City of Tulsa v. Randall

• Decision Date: 26 November 1935
• Docket Number: 25391.
• Parties: CITY OF TULSA v. RANDALL.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

52 P.2d 33

174 Okla. 630, 1935 OK 1149

CITY OF TULSA v. RANDALL.

No. 25391.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

November 26, 1935

Syllabus by the Court.

1. When a master seeks to defend against the negligence of his servant upon the theory that the servant has been loaned to a third person, who was for the time being his master, a question of fact is presented for determination of the jury under proper instructions.

2. Where a servant is under the control and subject to the orders of the master and under his employ, owes obedience to such master, and is ordered by such master to assist a third person to do a piece of work, and while so doing he remains under the control and subject to the orders of his master, he does not in such case become the servant of such third person, but remains the servant of his master.

Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; Harry L. S. Halley, Judge.

Action of Theodore Randall against the City of Tulsa, a municipal corporation, for damages for injury. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Hudson & Hudson and H. O. Bland, City Atty., all of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Bailey E. Bell and W. Cliff Klein, both of Tulsa, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM.

Throughout this opinion the parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court. Plaintiff, accompanied by two other persons, one of whom owned and was driving a Ford coupé in which they were riding, were on their way to Mohawk Park to attend a picnic. They were traveling east on the Mohawk road when at a point between Lewis and Harvard streets in the city of Tulsa they observed a Ford truck, which it developed was owned by defendant, and driven by Zack Wright, a regular employee of the defendant, traveling west on the Mohawk road. It appears from the evidence that, as the driver of defendant's truck traveled along, he saw and was waving at his niece who was hoeing in a garden on the south side of the Mohawk road, and, in doing so, got over on his left or south side of the road, and the driver of the Ford coupé in which plaintiff was riding, in order to keep from being struck head-on by the truck, swerved his car to his left or north side of the road, there being a ditch on the south side which prevented him from swerving that way; and at the same time Wright, the driver of the truck, swerved the truck to his right or north side of the road and collided with the Ford coupé, striking it on the right front end, and seriously injuring the plaintiff, who was riding between the driver and the other occupant of the car.

Defendant in its answer to the petition of plaintiff denies that Zack Wright was an agent, servant, or employee of the city of Tulsa; and that the injuries complained of by plaintiff were contributed to and caused by the negligence and want of care of plaintiff.

The only question presented on appeal is, Was Zack Wright in the employment of the city of Tulsa, and on a mission for and in the performance of his duties as such employee at the time of the collision and resulting injury to the plaintiff? If so defendant is liable in damages to plaintiff for the injuries sustained by him in the collision, as it is clear from the evidence that Zack Wright was negligent and that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. It is clear from the evidence that Zack Wright was a general employee of the city of Tulsa; but defendant contends and sought to show that he had been loaned to the RFC made-work program, and at the time the collision occurred was performing a duty in that capacity, was under the direction of that agency, and not on a mission for, nor under the control of the city of Tulsa. We have carefully reviewed the evidence, and are of the opinion that it does not sustain defendant in that contention; but, on the other hand, shows that when the collision occurred, he was an employee and under the control of, and in the performance of his duties for defendant. Wright had gone out to Mohawk Park to get some RFC workers who were working on a city project, but they had already left, and he was returning with the truck empty.

Defendant contends that the "loaned servant doctrine" applies and in support of their contention cites the following cases: Palmer v. Skelly Oil Co., 129 Okl. 32, 263 P. 440; Thomas v. Great Western Mining Co., 150 Okl. 212, 1 P.2d 165; Isaacs v. Prince & Wilds, 133 Miss. 195, 97 So. 558; Sawmill Construction Co. v. Bright, 116 Miss. 491, 77 So. 316; Carr v. Burke, 183 A.D. 361, 169 N.Y.S. 981; Burns v. Jackson, 59 Cal.App. 662, 211 P. 821; Burns v. Southern Pacific Co., 43 Cal.App. 667, 185 P. 875; Diamond v. Sternberg Motor Truck Co., 87 Misc. 305, 149 N.Y.S. 1000; American Express Co. v. O'Connor, 51 App.D.C. 359, 279 F. 997; Braun et al. v. Averdick, 113 Ohio St. 613, 150 N.E. 41; also 39 Corpus Juris § 5, page 36; and 18 R.C.L. § 244, page 784. The law as laid down in these cases is not applicable to the facts in this case.

The general law governing loaned servants is stated in 39 C.J 1274, which is as follows: "The test of liability for the acts of the servant is whether in the particular service which the servant is engaged or requested to perform he continues liable to the direction and control of his original master or becomes subject to that of the person to whom he is lent or hired, or...