City of St. Paul v. St. Paul & Sioux City R. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1877
• Citation: 23 Minn. 469
• Parties: CITY OF ST. PAUL <I>vs.</I> ST. PAUL & SIOUX CITY RAILROAD COMPANY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

23 Minn. 469

CITY OF ST. PAUL vs. ST. PAUL & SIOUX CITY RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 30, 1877.

Certain lots of the defendant, in the city of St. Paul, were assessed by the proper municipal officers for benefits conferred on them by the grading of Second street from Wabasha to Jackson street, in that city, and, on non-payment by defendant, the city treasurer applied to the district court for Ramsey county for judgment against such lots for the amount of the assessment. The defendant duly appeared and filed objections to the entry of judgment,

on the ground, among others, that, by the charter of the company, such lots were exempt from all taxation and assessments. It was thereupon stipulated between the city and the defendant that the latter is a corporation, duly created, organized, and existing under the act of March 2, 1855, entitled "An act to incorporate the Root River Valley & Southern Minnesota Railroad Company," (Laws 1855, c. 24,) and other acts mentioned in the following opinion; that defendant, for transportation of freight and passengers, has constructed, equipped, and put in operation, and now owns and operates, and for more than seven years last past has owned and operated, in this state, a continuous line of railroad more than sixty miles in length, etc.; that the lots assessed were long prior to and at the time of the assessment, and now are, owned by the defendant, and used and occupied by it in the actual operation of its road, and its tracks are laid and operated upon and across the same; that such lots form no part of its land grant, and that it has fully complied with the acts mentioned in the opinion, and has at all times paid into the treasury of the state all the percentage of its gross earnings required by such acts.

Upon this stipulation the defendant's objection was sustained by Simons, J., and judgment of dismissal was entered, to review which the plaintiff sued out this writ of certiorari.

H. J. Horn and W. P. Murray, for plaintiff.

Palmer & Bell, for defendant

CORNELL, J.

In expounding any statute, the sole purpose is to ascertain its true meaning and the intention of the law-maker, so that the objects sought to be accomplished by it may be carried into effect, and not defeated. Hence, in the application of any general rule or canon of interpretation to a particular statute, regard should be had to the reason of the rule, considered in connection with the particular circumstances of that case. It is claimed by the plaintiff that the provision contained in section 9, of the act of May 22, 1857, (Laws 1857, ex. sess., c. 1, subc. 3, § 9, p. 20,) exempting the land grant of the defendant corporation from all taxation, and requiring the annual payment of 3 per cent. of the gross earnings of its road, "in lieu of all taxes whatsoever" upon the property of said company, must be strictly construed as having reference solely to general or ordinary taxes, and not to special or local assessments, because of the general rule giving to the words "taxation" and "all taxes" that limited meaning.

When used in statutes granting immunity from taxation, such, undoubtedly, is the general rule to be observed in construing statutes strictly of that character, as is the case with statutes exempting burial-grounds, cemeteries, churches, public school-buildings, and the like, absolutely from all taxation. The reason of this rule grows out of the general policy of the law, by which all kinds of property are required to contribute proportionally to the support of government, whereby taxation becomes the rule, and exemption the exception. Whenever, therefore, an absolute exemption is claimed under a statute in favor of any one in respect to any kind of property, it is but reasonable to limit its scope and operation to the express words of the statute, or within some necessary implication from its terms. When, however, the statute relieves, as in this case, the corporate grantee of the exemption from no portion of its just and equal share of taxation in respect to any of its property, but merely provides a mode of commutation therefor, based upon a percentage of earnings or income agreed upon as a just equivalent, equally advantageous and beneficial to the state, this rigid rule of construction, applied to such a condition of things, must be so far modified as to harmonize with other well-settled rules of construction observed in determining the meaning of a contract of this character.

It is part of the legislative history of the state that its policy in regard to the taxation of this and the other land-grant railroads, so called, was adopted with reference alike to facilitating the early construction of these lines of road, and to securing to the state, and every portion thereof, so far as possible,...