City of Toledo v. Dandridge, Court of Appeals No. L-10-1333
| Citation | 2013 Ohio 317 |
| Decision Date | 01 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | Trial Court No. TRD-10-12906,Trial Court No. CBR-10-10207,Court of Appeals No. L-10-1333 |
| Parties | City of Toledo Appellee v. Keith D. Dandridge Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Toledo Municipal Court in two cases that were consolidated for trial below. Following a trial to the bench, defendant-appellant, Keith D. Dandridge was found guilty of driving on an expired license, obstructing official business and resisting arrest. The court then sentenced appellant to a $50 fine for driving on an expired license, 45 days in jail for obstructing official business,suspended on the condition that he perform 45 hours of community service work, and 60 days in jail for resisting arrest, also suspended on the condition that he perform an additional 45 hours of community service work. Appellant now challenges that judgment through the following assignments of error.
{¶ 2} The facts of this case, as testified to at the trial below, are as follows. On June 24, 2010, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Officer Jon Mugler of the Toledo Police Department initiated a traffic stop of appellant's vehicle near the intersection of Nebraska and Marmion Streets in Toledo, Ohio, because no license plate was visible on the vehicle. Mugler then approached appellant and asked him where his license plate was. Appellant exited the vehicle and showed him the plate, which was in the back seat of the car. Mugler then asked appellant for his driver's license, to which appellant responded "I don't have to give it to you." Appellant eventually revealed that the car was registered to him and that his name was Keith. Mugler then ran the license plate number and learned that the car was registered to a woman whose last name was Dandridge. He then ran the name "Keith Dandridge." While the name came back as a hit, the physical description did not match appellant. Mugler also learned that the driver's license of Keith Dandridge had expired. At that point, appellant was back in the car in the driver's seat and Officer Brian Mitchell had arrived to assist Mugler. Mugler again asked appellant for his driver's license and appellant refused. Mugler then opened appellant's car door and told him he was under arrest. When appellant would not exit the car, Mitchell and Mugler physically attempted to remove appellant from the car at which time appellant wrapped his arms around the back of the seat and hooked his knees under the steering wheel to prevent his removal. With that, the officers sprayed mace in appellant's face and removed him from the car.
{¶ 3} After appellant was arrested, the officers searched his car and found his expired driver's license in the console and determined that he was in fact Keith Dandridge.
{¶ 4} Appellant was charged with driving on an expired license in violation of Toledo Municipal Code 335.01, resisting arrest in violation of Toledo Municipal Code 525.09, obstructing official business in violation of Toledo Municipal Code 525.07, and failure to wear a seat belt. After a bench trial, at which appellant represented himself, appellant was found guilty of driving on an expired license, obstructing official business and resisting arrest and was sentenced accordingly. On appellant's motion for an acquittal, the court dismissed the charge of failure to wear a seat belt.
{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, appellant cites numerous errors allegedly committed by the trial court which he asserts operated to deny him various constitutional rights.
{¶ 6} Several of these alleged errors address the trial court's rulings regarding a piece of videotape evidence. During his encounter with the officers, appellant pulled out his cell phone and videotaped the encounter. The phone then was collected by the officers and booked into the police property room. Prior to trial, appellant never sought discovery of the recording pursuant to Crim.R. 16. During trial, the state never introduced the video as evidence. Nevertheless, appellant asked to view the video, believing that it would exonerate him. The court told him that because the state was not introducing it into evidence, he would have to wait until the state had rested its case, atwhich time appellant could view the tape and decide if he wanted to introduce it into evidence. At the close of the state's case, appellant viewed the video directly from the phone. He then informed the court that he was not going to introduce the video into evidence.
{¶ 7} Appellant now contends on appeal that the lower court violated his right of confrontation because it denied his request to view the video during the state's case in chief, at which time, he asserts, he would have been able to use it to test the veracity of the state's witnesses. He further contends that he was denied his right of confrontation when the lower court denied his request to recall the state's witnesses during his case in chief, when the court refused to allow him to use his notes during his cross-examination of Officer Mugler, when the court refused to allow him to finish his cross-examination of Officer Mugler, and when the court limited his cross-examination of the state's witnesses by preventing him from referring to the video. Appellant's arguments are without merit.
{¶ 8} In all criminal prosecutions, the defendant has a constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999). "'The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.'" Id. at 123-124, quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). In addition, while a defendant has a right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, the "'extent of cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is withinthe sound discretion of the trial court.'" State v. Green, 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 147, 609 N.E.2d 1253 (1993), quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931).
{¶ 9} In the proceedings below, the state never introduced the video as evidence or used it in any manner. If appellant believed that the recording was exculpatory, he should have introduced it when presenting his own case. The court clearly gave appellant that opportunity. Moreover, because appellant created the recording himself, and was therefore aware of its existence prior to trial, had he believed it could be useful at trial, he should have filed a Crim.R. 16 demand for discovery of it. Crim.R. 16(M) states that such demands are to be filed prior to trial. Accordingly, the lower court did not abuse its discretion or violate appellant's right of confrontation by its treatment of the video at the trial below.
{¶ 10} Appellant next asserts that the lower court prevented him from effectively cross-examining Officer Mugler by refusing to allow him to use his own notes and by denying him the opportunity to complete his cross-examination of him. The record reveals that during his cross-examination of Mugler, appellant started to read from his own notes the following statement: "And so are you aware that traveling in an automobile on a public road when it's not a threat to the public safety or health and constitutes no hazard to the public and will constitute no --." The state objected on the grounds of relevance and that the state did not know what appellant was reading from. The court sustained the objection, told appellant that he was testifying and told him to aska question. The court also told appellant that when it was his turn to testify, he could read from his notes. Having reviewed Officer Mugler's direct testimony and his testimony on cross-examination that immediately preceded the quoted question, we can find no error in the trial court's ruling. The objectionable question was completely irrelevant and unrelated to Mugler's direct testimony. We further note that the lower court bent over backwards to steer appellant as to the proper way to ask questions, but appellant would not listen. Despite appellant's insistence on representing himself, the court assigned an attorney to sit with him and answer any questions he may have about proper procedure. Appellant refused the assistance. Appellant cannot now complain that his rights were violated by the court's following proper procedure.
{¶ 11} The first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 12} Appellant's second and third assignments of error are related and, together, challenge his conviction on obstructing official business. Appellant contends that that conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the lower court should, therefore, have granted his motion for acquittal.
{¶ 13} ...
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