City of St. Louis v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company
| Decision Date | 27 July 1917 |
| Citation | 197 S.W. 107,272 Mo. 80 |
| Parties | CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al.; NATIONAL LEAD COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. George H. Shields Judge.
Affirmed.
Boyle & Priest and T. E. Francis for appellant.
(1) Where property is taken for public use its value should be paid; when not taken, but only injured, its depreciation in value only should be allowed. Railroad v. McGrew, 104 Mo. 300; Railroad v. George, 145 Mo. 46; Doyle v. Railroad, 113 Mo. 288. (2) The value of buildings or other improvements located on land taken for public use should be included in the award of damages. City v. Morse, 105 Mo. 518. (3) Where two tracts of land, divided by a public street, are used for a single purpose, and one or part of one of such tracts is condemned and taken for public use, and the other tract is damaged or its market value is depreciated by such taking, damages should be awarded the owner therefor. 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 1166; Bridge Co. v. Schaubacher, 57 Mo. 582; Railroad v. McGrew, 104 Mo. 282; Elevator Co. v Railroad, 135 Mo. 353; Railroad v. Nercross, 137 Mo. 415; City v. Brown, 155 Mo. 545; Railroad v. Brick Co., 198 Mo. 698; Drainage District v. Dawson, 243 Ill. 175; Railroad v Drummond, 205 Mo. 167; Lough v. Railroad, 116 Iowa 31; Shirley v. Railroad, 121 Ky. 87. (4) In such a case, if the part taken is of greater value in connection with the whole than as a separate parcel, the measure of damages for the part taken is the fair cash value of the part taken considered as a part of the whole. Railroad v. Humiston, 208 Ill. 100. (5) Where property taken for public use has been improved for carrying on a special business, and such business enhances the value of the site, this should be considered in awarding damages to the owner. 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 1161; Railroad v. Jacobs, 110 Ill. 414; Belting Co. v. Boston, 183 Mass. 254; Railroad v. Chicago, 172 Ill. 198; Railroad v. Chicago, 100 Ill. 21; King v. Railroad, 20 N.W. 135; Telegraph Co. v. Railroad, 202 Mo. 688; Railroad v. Brick Co., 198 Mo. 711. (6) While the owner of land taken for public use is required to minimize the damages by using his property in the most advantageous way, he is not required to invest large sums in the acquisition of other property to take the place of that condemned, in order to minimize the damages. Railroad v. Brick Co., 198 Mo. 714; Bridge Co. v. Schaubacher, 57 Mo. 582; Railroad v. McGrew, 104 Mo. 299.
Chas. H. Daues and H. A. Hamilton for respondent.
(1) The finding of the court stands as a special verdict and will not be disturbed where there is substantial evidence to support the same. Leavitt v. Taylor, 163 Mo. 170; Walther v. Null, 233 Mo. 110. (2) On a mere question of value depending on conflicting evidence, this court will not interfere with the findings of the commissioners and the circuit court. St. Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 567; St. Louis v. Abeln, 170 Mo. 324. (3) Where two tracts of land, divided by a public street, are used for a single purpose, and a part of one of the tracts is taken for public purposes, the owner is entitled to damages for the depreciation in the value of the other tract, but he must minimize the damages by adjusting himself to the changed condition. The possibility of obtaining other land in the neighborhood for the same purpose must be considered in estimating appellant's damage. Bridge Co. v. Schaubacher, 57 Mo. 582; Railroad v. McGrew, 104 Mo. 282; Elevator Co. v. Railroad, 135 Mo. 353; St. Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 545; Railroad v. Brick Co., 198 Mo. 698; Railway Co. v. Switzer, 117 Ill. 399; Railway Co. v. Brugger, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 367; Sutherland on Damages (3 Ed.), sec. 1067, p. 3122; Sedgwick on Damages (8 Ed.), sec. 1172, p. 437.
This action was commenced by the city of St. Louis for the purpose of condemning the property of appellant, the National Lead Company, and others, as a right-of-way for the western approach to a bridge across the Mississippi River, called locally the Municipal or Free Bridge. The commissioners appointed by the court awarded to appellant for the land taken and for consequential damages the sum of $ 67,100. Exceptions were promptly filed by appellant and upon a trial by the court sitting as a jury, the court found for appellant exactly the amount of damages which had been given to it by the commissioners. Thereupon appellant took and perfected this appeal.
The appellant is engaged in the city of St. Louis in the manufacture of white lead, and for the purpose of carrying on this business it has constructed an extensive plant at First and Lombard Streets. The factory of appellant is located upon two separate parcels of land, called in the record the "north tract" and the "south tract," which are separated from each other by said Lombard Street. Appellant had improved both parcels of land for the purpose of carrying on its business of manufacturing white lead, by erecting thereon factory buildings, warehouses and other structures, and by installing in such buildings the necessary accessories, machinery and appliances for its trade.
The evidence discloses that in the manufacture of white lead it is necessary to devote a large amount of space to a process called in the nomenclature of the trade, "corroding" the lead. That part of appellant's plant situated south of Lombard Street (and called hereinafter for convenience the "south corroding yard") was used by appellant in the corroding process and upon it, as the proof shows, some 48 per cent of the lead processed in the factory was corroded. There was also a yard north of Lombard Street, and hereinafter referred to as the "north corroding yard," which was likewise devoted to similar purposes, and on which the remainder of the lead made by appellant was corroded. The south corroding yard, of which the city appropriated 17,800 square feet, contained in all 22,872 square feet; thus leaving, after the condemnation, only a wedge-shaped parcel containing 5072 square feet. The taking of the portion mentioned from the south corroding yard rendered the latter wholly useless for lead corroding purposes, and it is therefore strenuously contended that since, by the taking of the south yard 48 per cent of appellant's corroding area was destroyed, this fact so depreciated the value of appellant's factory as a lead factory as practically to destroy it. This, for the reason that upon the remaining corroding area it is impossible to operate the plant to its full capacity, and since it cannot be operated to its full capacity, the overhead expense renders it financially impossible to operate it at all. Upon this view appellant made below, and now makes here, two claims for damages: (a) That it is entitled to the actual damages sustained by reason of the physical taking of its south corroding yard, that is, of the tract located south of Lombard Street, and (b) that it is entitled to consequential damages by reason of its entire plant being depreciated in value as a result of the city's taking part of the south corroding yard, without which the plant cannot be operated successfully, or profitably.
Many witnesses were called both by the city and by appellant. The testimony of these witnesses, as to the value of the south corroding yard which was actually and physically taken, varied greatly; the values fixed by some of the witnesses thereon being two or three times greater than the value fixed by other witnesses in the case. Likewise the depreciation which appellant urges will accrue to its plant by the physical taking of 48 per cent of its corroding yard area was fixed at amounts which varied greatly. Some of the witnesses fixed this latter depreciation alone at two hundred and fifty thousand dollars; others said no depreciation would result, and others testified that depreciation in varying amounts would result, thus fixing the amount thereof from nothing to a quarter of a million dollars.
Against the second contention of appellant set out above, the city, while not seriously disputing that appellant's plant could not be operated profitably or successfully without the south corroding yard, urges nevertheless that the value of the plant was not depreciated because other parcels of land could have been procured by appellant to take the place of the south corroding yard condemned by the city, upon which the necessary corroding process could be carried on by appellant as conveniently and economically as theretofore on the yard condemned.
At the request of appellant the trial court made, pursuant to the statute in such behalf, separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Among these findings of fact the court specifically considered the point in this case which is most strenuously urged upon our attention by appellant. Its findings upon this point and its conclusions of fact upon the controlling questions in the case are thus set out:
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