City of St. Louis v. Green
Decision Date | 26 November 1879 |
Citation | 7 Mo.App. 468 |
Parties | CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Respondent, v. ORANGE F. GREEN ET AL., Appellants. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
1. The constitutional provision that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, is not violated where the general title is not used as a cloak for legislating upon different matters, or where incongruous matters are not joined.
2. The constitutional provisions as to the equality and uniformity of taxation apply to property, and not to taxes on privileges or occupations.
3. It is competent for the Legislature, unless expressly prohibited by the Constitution, to authorize a municipal corporation to require a license from private vehicles using its streets.
4. Where a city charter gives the power to tax and license private vehicles, it gives the power to tax the citizens for their use upon the public streets.
5. That the property used in any particular calling is taxed as property ad valorem does not interfere with the right to impose a license tax on the pursuit.
6. With the question of the reasonableness of a city ordinance, passed in strict pursuance of an express grant of authority, the courts have nothing to do.
7. General words in a city charter are not sufficient to confer upon the city the power to enforce by fine and imprisonment the collection of a tax levied, not as a police regulation, but as a means of revenue.
APPEAL from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction.
Reversed, and defendants discharged.
C. C. SIMMONS and R. S. MacDONALD, for appellants.
LEVERETT BELL and SAMUEL ERSKINE, for respondent.
Defendants were charged, in the First District Police Court of the city of St. Louis, with violation of sect. 1 of City Ordinance No. 10494 of that city, approved January 7, 1878, in this: that, being owners and drivers of a certain two-horse wagon, they did, on a day named, drive and cause to be driven said vehicle from place to place on Pine Street and on Twentieth Street, public streets of said city, and did then and there use, and cause to be used, said streets for the purpose of trade and traffic, and for private purposes, without having first paid for and obtained a license so to do from the collector of the city of St. Louis, as required by the provisions of said ordinance.
On conviction, defendants appealed to the Court of Criminal Correction, and there moved to dismiss the proceeding on the following grounds:--
1. The statement does not allege that the defendants drove the wagon or vehicle mentioned in the statement, or caused the same to be driven, or that they used the streets of the said city of St. Louis, or caused the same to be used, as is charged in the complaint, for any other purposes than their own private business and convenience.
2. The statement does not contain or allege any sufficient facts to constitute a cause for this action or prosecution, and is in all respects substantially insufficient and defective.
3. The ordinance referred to and mentioned in the statement is not authorized by any provision of the Constitution or laws of this State, but is in derogation of both, and is therefore inoperative and void.
The motion was overruled, and the defendants duly excepted.
The trial proceeded, and on behalf of the plaintiff it was proved that the defendants, at the time mentioned in the complaint, were copartners, doing business in the city of St. Louis as manufacturers of cider and vinegar, and were the owners of the wagon in question, and that they drove and caused said wagon to be driven upon the streets of the city, without taking out a license therefor under ordinance 10494, and that said license had been demanded and required of them without avail.
Ordinance 10494 was read in evidence, against the defendant's objection that it was unconstitutional and void. The plaintiff read in evidence the first, fifth, tenth, and fourteenth paragraphs of sect. 26 of art. 3, and sects. 1 and 4 of art. 5 of the city charter, as follows:--
Art. 3, sect. 26. “The mayor and Assembly shall have power within the city, by ordinance not inconsistent with the Constitution, or any law of this State, or this charter,--
* * *
* * *
“Art. 5, sect. 1. For the support of the government of the city, the improvement thereof, and the payment of the public debt, the Municipal Assembly shall, by ordinance, annually levy and collect taxes on all subjects and objects of taxation, and all property within the city made taxable by law for State purposes; and shall establish the rates thereof, as follows:” * * *
“ .
At the close of plaintiff's case, the defendants asked the court to declare that, upon the evidence, they were not guilty; which instruction was refused by the court, and defendants duly excepted.
On the part of the defendants, testimony was given to show that the defendants offered to include the wagon in question in the return of the property of the firm for general taxation, and that it was stricken out by the assessor; also, that said wagon was used by the firm on the streets of the city for the delivery of cider, etc., to their customers, and was never used to do hauling for hire or compensation. Defendants offered to prove that during the time covered by the prosecution the firm was doing business in the city of St. Louis under a manufacturer's State license and a manufacturer's city license and a merchant's license; and upon plaintiff's objection the evidence was excluded, and defendants excepted. It also appeared that the value of the wagon was stricken out from the return made for the manufacturer's city license.
The case was submitted to the court, a jury having been waived, and the judgment of the Police Court was affirmed, and the defendants were ordered to pay to the city of St. Louis a fine of $10 and costs. A motion for a new trial was overruled; and defendants then moved in arrest, on the ground that the statement filed by the city attorney is insufficient, and because the ordinance in question is illegal and inoperative so far as it attempts to impose a tax or require a license for the vehicle in question. This motion being overruled, defendants appeal.
1. It is contended that the ordinance under which defendants were convicted violates the constitutional provision that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. Const., art. 4, sect. 28; City Charter, art. 3, sect. 13.
The title expresses the subject-matter of the ordinance to be the licensing of vehicles and the fixing the rates of the same. It provides for the impoion of the license, the regulation of vehicles driven in the ight, the fixing rates of charges for the use of vehicles, and the licensing of drivers. But we do not perceive that any incongruous matters are here joined. The general title is not used as a cloak for legislating in one bill upon matters which cannot be considered, by fair intendment, to have a proper connection. The constitutional provision is intended to prevent fraud, but is not intended to embarrass fair and honest legislation. St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578. We see nothing in this objection.
2. It is insisted that the ordinance violates the constitutional provisions that all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value, and that taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws. Const. Mo., art. 9, sects. 3, 4.
The General Assembly, in the charter of the city of St. Louis, has expressly given it the power to license, tax, and regulate a variety of trades, occupations and articles of commerce and property, among which are private carriages.
The constitutional provision that taxation upon property shall be in proportion to its value, has, in some form or other,...
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