City of Taylor v. Taylor Bedding Mfg. Co.
Decision Date | 27 October 1948 |
Docket Number | No. 9740.,9740. |
Citation | 215 S.W.2d 215 |
Parties | CITY OF TAYLOR et al. v. TAYLOR BEDDING MFG. CO. et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, 26 Jud. Dist., Williamson County; D. W. Wilcox, Judge.
Action by Taylor Bedding Manufacturing Company and others against the City of Taylor and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
C. S. Griffith and E. M. Grimes, both of Taylor, for appellants.
Dan Moody, of Austin, and Amos Peters, Jr., of Taylor, for appellees.
The right of appellees, Taylor Bedding Manufacturing Company and others, to a discount of 3% of the amount of ad valorem taxes, due by them to the City of Taylor for the year 1947, is the question presented for our decision.
An ordinance of the City of Taylor provides:
If appellees are entitled to a discount of 3%, they have tendered and there is now in the registry of the trial court a sum of money equal to the amount owing.
The City of Taylor contends that appellees are not entitled to such discount and that therefore the sum of money tendered is insufficient because there were, at the time of such tender (September 1947), delinquent taxes against the same property as to which the tender of taxes was made.
It is undisputed that taxes for the year 1946, on this property, were not paid by appellees before the date on which the law provided they should become delinquent. Appellees say, however, that since the 1946 taxes were involved in a bona fide lawsuit (Forwood v. City of Taylor, Tex. Sup., 214 S.W.2d 282, affirming this court in Tex.Civ.App., 208 S.W.2d 670, and Tex. Civ.App., 209 S.W.2d 434) they were not delinquent.
Since we are of the opinion that the City of Taylor was without authority to provide in the ordinance, above set out, that the tax discount would not be allowed if there were delinquent taxes against the same property, and that such provision is void, it is unnecessary for us to determine if the 1946 taxes were delinquent.
Art. 3, Sec. 55, of our Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St., provides that "The Legislature shall have no power to release or extinguish, or to authorize the releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability or obligation of any corporation or individual, to this State or to any county or defined subdivision thereof, or other municipal corporation therein, except delinquent taxes which have been due for a period of at least ten years." (Adopted Nov. 8, 1932.)
It is obvious that any law which provided for a discount of the amount of taxes due, for any reason, except ten years delinquency, would be in violation of the above constitutional provision.
This fact, no doubt, accounts for the adoption, in August 1937, of that portion of art. 8, Sec. 20 of our Constitution, which provides:
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate the Legislature in 1939 enacted art. 7255b, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., which contained the substance of the above constitutional provision, but it was expressly provided that such discount should not apply to cities and towns (and others), "unless and until" such city or town should "adopt" the provisions of such statute.
The specific question then is whether the City of Taylor, in adopting art. 7255b, could impose conditions or restrictions upon the right to discount which are not found in such statute.
This question is answered adversely to appellants in Spears v. City of San Antonia, 110 Tex. 618, 223 S.W. 166, 168.
In that case the City of San Antonio adopted, at an election as provided for in the legislative act, a paving law which was attacked on the ground that the Legislature had unlawfully delegated lawmaking powers to the people of San Antonio. The law was upheld and we quote from the opinion by Justice Greenwood:
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