City of Tulsa v. McIntosh
Decision Date | 11 February 1930 |
Docket Number | 18738. |
Citation | 284 P. 875,141 Okla. 220,1930 OK 71 |
Parties | CITY OF TULSA v. McINTOSH. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Cities of this state are responsible for their acts of negligence in the care of streets as a common-law liability independent of any express statutory declaration.
In an action against the city of Tulsa to enforce a liability such as is set out in the preceding paragraph, the defense that plaintiff failed to serve a notice of injury complained of within 30 days, pursuant to section 9, art. XI, of the Home Rule Charter of said city, and that by reason whereof the action is barred, is not available, for such charter provision is essentially in the nature of a special statute of limitation, and is in violation of article 5, § 46, subd (z), and article 5, § 59, of Oklahoma Constitution.
Instruction No. 16 herein, advising the jury to what extent one guilty of negligence is responsible to a party injured thereby examined, and held substantially correct. C R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Brazzell, 40 Okl. 460, 138 P. 794.
Commissioners' Opinion.
Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; Luther James, Judge.
Action by Andrew M. McIntosh against the City of Tulsa. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
H. O Bland and Harry L. S. Halley, both of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.
A. F. Moss and H. R. Young, both of Tulsa, for defendant in error.
Fred McIntosh, 11 years old, was injured on May 22, 1918, by the explosion of a dynamite cap. The injuries necessitated the amputation of the thumb, the first, second, and third fingers of his left hand, and, in addition, the boy lost the sight of one eye, and suffered a very serious injury to the other eye. Certain contractors who were doing work for the city left their box of tools, in which there was a large number of dynamite caps, on the street exposed, and this boy, among other school children, on the way to and from school, was attracted to the tool box and secured many of the dynamite caps, and, in playing with the same, he tried to light one end of one of the dynamite caps, and the injury resulted.
On June 24, 1928, Fred, by Andrew M. McIntosh, his father and next friend, by O'Meara, Bush & Moss, their attorneys, filed with the proper officers of the city of Tulsa a written statement showing the age, name, and residence of Fred McIntosh, and the nature, time and place and extent of the injury, and the circumstances leading up to the same, and alleging damages of $30,000.
Soon thereafter suit for damages for said injuries against the city and others was instituted by Fred McIntosh, by his next friend and father, resulting in judgment for the minor, which, upon appeal, was affirmed by this court. Tulsa v. McIntosh, 90 Okl. 50, 215 P. 624. The present action is brought by Andrew M. McIntosh against same defendants to recover consequential damages which plaintiff suffered by reason of the injuries to his minor son, including $1,000 alleged to have been expended for medical, hospital, and nurses' bills in the necessary treatment of said son and also for the value of services of his said son during minority.
There was a verdict and judgment in the trial court for plaintiff for $1,500, from which the city of Tulsa appeals.
Defendant assigns thirty alleged errors of the court, but on page 46 of its brief appears this language:
This frank and proper statement then leaves for our determination the question whether or not the failure of the father (plaintiff) to file a written notice of injury, according to the charter provisions of the city of Tulsa, within thirty days, is a bar to his recovery. While this action might be determined upon other grounds, nevertheless the constitutionality of the charter provision of defendant, purporting to require notice, is here assailed, and, since the question involved is of very great importance, it has been considered advisable to squarely meet the issue thus raised; otherwise this question will be presented again and again for attention.
It is worth nothing that the validity of this identical charter provision has been twice presented to this court (City of Tulsa v. Wells, 79 Okl. 39, 191 P. 186, and City of Collinsville v. Brickey, 115 Okl. 264, 242 P. 249), but these cases passed up the question and left it for future determination.
The charter provision in question is section 9 art. XI, of the city of Tulsa, which charter was adopted by the people of that city under the provisions of article 18, § 3(a), of the Oklahoma Constitution, and said section is as follows:
"Before the City of Tulsa shall be liable for damages of any kind the person injured, or some one in his behalf, shall give the Mayor or City Auditor notice in writing of such injury within thirty days after the same has been received, stating specifically in such notice when, where and how the injury occurred and the extent thereof. * * *"
The assault on this section is as follows:
(1) That the limitation therein provided was not within the power of the city to enforce, for that it is in violation of article 5, § 46, subd. (z), of the Oklahoma Constitution, which is as follows:
(2) That the same is in violation of section 59, art. 5, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, which is as follows:
(3) Because said provision of the charter of the city of Tulsa conflicts with and is an attempt to supersede the general statutes of the state of Oklahoma upon a matter of state and public concern. Section 3(a), art. 18, Okl. Const.
The view that we entertain makes it necessary for us to discuss only the first and second propositions. It will be observed that article 5,§ 46, subd. (z), of our State Constitution, places a specific limit upon the power of the state Legislature to pass local or special laws for the limitation of civil or criminal actions.
6 R. C. L. p. 40, par. 34, and cases cited.
"It has also been said that a constitution is to be interpreted by the spirit which vivifies, and not by the letter which killeth (Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S.Ct. 770, 45 L.Ed. 1088) and that a written constitution is to be interpreted by the same spirit in which it was produced." Wells v. Missouri P. R. Co., 110 Mo. 286, 19 S.W. 530, 15 L. R. A. 847; 6 R. C. L. p. 47, par. 40.
"It is a fundamental canon of construction that a constitution should receive a liberal interpretation, especially with respect to those provisions which were designed to safeguard the liberty and security of the citizen." Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 10 L.Ed. 1060; 6 R. C. L. p. 49, par. 44.
"Words or terms used in a constitution, being dependent on ratification by the people, must be understood in the sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption. * * *" Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, 14 P. 27, 1 Am. St. Rep. 67; 6 R. C. L. p. 52, par. 47.
The...
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