City of Tybee Island v. Godinho
| Decision Date | 08 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. S98G1091.,S98G1091. |
| Citation | 511 S.E.2d 517,270 Ga. 567 |
| Parties | CITY OF TYBEE ISLAND v. GODINHO. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Patrick T. O'Connor, Timothy M. O'Brien, David Seth Gruskin, Oliver, Maner & Gray, Savannah, for City of Tybee Island.
Jordon Dean Morrow, Barrow, Sims, Morrow, Lee & Gardner, P.C., Savannah, Walter Edwin Sumner, Atlanta, for Jairza Godinho.
We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly held that the Recreational Property Act1 (the "RPA") does not apply to a sidewalk owned and maintained by the City of Tybee Island, Georgia.2 Because we conclude that the sidewalk, which is located adjacent to a public beach, is used for a "recreational purpose," as defined by the RPA, we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding.
The RPA, with certain exceptions, shields property owners from tort liability for property that they permit the public to use without charge for "recreational purposes."3 The RPA's purpose "is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting the owner's liability toward persons entering thereon."4 The RPA also provides that a "`recreational purpose' includes, but is not limited to, any of the following or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites."5
On September 5, 1994, appellee Jairza Godinho was visiting the City of Tybee Island, Georgia, the appellant. While walking on a city sidewalk, Godinho tripped over a broken section of pavement and fell and fractured her wrist. The sidewalk ran adjacent to a large public parking lot on one side and to the beach on the other side. Ms. Godinho subsequently sued the City. The City, however, moved for summary judgment, contending, among other things, that the sidewalk was being used for a recreational purpose within the meaning of the RPA since it provided viewing and enjoyment of the beaches and ocean adjacent to the sidewalk. The trial court agreed, granting the City's motion for summary judgment. It ruled that the sidewalk was included under the RPA as recreational property, thereby protecting the city from tort liability, and that, in addition, there was an absence of evidence in the record demonstrating that the city had actual or constructive knowledge of the sidewalk's defect. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the sidewalk did not fall under the ambit of the RPA for two reasons. 6
First, based upon its conclusion that the State, not the City, owns the beach adjacent to the sidewalk, the Court of Appeals held that the sidewalk, even though it provides access to and viewing of the beach, could not be considered recreational property within the meaning of the RPA.7 We disagree with this reasoning, as we conclude that the plain language of the RPA extends protection to property owners who provide access to their property so that people may access or enjoy property that is actually owned by someone else. For example, the RPA specifically defines the term "recreational purposes" to include "pleasure driving" and the "viewing or enjoying" of "scenic... sites." These types of recreational activities frequently, if not most often, involve a person using one person's land to enjoy property owned by a second person. Moreover, to exclude coverage in these circumstances might encourage people not to provide access to their property for the purpose of permitting people to enjoy property owned by others, and thus would defeat the very purpose of the RPA.8 For this reason, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the RPA does not apply to the sidewalk because the beach is not owned by the City.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the RPA does not apply to the sidewalk because "the City attracts the public to the beaches, not for the sheer recreational pleasure of the people, but because the public spends money in the City's businesses."9 In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on Cedeno v. Lockwood, Inc.10 That case involved a private business located in the Underground Atlanta entertainment complex. In concluding that the RPA did not shield the business owner from liability for injuries suffered by a person injured on the owner's premises, we concluded that the business owners in Underground Atlanta 11 Thus, in Cedeno, the party seeking the protection of the RPA was in the business of entertainment, and the public was permitted on the property to further the direct business interests of the property owner. Here, on the other hand, the evidence in this case shows that a primary purpose of the sidewalk is to "give the public a place of recreation" by providing access to and viewing of a scenic site,12 and that the City is not in the business of entertainment or recreation and does not seek to...
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Mercer Univ. v. Stofer
...Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games, Inc. , 273 Ga. 113, 115-117 (2), 537 S.E.2d 345 (2000) (same); City of Tybee Island v. Godinho , 270 Ga. 567, 568-569, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999) (activity was using sidewalk that "provid[ed] access to and viewing of a scenic site"); Cedeno v. Lockwood, I......
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Mayor v. Harris
...to the property ." 250 Ga. at 801 (2), 301 S.E.2d 265 (citing OCGA § 51-3-25 ) (emphasis supplied). See also City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999) ("The RPA, with certain exceptions, shields property owners from tort liability for property that they permit the ......
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ATLANTA COMMITTEE v. HAWTHRONE
...whether the property was made available free of charge to the public for recreational purposes.5 E.g., City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999); Cedeno v. Lockwood, Inc., 250 Ga. 799(2), 301 S.E.2d 265 (1983); Hogue v. Stone Mtn. Mem. Assoc., 183 Ga.App. 378, 358 ......
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...Godinho v. City of Tybee Island, 231 Ga. App. 377, 379 (2), 499 S.E.2d 389 (1998), rev'd on other grounds, City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999). In Godinho v. City of Tybee Island, supra, another case involving broken pavement, the following evidence permitted......
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Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell Jr.
...landowners from liability arising under a negligence cause of action." Id. 77. Id. 78. Id. (quoting City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567, 569, 511 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1999)). The court thus affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for the municipality. Id. 79. 240 Ga. App. 798, 522 ......
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...v. State, 273 Ga. 466, 542 S.E.2d 99 (2001); Jackson v. Shadix, 272 Ga. 631, 533 S.E.2d 706 (2000); City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999), overruled on other grounds by Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116, 118, 598 S.E.2d 471, 47......
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Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
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