City of St. Louis v. Spiegel

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SHERWOOD
• Citation: City of St. Louis v. Spiegel, 75 Mo. 145 (Mo. 1881)
• Decision Date: 31 October 1881
• Parties: THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. SPIEGEL, Appellant.

75 Mo. 145

THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS

v.SPIEGEL, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1881.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Appeals.

REVERSED.

Jas. C. McGinnis for appellant.

L. Bell for respondent.

SHERWOOD, C. J.

The defendant, convicted in the police court for violating ordinance No. 10,384, known as the meat-shop ordinance, was successful, on appeal to the court of criminal correction, in his motion to dismiss, on the ground that the ordinance was in conflict with that section of the constitution of the State which provides that taxes “shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.” § 3, art. 10, Const. The point upon which this case hinges, is, therefore, this: Is the fee which the ordinance imposes, as a prerequisite to obtaining a license, a tax? If it is, then the ordinance cannot stand against the prohibition of the constitution.

This constitutional provision is a new one, and has never been passed upon by this court. And it is evidently intended to apply to matters other than those embraced in the next succeeding section of the same article, where it is provided that: “All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value.” § 4. This last section, which was obtained from the constitution of 1865, (art. 1, § 30,) plainly applies to a property tax; to cases where there is specific and tangible property, capable of valuation, and, consequently, of being taxed in proportion thereto. Not so, however, with the section under consideration. If that section relates to the uniformity of taxation to be levied directly upon property, then it is obvious that either that section or section 4, supra, is superfluous. We do not regard either section in that light. But while section 3 does not apply to a tax on property, it gives recognition to the same idea of equality and uniformity, by preventing discrimination between objects belonging to the “same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.”

Is, then, the license fee a tax within the meaning of the 3rd section, supra? And does the ordinance which authorizes its collection discriminate in favor of some subjects and against others of the same class? That the license fee is a tax when imposed for the main purpose of revenue, is established by abundant authority. Dillon Munic. Corp., § 768; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Cooley's Const. Lim., pp. 201, 494; North Hudson v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L. 71; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479; Cooley on Taxation, 403, et seq.; and it is competent for the courts to make examination and see if, under a mere power to license, the power of taxation for revenue is exercised. Burlington v. Ins. Co., 31 Iowa 102; Muhlenbrinck v. Commissioners, 42 N. J. L. 364; s. c., 36 Am. Rep. 518. In this case it is apparent at first blush that the license fee is imposed for the purpose of revenue. That such fee is also imposed for the purpose of regulation does not deprive it of the salient characteristics of a tax.

Regarding the license fee as a tax, does the ordinance which authorizes the collection of such fee conform to the constitutional provision contained in section 3, above...