City of St. Paul v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 21 May 1915 |
| Docket Number | 19,204 - (133) |
| Citation | 152 N.W. 777,129 Minn. 383 |
| Parties | CITY OF ST. PAUL v. HARRY E. ROBINSON |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Defendant was prosecuted in the municipal court of St. Paul for violating Ordinance No. 3,218 with intent to defraud the St. Paul City Railway Company. Defendant was tried before Finehout, J., pleaded not guilty, and was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $5, or in default thereof to be imprisoned in the workhouse not to exceed five days. From the judgment of conviction, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Trial by jury.
1. Neither the Constitution nor the statutes of this state give the right of trial by jury to persons charged with petty offenses under the ordinances of a city.
Publication of city ordinance.
2. The publication of an ordinance of the city of St. Paul under the 1900 Home Rule Charter might lawfully be made on Memorial day.
Authority to regulate street car transfers.
3. The common council of the city of St. Paul under that charter had the right to pass an ordinance restricting the use of street car transfers to the persons to whom they were issued. The city council possessed only such legislative power as is granted to it by the Constitution or statutes in express terms and such as is necessary to the full enjoyment of powers expressly granted. The power was given to grant franchises for the operation of street railways and to regulate and control the exercise of such franchises. This conferred, by implication, the power to require issuance of transfers by the railway company and to regulate the manner of their issuance by the company, and the manner of their use by the public.
Evidence of violation of ordinance.
4. The evidence is sufficient to establish all the elements necessary to constitute an offense under the ordinance.
Russell L. Moore, for appellant.
O. H O'Neil and Thomas W. McMeekin, for respondent.
Defendant was convicted in the municipal court of the city of St. Paul upon a charge of violation of an ordinance of the city which provides that no person, for the purpose of defrauding the street railway company, shall use for passage or transportation upon any street car within the city of St. Paul, any transfer ticket, issued by the street railway company, which has not been issued directly to such person. Ordinance No. 3,218.
1. Defendant assigns as error the refusal of the court to grant him a jury trial. It is not claimed that he had any constitutional right to a jury trial, nor could he so claim under repeated decisions of this court that the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury does not extend to trials for petty offenses under the ordinances of a city. City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N.W. 305; State v. Harris, 50 Minn. 128, 52 N.W. 387, 531; State v. Grimes, 83 Minn. 460, 86 N.W. 449; City of Madison v. Martin, 109 Minn. 292, 123 N.W. 809. It is not claimed that the statutes of the state give the right of trial by jury in this class of offenses in all courts of the state. The contention of defendant is that the statutes of the state give to all alleged offenders tried in this particular municipal court the right to a jury trial, even though the offense charged is the violation of a city ordinance. This contention cannot be sustained. Section 7 of the Municipal Court Act (chapter 351, p. 996, Sp. Laws 1889), provides in terms that the judges of that court shall hear and dispose of such offenses "in a summary manner." This clearly means without a jury. City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N.W. 305; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray (Mass.) 329; State v. Williams, 40 S.C. 373, 19 S.E. 5.
Defendant's contention is based on the provision of section 40 [p. 1002] of the Municipal Court Act, which reads as follows:
"Trial by jury in said court shall in all respects be conducted as in the district court of this state, and all laws of a general nature applicable to jury trials in said district court shall apply to said municipal court" and the further provision in section 41, p. 1002, which reads: "Each party to a civil or criminal action shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges and no more."
These provisions undoubtedly recognize that the right of trial by jury exists in some civil actions and criminal proceedings in that court. In construing these provisions it must be borne in mind that there exists under the Constitution (article 1, § 4), unquestioned right of trial by jury in certain cases which are cognizable by the municipal court. The right of trial by jury exists in civil actions at law regardless of the amount involved. Whallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 70 (109); State v. Minnesota Thresher Mnfg. Co. 40 Minn. 213, 41 N.W. 1020, 3 L.R.A. 510. It exists also in criminal prosecutions for offenses which are essentially criminal under the general laws of the state and such as have by the regular course of law and the established modes of procedure as theretofore practiced been the subjects of jury trial. State v. Everett, 14 Minn. 330 (439); City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N.W. 305; State v. West, 42 Minn. 147, 43 N.W. 845. Some of these civil actions and criminal proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the municipal court of St. Paul (section 1 [p. 994] Municipal Court Act), and in such actions and proceedings the right of trial by jury exists in that court. Construing the above sections of the Municipal Court Act in the light of these facts we are of the opinion that they were intended merely to regulate the manner of exercise of the right of trial by jury in the cases where it already existed, and not to extend the right to any new cases. In no other manner can these sections be construed in harmony with section 7 [p. 996] of the act providing for "summary" trial of offenses arising under the ordinances of the city.
2. The next contention is that the ordinance under which defendant is being prosecuted is void because published on Memorial day. Under section 47 [c. 4, § 8] of the St. Paul Home Rule Charter of 1900, which was then in force, every ordinance was required to be published in the official paper before the same should be in force. Memorial day is made by statute one of the prescribed legal holidays, and it is provided that "no public business shall be transacted on those days, except in cases of necessity, nor shall any civil process be served thereon." G.S. 1913, § 9412 subd. 6. Two things are forbidden, service of process and transaction of public business. The publication of this ordinance clearly did not constitute service of process. Did it constitute transaction of public business? Two early decisions of this court bear on this question, Sewall v. City of St. Paul, 20 Minn. 459 (511), and Malmgren v. Phinney, 50 Minn. 457, 52 N.W. 915, 78 L.R.A. 753. In the former it was held that a notice of confirmation of a city assessment for local improvement made on Sunday was void. The statute at that time forbade the doing on Sunday of "any manner of labor, business or work, except only works of necessity and charity." G.S. 1866, c. 100, § 19. The court said that "Sunday is not a business day," and that therefore such a publication on that day was invalid. Even as to that proposition there is respectable authority to the contrary. Savings & L. Society v. Thompson, 32 Cal. 347; City of Denver v. Dumars, 33 Colo. 94, 80 P. 114; Hastings v. Columbus, 42 Oh. St. 585; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. 107 Tenn. 647, 666, 64 S.W. 1075, 61 L.R.A. 888. In the Malmgren case it was held that a publication of a summons on Memorial day was valid. A distinction was drawn between Sunday and holiday publications. It was held that the publication on Memorial day was not a violation of the provision which prohibits the service of legal process on a legal holiday; that...
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