of any present incumbents.'

According to the transcript of the proceedings of the 1945 Constitutional Convention, § 22 of Article VI was added as a new provision of the constitution, largely the result of a series of cases in this court involving the municipal license collector in the City of Kansas City. Those cases held that state statutes, rather than the city charter provisions, governed the manner of selection and compensation of that official and his employees. Coleman v. Kansas City, 348 Mo. 916, 156 S.W.2d 644 (1941); Coleman v. Kansas City, 351 Mo. 254, 173 S.W.2d 572 (1943); Coleman v. Kansas City, 353 Mo. 150, 182 S.W.2d 74 (banc 1944). See Preisler v. Hayden, 309 S.W.2d 645, 646(1) (Mo.1958).

§ 22 of Article VI was applied in State ex rel. Burke v. Cervantes, 423 S.W.2d 791 (Mo.1968). In that case, the court held that the mayor of the City of St. Louis could not be compelled to appoint a firemen's arbitration board under § 290.360, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S. The court held that § 22 of Article VI precluded the applicability of the statute to St. Louis in view of its status as a special charter city.

Article XVIII of the charter of the City of St. Louis establishes the Civil Service Commission and creates the office of Director of Personnel. The charter provides for the establishment and administration of a system of employment of municipal employees 'on the sole basis of merit and fitness.' Art. XVIII, § 2(a).

Section 16 of Article XVIII provides:

'No recommendation or question under the authority of this article shall...

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