City of Twinsburg v. State Employment Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-1947,86-1947
• Parties: , 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2995, 1988 SERB 4-105 CITY OF TWINSBURG, Appellant, v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 226

39 Ohio St.3d 226

530 N.E.2d 26, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2995, 1988 SERB 4-105

CITY OF TWINSBURG, Appellant, v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellees.

No. 86-1947.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 8, 1988.

Decided Nov. 2, 1988.

William A. LeFaiver, Law Director, Cleveland, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Loren L. Braverman, Columbus, for appellee State Employment Relations Bd.

Climaco, Climaco, Seminatore, Lefkowitz & Garofoli Co., L.P.A., Paul S. Lefkowitz and Susannah Muskovitz, Cleveland, for appellee Northern Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n.

Lucas, Prendergast, Albright, Gibson & Newman, Robert J. Walter and Rankin M. Gibson, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Ass'n of Public School Employees, AFSCME/AFL-CIO, Local No. 4.

Hensley, Cox, Murry & Clark and James A. Hensley, Jr., urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio, Inc.

Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Robert W. Sauter and Russell E. Carnahan, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9.

Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. & Associates Co., L.P.A., Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. and William F. Schmitz, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Cuyahoga County Firefighters Ass'n.

Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Renny J. Tyson, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Ass'n. of Professional Fire Fighters.

Berkman, Gordon, Murray & Palda, George W. Palda, Lorraine R. Baumgardner and Kirschner, Weinberg & Dempsey, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Ohio Council 8.

Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy & Macala Co., L.P.A., Dennis Haines and Richard T. Bush, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Educ. Ass'n.

Charles E. Merchant, urging reversal for amicus curiae, city of Richmond Heights.

Paul A. Grau, Nick A. Mandanici, Directors of Law, and Ross S. Cirincione, urging reversal for amicus curiae, city of Brecksville and the city of Warrensville Heights.

Calfee, Halter & Griswold, John E. Gotherman, Mark I. Wallach and William E. Coughlin, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Mun. League.

LOCHER, Justice.

In Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 196, 530 N.E.2d 1, this court held that the provision for mandatory binding arbitration of collective bargaining disputes over municipal safety-employee benefits and wages, R.C. 4117.14(I), was unconstitutional in that such section (1) violated a municipality's right to exercise the powers of local self-government under Sections 3 and 7, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, and (2) unlawfully delegated municipal legislative authority to set wages and salaries for municipal safety employees. We also held that Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution has no application to R.C. Chapter 4117, as the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act neither directly nor indirectly regulates or establishes hours of employment and minimum wages. See Rocky River, supra, at 205-206, 530 N.E.2d at 9-10.

In the present appeal, we are called upon by Twinsburg to rule that the entire Act is unconstitutional as applied to home-rule municipalities where its application would be contrary to specific charter provisions. Generally, "all legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of constitutionality[,]" and "the courts must apply all presumptions and pertinent rules of construction so as to uphold, if at all possible, a statute or ordinance assailed as unconstitutional." State v. Dorso (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 60, 61, 4 OBR 150, 151, 446 N.E.2d 449, 450. We find that, with the exception of its arguments concerning the Act's mandatory binding arbitration provisions, Twinsburg has not met the burden of overcoming this presumption of constitutionality. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that it is consistent with our holding in Rocky River, supra.

Twinsburg first contends that R.C. Chapter 4117 is unconstitutional because it conflicts with a municipality's right, by way of the home-rule provisions of the Ohio Constitution, to independently determine the wages and terms of employment of its employees. We do not agree that an irreconcilable conflict exists in this case.

It is beyond question that pursuant to Sections 3 and 7, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, all powers of local self-government are protected from state interference, and that state statutes may take precedence only where they conflict with local police power regulations. As this court held in State ex rel. Canada, v. Phillips (1958), 168 Ohio St. 191, 5 O.O.2d 481, 151 N.E.2d 722, at paragraph four of the syllabus:

"The words, 'as are not in conflict with general laws' found in Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, modify the words 'local police, sanitary and other similar regulations' but do not modify the words 'powers of local self-government.' "

See, also, Fenton v. Enaharo (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 69, 70-71, 31 OBR 183, 184, 509 N.E.2d 67, 68-69; State Personnel Bd. of Review v. Bay Village Civil Service Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 214, 28 OBR 298, 503 N.E.2d 518; Novak v. Perk (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 43, 18 O.O.3d 251, 413 N.E.2d 784; Dies Electric Co. v. Akron (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 322, 16 O.O.3d 365, 405 N.E.2d 1026; Northern Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. Parma (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 375, 15 O.O.3d 450, 402 N.E.2d 519; State, ex rel. Kohl, v. Dunipace (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 120, 10 O.O.3d 309, 382 N.E.2d 1358; State, ex rel. Mullin, v. Mansfield (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 129, 55 O.O.2d 239, 269 N.E.2d 602, certiorari denied (1981), 404 U.S. 985, 92 S.Ct. 452, 30 L.Ed.2d 369; State, ex rel. Bindas, v. Andrish (1956), 165 Ohio St. 441, 60 O.O. 92, 136 N.E.2d 43; Fitzgerald v. Cleveland (1913), 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512.

The first step, then, in a proper home-rule analysis is to decide whether the matter in question involves an exercise of local self-government or an exercise of local police power. The final determination of municipal employee compensation and other terms of [1988 SERB 4-107] employment lies exclusively within the municipal power of local self-government. There is simply no more fundamental power of local self-government than the power of the purse. See Rocky River, supra, 39 Ohio St.3d at 200, 530 N.E.2d at 5; Benevolent Assn., supra, 61 Ohio St.2d at 383, 15 O.O.3d at 455, 402 N.E.2d at 525.

Nevertheless, a municipality's constitutionally protected right to determine the compensation of its employees is not irreconcilable with those portions of R.C. Chapter 4117 that were left intact by our holding in Rocky River, supra. While municipal employee compensation is, in its final determination, an exercise of local self-government, it does not follow that the method or process by which such determination is made is exclusively encompassed by the power of local self-government. Without the mandatory binding arbitration provisions, R.C. Chapter 4117 sets forth a salutary framework for labor negotiations between public-employee organizations and public employers, and provides a means of resolving collective bargaining disputes that is intended to avoid, or at least minimize, the possibility of work stoppages in the public sector. See Rocky River, supra, 39 Ohio St.3d at 207-208, 530 N.E.2d at 11; State, ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44, v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 1, 22 OBR 1, 488 N.E.2d 181.

As a result, we are unable to conclude that Twinsburg's arguments in this case are sufficient to overcome the presumption that R.C. Chapter 4117 is constitutional. Broadly construed, the Act does not, on its face, unconstitutionally intrude on a home-rule municipality's power to make the final determination regarding the wages and terms of employment of its employees.

Twinsburg also argues that R.C. Chapter 4117 violates the doctrine of separation of powers because it unlawfully delegates municipal legislative power to SERB and in effect places the city's officials in the position of being de facto agents of SERB. This issue was not raised before the courts below and is thus not properly before this court for review. See State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 22 OBR 199, 489 N.E.2d 277; Thirty-Four Corp. v. Sixty-Seven Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 350, 352, 15 OBR 472, 474, 474 N.E.2d 295, 297. However, we note that this issue was disposed of in favor of the unconstitutionality of R.C. 4117.14(I) in Rocky River, supra, 39 Ohio St.3d at 201-205, 530 N.E.2d at 5-9.

Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed insofar as it conflicts with our holding in Rocky River, supra, and is affirmed in all other respects.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

MOYER, C.J., and HOLMES and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.

HERBERT R. BROWN, J., concurs in judgment only.

SWEENEY and DOUGLAS, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.

WRIGHT, Justice, concurring.

I would go further than the majority opinion and uphold the Act with specificity. The Act removes the prohibition against strikes by public employees (except for safety forces), establishes a system for collective bargaining for public employees, and provides a neutral body in the form of SERB to enforce the terms of the Act. Prior to the Act's passage, a public employer had the complete discretion to determine how, when, with whom, and about what it would bargain. The Ferguson Act provided severe sanctions for those acting contrary to its provisions. Despite these sanctions, strikes plagued both state and local governments. The Act provides a salutary framework for labor negotiations between public-employee organizations and public employers. Indeed, much of the Act is designed to avoid, or at least minimize, the possibility of work stoppages.

The Act's principal features are as follows:

(1) The Act confers upon public employees the right...