Trumbull Falls v. Planning and Zoning Com'n

• Decision Date: 08 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 26715.,26715.
• Citation: 97 Conn.App. 17,902 A.2d 706
• Parties: TRUMBULL FALLS, LLC, et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF TRUMBULL.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

902 A.2d 706

97 Conn.App. 17

TRUMBULL FALLS, LLC, et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF TRUMBULL.

No. 26715.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 1, 2006.

Decided August 8, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kevin J. Gumpper, Fairfield, for the appellant (defendant).

Thomas J. Welch, with whom, on the brief, was John H. Welch, Jr., Shelton, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

SCHALLER, ROGERS and FOTI, Js.

SCHALLER, J.

The defendant, the planning and zoning commission of the town of Trumbull, appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiffs, Trumbull Falls, LLC, Old Mine Associates, LLC, and Richard Aiello, trustee, permitting the construction of a planned residential development.¹ On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly interpreted the town's zoning regulations. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the court, and procedural history are relevant to our discussion. On February 10, 2004, Trumbull Falls, LLC,² filed an application for a special permit to construct a planned residential development (development) on 18.648 acres of land located at 80-100 Monroe Turnpike in Trumbull.³ This proposed development consisted of 112 units.

The defendant held a public hearing on the application on March 17 and April 27, 2004. On May 19, 2004, the defendant, by a three to two vote, denied the application. The sole basis for the denial was the determination that the proposed development violated article IX, § 4, of the zoning regulations, which requires a distance of one mile between such developments.⁴ Specifically, the defendant determined that the proposed development was located approximately seven-tenths of one mile from another development when measured as the crow flies, that is, on a straight line on a map.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court on June 14, 2004. During a hearing before the court on December 23, 2004, the parties stipulated that if the application did not satisfy article IX, § 4, a variance from the zoning board of appeals would be necessary. They also agreed that if the straight line method was utilized, the distance was less than one mile. In a memorandum of decision dated March 24, 2005, the court sustained the plaintiffs' appeal and concluded that the defendant acted in an arbitrary manner when it denied the application. Specifically, the court determined that, in the past, the normal practice was for the town engineer to measure distance along the road rather than by the straight line method. The parties had agreed that measured by the roadway method, the distance between the proposed development and the nearest development exceeded the one mile requirement.⁵ According to the court, "the [defendant] departed from a settled measurement procedure and did not consider the maintenance of the neighborhood nor the effect on adjacent neighborhoods."

The court noted that it did not consider the plaintiffs' equal protection claim as a result of its conclusion that the plaintiffs' property rights were affected by an arbitrary decision. The court further determined that the defendant properly eliminated two units from the proposal in favor of open space.⁶ This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

At the outset of our discussion, it will be helpful to set forth the relevant legal principles regarding special permits. "General Statutes § 8-2(a) provides in relevant part that local zoning regulations may provide that certain . . . uses of land are permitted only after obtaining a special permit or special exception . . . subject to standards set forth in the regulations and to conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience and property values. . . . The terms special permit and special exception are interchangeable. . . . A special permit allows a property owner to use his property in a manner expressly permitted by the local zoning regulations. . . . The proposed use, however, must satisfy standards set forth in the zoning regulations themselves as well as the conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience and property values. . . . An application for a special permit seeks permission to vary the use of a particular piece of property from that for which it is zoned, without offending the uses permitted as of right in the particular zoning district. . . . When ruling upon an application for a special permit, a planning and zoning board acts in an administrative capacity. . . . [Its] function . . . [is] to decide within prescribed limits and consistent with the exercise of [its] legal discretion, whether a particular section of the zoning regulations applies to a given situation and the manner in which it does apply." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gevers v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 94 Conn.App. 478, 481-82, 892 A.2d 979 (2006); see also Housatonic Terminal Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Board, 168 Conn. 304, 307, 362 A.2d 1375 (1975); see generally R. Fuller, 9 Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (2d Ed.1999) § 5.1, pp. 135-37; T. Tondro, Connecticut Land Use Regulation (2d Ed.1992) pp. 175-79.

We now identify the applicable standard of review. This case requires us to interpret article IX, § 4, of the zoning regulations. "Because the interpretation of the regulations presents a question of law, our review is plenary. . . . Additionally, zoning regulations are local legislative enactments . . . and, therefore, their interpretation is governed by the same principles that apply to the construction of statutes. . . . Moreover, regulations must be interpreted in accordance with the principle that a reasonable and rational result was intended. . . . The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language [or . . . the relevant zoning regulation] as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Graff v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 277 Conn. 645, 652, 894 A.2d 285 (2006); see also Blakeman v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 82 Conn.App. 632, 638-39, 846 A.2d 950, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 905, 853 A.2d 521 (2004); Doyen v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 67 Conn.App. 597, 604-605, 789 A.2d 478, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 901, 793 A.2d 1088 (2002).⁷

We have stated that "[o]rdinarily, this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes. . . . [A]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight. . . . Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Furthermore, when [an] agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . . the agency is not entitled to special deference. . . . [I]t is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunningham v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 90 Conn.App. 273, 279, 876 A.2d 1257, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 915, 888 A.2d 83 (2005); see also Raymond v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 76 Conn.App. 222, 233, 820 A.2d 275, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 906, 826 A.2d 177 (2003).

Finally, we note that a "court that is faced with two equally plausible interpretations of regulatory language . . . properly may give deference to the construction of that language adopted by the agency charged with enforcement of the regulation. . . . Thus, in construing regulations, our function is to determine the expressed legislative intent. . . . Moreover . . . the words employed therein are to be given their commonly approved meaning." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunningham v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 90 Conn.App. at 280, 876 A.2d 1257.

The plain language of article IX, § 4, provides that the defendant "shall not allow more than one Planned Residential Development to be located closer than one mile from any other Planned Residential Development. . . ." The regulation is silent as to how the distance between developments is to be measured. At the May 19, 2004 hearing, much of the discussion focused on the method of calculating the distance between the proposed development and the nearest existing development. With respect to the three other developments in Trumbull, it was undisputed that they all exceeded the one mile requirement regardless of the method used to calculate distance.⁸ Two of the members of the defendant, however, argued that, in the past, the distance had been calculated by the roadway method. The town engineer indicated that he had measured the distance by using the roadway method.

The crucial determination in this case is the method to be used in measuring distance. Is it to be measured: (1) using the straight line method of measuring from property line to property line; (2) as the distance via available roadways to and from the entrances to the developments; or (3) as the distance via available roadways from the doorway of a particular building in each development? See Borough of Perkasie v. Moulton Builders, Inc., 850 A.2d 778, 782 (Pa.Commw.2004).

"When more than one construction [of a regulation] is possible, we adopt the one that renders the enactment effective and workable and reject any that might lead to unreasonable or bizarre results." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Graff v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 277 Conn. at 653, 894 A.2d 285. Our Supreme Court has instructed that courts should avoid interpretations that could result in "absurd [and] unworkable . . ....