City of Tacoma v. Mundell

Decision Date05 April 1972
Docket NumberNo. 402--II,402--II
PartiesThe CITY OF TACOMA, Respondent, v. Joseph Robert MUNDELL, Appellant.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

James B. Gorham, of Snure & Gorham, Des Moines, for appellant.

Robert R. Hamilton, City Atty., F. H. Chapin, Jr., and Hugh W. Judd, Tacoma, for respondent.

PEARSON, Judge.

Defendant, Joseph Robert Mundell, appeals from a conviction for possession of a narcotic drug and possession of a dangerous drug. Both offenses were prosecuted as misdemeanors in municipal court, and later appealed to the Superior Court for Pierce County. A motion to suppress was denied in the superior court and defendant was found guilty.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress certain evidence removed from his person. He bases this contention on three separate grounds: (1) The supporting affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. (2) The warrant to search the premises did not authorize a search of defendant's person. (3) The search warrant was not properly served upon defendant.

We agree with defendant's second contention and reverse his conviction.

On February 3, 1970 two officers of the Tacoma Police Department obtained a search warrant from Judge Waldo F. Stone of the Municipal Court for the City of Tacoma, commanding any peace officer to search a premises on North Fife Street in Tacoma. The warrant, which mentioned no individuals (either by name or 'John Doe') is set out in part below. 1 The warrant was based upon an affidavit signed by the two police officers, stating that a reliable informant had observed the possession and sale of narcotics at the premises. 2

Late in the evening of February 3, 1970, five Tacoma police officers went to the North Fife address. Defendant, who was renting the house, answered the door, and when one of the officers exhibited his badge and stated that he had a search warrant, defendant let them in. The premises were dark. Three additional occupants were seated in the living room. One of the officers read the warrant aloud, and the search then commenced. During the search of the premises, defendant's person was searched and a small quantity of marijuana and two dextroamphetamine capsules were found in his clothing. No contraband was otherwise found on the premises. The officer admitted at trial that the only basis on which he searched defendant's person was the search warrant itself. Defendant was subsequently arrested and transported to the station. He was never given a copy of the warrant personally, but one was placed in his property box after he was booked in jail.

With regard to the sufficiency of the supporting affidavit, it has often been said that affidavits of probable cause are tested by much less vigorous standards than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial, and issuing magistrates are not to be confined by restrictions on the use of their common sense. Furthermore, a magistrate's determination of probable cause should be given great weight by reviewing courts. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); State v. Hodge,5 Wash.App. 639, 490 P.2d 126 (1971).

When the affidavit is based upon information from an unidentified informer, the often quoted 2-pronged test in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) must be met. That is, the magistrate must be informed of: 1. Some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were. 2. Some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible or his information was reliable. State v. Hodge, Supra; State v. Walcott, 72 Wash.2d 959, 435 P.2d 994 (1967).

We feel the affidavit in the present case met the Aguilar test. The informer claimed he personally observed narcotics in the residence and saw them being sold there. Hypodermic syringes and needles were also observed. The affiants stated that the informant was a college student at the time and had never had any trouble with the police. The affiants corroborated the information by stating they had been conducting an investigation at the same residence and had seen known narcotics users and sellers frequent the home.

Although the affidavit did not contain the most reliable of information, recognizing the magistrate's determination is entitled to great weight, we conclude the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause. It is most important that the informant's Present information is truthful and reliable, and not that he has been reliable in the past. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 29 L.Ed.2d 723, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971).

While the warrant was based upon probable cause, we are of the opinion that the general search warrant to search the North Fife Street premises did not permit, by itself, a search of defendant's person. There are no Washington cases that clearly answer this issue; however, it has been said that an officer who has a warrant to search for and seize property upon designated premises does not possess authority so broad as to allow him to search all persons found in it. United States v. Festa, 192 F.Supp. 160 (D.C.Mass.1960) (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948)). A specific warrant to search a premises cannot be converted into a general one to search individuals. See United States v. Haywood, 284 F.Supp. 245 (E.D.La.1968). See also, State v. Raum, 172 Wash. 680, 21 P.2d 291 (1933).

Clearly, defendant could have been searched incident to a lawful arrest if incriminating evidence had been found in the general search, or if he had attempted to flee or dispose of incriminating evidence, for there would be, at that point, probable cause to make an arrest. State v. Ramsey, 5 Wash.App. 361, 486 P.2d 1109 (1971). Also, as the officers had a valid search warrant to be inside the premises, they undoubtedly could seize objects in plain view, on defendant's person. See State v. Cagle, 5 Wash.App. 644, 490...

To continue reading

Request your trial
20 cases
  • State v. Broadnax
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • December 2, 1982
    ...the search of a premises does not also extend to authorize the search of an individual found on the premises. Tacoma v. Mundell, 6 Wash.App. 673, 495 P.2d 682 (1972). In Ybarra, the Supreme Court's holding had a twofold impact on the "mere presence" doctrine. First, the Court held that "a p......
  • State v. Cottrell, 975--III
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • January 27, 1975
    ...§ 27 (1972). The search of persons on premises authorized to be searched pursuant to a search warrant is limited. Tacoma v. Mundell, 6 Wash.App. 673, 495 P.2d 682 (1972); Olympia v. Culp, 136 Wash. 374, 377, 240 P. 360 (1925); State v. Ryan, 163 Wash. 496, 502, 1 P.2d 893 (1931). However, t......
  • State v. Hill
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1994
    ...to search the individuals found at the premises. State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 301, 654 P.2d 96 (1982) (citing Tacoma v. Mundell, 6 Wash.App. 673, 495 P.2d 682 (1972)). Furthermore, generally officers have no authority under a premises warrant to search personal effects an individual i......
  • State v. Jung
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • February 22, 1973
    ...1295 (1972), and issuing magistrates are not to be confined by restrictions on the use of their common sense. City of Tacoma v. Mundell, 6 Wash.App. 673, 495 P.2d 682 (1972). The magistrate was not required to construe the word 'residence' as meaning only the white stucco We agree with defe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT