City of St. Louis v. Russell

• Decision Date: 31 October 1845
• Citation: 9 Mo. 507
• Parties: THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. WILLIAM RUSSELL.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

9 Mo. 507

THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS

v.WILLIAM RUSSELL.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1845.

APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS CIRCUIT COURT.

C. D. DRAKE. for Appellant. 1. The legislative power vested by the Constitution in the General Assembly, is absolute over all matters of domestic government, unless restrained by provisions contained in the State or National Constitution. 2. The State Constitution imposes no restriction upon the power of the General Assembly in this respect. 1 Tuck. Com. 162-3-4. 3. The incorporation of cities being a legislative grant of political power, creating a civil institution to be employed in the administration of the government, is a matter in which the Legislature may act according to its own judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its power imposed by the Constitution of the United States. Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 4 Wheaton, 518; Terrell and others v. Taylor and others, 9 Cranch., 52; 1 Tuck. Com. 162-3-4. 4. The acceptance, by the people of St. Louis, of the charter of 1822, by which the town was erected into a city, was not in any sense, a contract between the State and the people of St. Louis; or, if a contract, the power to repeal, alter, amend, or modify it at pleasure, was expressly reserved in the last section of the act. 1 Ter. Laws, 973; 1 Tuck. Com. 164. 5. The limits of the city of St. Louis, as established by the charter of 1822, did not by the popular acceptance of the charter, become permanent and unalterable, but were subject to be changed by the Legislature at pleasure. 6. The consent of inhabitants residing out of the city limits, was not at all necessary to the extension of the limits so as to bring them within the city. The Legislature was fully authorized to make the extension, with or without such consent, and against opposition from any quarter. 7. The act of 1831, supplementary to the charter of 1822, in which provision was made for the extension of the city limits over adjacent territory, when requested by the inhabitants of such territory, and consented to by the people of the city, was merely permissive of the extension, without the necessity of the action of the Legislature, and did not establish a principle or contract that such extension should take place in no other way. 2 Ter. Laws, 244. 8. The extension of the city limits by the act of 1841, was a legitimate exercise of the legislative power, not violative of the State or National Constitution. 9. The land of the complainant brought into the city, by the extension of the limits in 1841, was the subject of taxation by the city, notwithstanding he did not consent, but was opposed to the extension. 10. The 17th section of article 7, of the charter of 1841, restricting the rate of taxation upon property lying outside of the former limits, to one-sixteenth of one per cent., until the city should pave certain streets, presents no bar to the collection of the tax assessed in 1842, upon complainant's property, even though it be true that the streets were not paved, because it does not appear in the bill that the tax exceeded one-sixteenth of one per cent. on the value of complainant's property. 11. The city had power to sell complainant's land for the taxes assessed upon it.

H. S. GEYER, for Appellee. The complainant, now appellee, insists, that the demurrer of the appellant to the bill was properly overruled, on the following grounds: 1st. That although the first act of incorporation, as well as succeeding acts, reserved a power to alter, amend, or repeal, such reservation does not authorize the Legislature to bring within, and subject to the debts and power of the corporation, any persons or property not included by the first act, without the consent of such persons. 2nd. The provisions of the act of 15th January, 1831, and the 3rd section of the act of 8th February, 1839, in relation to the extension of the boundaries, were not subject to repeal or alteration, without the assent of those whose property was to be affected by such change. 3rd. The act of the 15th January, 1831, re-enacted in the act of February, 1839, amounted to a contract by which the faith of the State was pledged, as well to those without as to those within the city, that no lands should be annexed to the city in any manner, other than that prescribed by those acts; which act the Legislature could not constitutionally alter or change. 4th. The city, as it existed prior to 1841, was a distinct person in law, from whose debts the complainant was exempt, and the attempt to subject the person and property of the complainant to such debts, is contrary to the Constitution. 5th. The complainant could not lawfully be made a member of an existing corporation, without his consent, so as to subject his property to the debts and powers of such corporation. 6th. Independent of every other consideration, the corporation of the city of St. Louis has not power to sell, or authorize the sale of real estate for taxes, and for that reason, the demurrer was properly overruled. Ellis v. Marshall, 2 Mass. R. 269. 7th. The Legislature can only exercise such powers, as have been delegated to it, and when it transcends these limits, its acts are utterly void. Taylor v. Porter & Ford, 4 Hill, 140. 8th. Statutes which violate the plain and obvious principles of common right and common reason, are null and void. Ham v. Claws, 1 Bay, 98. 9th. A statute incorporating certain persons for purposes of private advantage or emolument, does not bind any person named therein, unless he consent thereto. Ellis v. Marshall, 2 Mass. R. 269; 4 Peters, 167. 10 th. A corporation has no power, except what is given by its incorporating act, either expressly, or as incidental to its existence. Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, 127; 4 Wheaton, 636; 4 Peters, 152; Goszler v. Corporation of Georgetown, 6 Wheaton, 597. 11th. A power to purchase, survey and locate land, to make partition thereof, and levy taxes thereon, to defray the expenses thereof, and all other necessary expenses, did not authorize the corporation to tax the land, for the purpose of paying State taxes thereon. Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Peters, 152. 12th. A corporation cannot exercise the power of creating forfeitures, unless it be expressly granted. Collier v. Doty, 6 Ham. 395. 13th. When a tax has been legally assessed, by a corporation clothed with competent powers, the proportion which each individual is bound to pay, becomes a debt which may be recovered at the suit of the corporation. But unless it is expressly authorized by the charter, summary proceedings by distress, warrant and sale, though directed by a by-law, is no justification, in an action brought against the officer executing the process, by the person whose goods are seized. Berger v. Clarkson, 1 Halstead, 352.

NAPTON, J.

Russell filed his bill in the Circuit Court of St. Louis county, praying an injunction to restrain the city from selling his land for city taxes. The fact upon which he based his right to enjoin, are stated to be these: Russell purchased a tract of land lying adjoining the city of St. Louis about the year 1828, of which he then took possession, and has occupied and cultivated as a farm ever since. In 1822, the charter of St. Louis defined the boundaries of the city, and those boundaries continued unchanged until 1839, when another charter was obtained from the Legislature, by which the southern...