City of Stamford v. Ten Rugby St., LLC.

• Decision Date: 22 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 36803.,36803.
• Citation: 137 A.3d 781,164 Conn.App. 49
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: CITY OF STAMFORD et al. v. TEN RUGBY STREET, LLC.

164 Conn.App. 49

137 A.3d 781

CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

v.TEN RUGBY STREET, LLC.

No. 36803.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 19, 2015.

Decided March 22, 2016.

Thomas M. Cassone, Stamford, for the appellant (defendant).

James V. Minor, special corporation counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Kathryn Emmett, director of legal affairs, Stamford, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

KELLER, MULLINS and SCHALLER, Js.

SCHALLER

, J.

The defendant, Ten Rugby Street, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court ordering the defendant to cease operation of a rock crushing enterprise or of a preparation recycling operation at 10 Rugby Street, Stamford (property), and issuing a permanent injunction preventing the defendant from operating any crushers on the property without a special exception. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) failed to interpret or apply the Stamford zoning regulations (regulations) correctly, and (2) violated the defendant's due process rights by exceeding the scope of the cease and desist order in issuing an injunction that went beyond the relief requested by the plaintiffs, the city of Stamford and James J. Lunney III, zoning enforcement officer for the city of Stamford. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the court, and procedural history are relevant to our discussion. On June 21, 2010, Lunney issued a cease and desist order to the defendant.¹ The order required in part that the defendant “was to cease a rock crushing operation, a recycling preparation operation and a material transfer site.”²

On September 20, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a verified complaint, alleging that the defendant had failed to comply with the cease and desist order. The court held a hearing over three days during which it heard testimony from Lunney, Antonio Vitti, Sr., owner of the defendant, and several residents of neighboring properties. The court also admitted numerous exhibits, including photographs and videos of the activities conducted on the property. The court issued a memorandum of decision on April 30, 2014. It summarized the facts, in relevant part, as follows:

“Mr. Vitti, Sr., has been in business in the city of Stamford since 1967 [hereinafter Vitti and his associated companies, including the defendant, Ten Rugby Street, LLC, are] collectively called [Vitti].³ [Vitti] rented vehicles, sold fill, trap rock, and accepted and stored and separated excavation materials from others. He also sold the separated and reclaimed materials. He was a licensed excavator. In 1976, [Vitti] purchased M–G [general industrial zone] property at 35 Harbor Street, and continued his same operation there until 1979, when he expanded into the abutting 10 Rugby Street lot pursuant to a lease with Gotham Technology.... In 1998 [Vitti] purchased 10 Rugby Street and continued the same operations, and leased back a part of the building portion of the premises to Gotham....

“Throughout, [Vitti] excavated [his] own materials and stored and separated them on-site, as well as accepting the materials of others; and with both activities separated, stored and sold them. The primary materials excavated, accepted, separated and stored by the defendant have been road building and construction site materials such as blacktop, concrete, bricks, gravel, dirt, sand and fill.”

The plaintiffs asserted at trial that the defendant's activities included crushing both rock and non-rock materials in violation of the regulations, and operation of a recycling preparation operation, which required a special permit. The defendant maintained that it was not in violation of the zoning regulations.

The court granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. The court concluded that the defendant's actions were barred on several grounds. It found that (1) any “crushing” is barred in the zoning district in question, an M–G zone; (2) the “primary business” of the defendant is “recycling large amounts of other contractors' excavation, construction and demolition material by crushing and shredding this material into a marketable product such as gravel or clean fill” (emphasis in original); (3) the defendant conducted a “recycling preparation operation” as defined by § 82.1 of the regulations, without the required special exception; (4) the defendant's use was not a valid nonconforming use; and (5) a contractor's material and equipment storage yard is for storage of material, rather than for processing it. It determined that it would not issue a fine, as the defendant had not wilfully violated the regulations, but it granted a permanent injunction “requiring the defendant, Ten Rugby Street, LLC, to comply with zoning regulations at the Ten Rugby Street property; to cease the operation of any crusher on Ten Rugby Street; to comply with the cease and desist order dated [June 21, 2010], to wit: that the said defendant cease to illegally utilize, or to permit to be so utilized, the premises located at 10 Rugby Street to operate a rock crushing enterprise or to conduct a preparation recycling operation without a special exception; and a permanent injunction from continuing violations of zoning regulations.” We will set forth further facts as necessary.

Following the trial court's decision, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant filed a motion for articulation, which the trial court denied.⁴ This court granted review of the trial court's order denying the motion, and subsequently denied the requested relief.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) failed to interpret or apply the regulations correctly, and (2) violated the defendant's due process rights by exceeding the scope of the cease and desist order in issuing the injunction.⁵ In considering the first issue, we consider whether the defendant's primary business, as found by the trial court, is permitted on a “contractor's material and equipment storage yard and building,” or any other use category permitted as of right in Stamford. We next consider whether the defendant's primary business is specifically prohibited by the zoning regulations because it constitutes operation of a recycling preparation operation without a special exception. Finally, we consider whether the defendant's primary business is permitted as a prior existing use. We then turn to the defendant's claim that the trial court violated the defendant's due process rights by exceeding the cease and desist order and complaint.

IINTERPRETATION OF ZONING REGULATIONS

The defendant claims that the court misinterpreted the regulations. We disagree. At the outset, we identify the applicable standard of review. As the interpretation of regulations poses a question of law, our review is plenary. See Driska v. Pierce, 110 Conn.App. 727, 732, 955 A.2d 1235 (2008)

. Where the trial court has made findings of fact, however, “our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnnycake Mountain Associates v. Ochs, 104 Conn.App. 194, 200, 932 A.2d 472 (2007), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 906, 944 A.2d 978 (2008).

We next set forth the relevant legal standards. “[Z]oning regulations are local legislative enactments ... and, therefore, their interpretation is governed by the same principles that apply to the construction of statutes.... Moreover, regulations must be interpreted in accordance with the principle that a reasonable and rational result was intended....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 98 Conn.App. 742, 745, 911 A.2d 1129 (2006)

. “Our Supreme Court has instructed that courts should avoid interpretations that could result in absurd [and] unworkable ... results.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trumbull Falls, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 97 Conn.App. 17, 24, 902 A.2d 706 cert. denied, 280 Conn. 923, 908 A.2d 545 (2006).

The parties agree that the regulations are permissive in character. Where “[t]he regulations are permissive in character ... [t]he uses which are permitted in each type of zone are spelled out. Any use that is not permitted is automatically excluded.” Gordon v. Zoning Board, 145 Conn. 597, 604, 145 A.2d 746 (1958)

. The regulations classify uses of property as permitted uses or uses subject to approval by the Zoning Board of Appeals, also known as special exceptions. Stamford Zoning Regs., art. III, § 5. At trial, Lunney also described permitted uses as uses “as of right,” and explained that while property owners “should” get a use permit when they change the use of their property from one permitted use to another, there was generally no reason not to issue a use permit if they met other zoning requirements. According to the regulations, special exceptions, on the other hand, “shall be granted by the reviewing board only upon a finding that the proposed use or structure or the proposed extension or alteration of an existing use or structure is in accord with the public convenience and welfare after taking into account [a variety of considerations, including location, nature of the use, traffic patterns, the nature of the surrounding area, and the Master Plan of the City of Stamford].” Stamford Zoning Regs., art. V, § 19, 3.2.

APermitted Uses

The defendant argues that the court was incorrect in finding that crushing of non-rock materials such as concrete, blacktop, and cement (crushing non-rock materials), one aspect of its primary business as found by the trial court, is not within any of the permissible use categories for the zone in which the property is located. The trial court found that the property is situated in an M–G (general industrial) district, although it abuts on residential property.⁶ Our primary inquiry, therefore, is whether any use listed for the general industrial district would permit crushing non-rock materials. As we explain below, we make this determination by considering the definition of “contractor's...