City of Vernon v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 03 March 1952
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: . L. A. 21820. Supreme Court of California, in Bank

Page 243

241 P.2d 243

38 Cal.2d 509

CITY OF VERNON et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al.

L. A. 21820.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

March 3, 1952.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 2, 1952.

E. L. Searle, Los Angeles, for petitioners.

Fred N. Howser, Atty. Gen., Bayard Rhone, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson B. Hubbard, City Atty., Huntington Park, Edward R. Young, John F. O'Hara, and John W. Shenk, III, Special Counsel, all of Los Angeles, for respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

The city of Vernon and the five members of its city council were found guilty of contempt for failing to obey a mandatory injunction. The petitioners here include the city and four members of the council. The trial court ordered that each petitioner pay a fine, that the individual petitioners be confined in the Los Angeles county jail for a period of five days, and that the individual petitioners be detained in jail until they, as members of the city council, complete all arrangements for financing Vernon's share of the cost of a sewage disposal plant as hereinafter described. In this proceeding the petitioners seek certiorari to annul the judgment of contempt. Their contentions are directed not only at the validity of the contempt proceeding but also at the injunction decree, which has long since become final. We have concluded that the judgment of contempt should be affirmed.

For many years Vernon and others, pursuant to contracts with the city of Los Angeles, disposed of their sewage through the Los Angeles sewer system, which emptied into Santa Monica Bay. Thus there was created and maintained a public nuisance so noisome and notorious as to finally (December 13, 1943) provoke the State of California into bringing the abatement action which forms the basis for this proceeding. By such action the People of the State of California sought to restrain the municipal and public corporations which used the Los Angeles sewer system, and their officers and employes, from discharging sewage into Santa Monica Bay without a permit and to abate the public nuisance which resulted from their sewage disposal. Judgment for plaintiff was entered on February 1, 1946, and affirmed (People v. City of Los Angeles (1948), 83 Cal.App.2d 627, 189 P.2d 489; this court denied hearing; and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (335 U.S. 852, 69 S.Ct. 80, 93 L.Ed. 400).

The judgment in material part required that Los Angeles build a sewage treatment plant of sufficient capacity to abate the nuisance; that each corporate defendant either should provide its own facilities for disposing of its sewage in a safe and sanitary manner or should 'within ninety days after the entry of this decree have * * * completed all arrangements necessary for the financing of its proportionate share of said new treatment plant * * * (to be built by Los Angeles) according to the gallonage allotted to said corporation, so that said share will be available as required'; each corporate defendant which elected to use the Los Angeles sewage system was ordered to report to the superior court, on or before April 29, 1946, the arrangements which it made to pay for its share of the plant; the superior court retained jurisdiction to make further orders to carry its decree into full effect. Those are the material terms of the decree which has become final.

The affidavit by which this contempt proceeding was instituted contains the following averments: Vernon elected to use the Los Angeles sewage system. After the denial of certiorari, the trial court ordered the corporate defendants, which had so elected, to report to it on or before August 29, 1949, what they had done to comply with the portion of the judgment requiring them to arrange to finance their share of the cost of the plant. Vernon, instead of reporting its arrangements, reported its reasons for not having complied with that portion of the judgment. Each member of the city council of Vernon has personal knowledge of the terms of the judgment. Neither Vernon nor the council has taken any steps to provide the money necessary to pay Vernon's share of the cost of such plant, although they have the ability to do so.

Certainty of Injunction

Petitioners cannot be guilty of contempt if the injunction which they violated is so uncertain that they could not determine what it required them to do. (Weber v. Superior Court (1945), 26 Cal.2d 144, 148, 156 P.2d 923.) Petitioners have been found guilty of violating those provisions of the injunction which required them to arrange for payment of Vernon's 'proportionate share' of the cost of the plant 'according to the gallonage allotted to said corporation' and have such undetermined (but ascertainable) sums 'available as required.' They contend that the judgment is fatally uncertain because it does not determine the amount or fractional interest which constitutes Vernon's 'proportionate share' or what the cost of the plant will be or how much 'gallonage' has been allotted to Vernon or to whom or how or when the undetermined sum shall be 'available as required.'

In California 'resort may be had to the findings of fact and conclusions of law to clarify any uncertainty or ambiguity' in an injunction. (Gelfand v. O'Haver (1948), 33 Cal.2d 218, 222, 200 P.2d 790; see also Ophir Creek Water Co. v. Ophir Hill Consol. Mining Co. (1923), 61 Utah 551, 216 P. 490, 492, where the court said, 'In arriving at a correct interpretation of the decree and its meaning and effect it is incumbent upon the court to consider not only the language of the decree * * * but also the purpose and object of the litigation which terminated in the decree'; a judgment of contempt for violation of the disputed terms of the decree was upheld.)

If petitioners will consider the 1946 injunction in the light of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and 'the purpose and object of the litigation which terminated in the decree,' as made evident by the pleadings, they will be able to comply with it. The findings give a definite formula for computation of Vernon's share of the cost; they make it clear that this share is to be paid to Los Angeles; and if Vernon had desired to comply with the decree it could have ascertained the precise amount to be paid at any fixed time by consultation with Los Angeles and, if necessary, under court supervision. As already mentioned, the court had retained jurisdiction to this very end. Other cities, parties to the same basic litigation and subject to the same judgment, have been able to understand and comply with its terms. Also, it is to be remembered, Vernon voluntarily elected to accept these terms of the decree, for abatement of its share of the nuisance, rather than to adopt the alternative of providing its own facilities for sewage disposal. It is not reasonable to infer that Vernon made such election without knowing what it was undertaking. Vernon's share of the cost of the plant based upon estimates known to it at the time of the entry of the decree would have been $901,250. Vernon made no attempt to raise or appropriate this or any other sum. From time to time the estimated cost of the plant increased, but Vernon made no effort to compute or raise its share of the increased cost.

In October, 1949, Los Angeles demanded $1,814,952.60 as Vernon's share; petitioners by resolution took the position that the 1946 judgment 'now requires the payment by The City of Vernon of $901,250.00, and * * * gives no legal basis for the demand of or the payment of $1,814,952.60' and that Los Angeles purportedly allotted to Vernon '10,129,968 gallons per day instead of 10,300,000 gallons per day as allotted by said judgment.' It thus appears that in October, 1949, petitioners recognized that the 1946 judgment required them to raise money to be paid to Los Angeles but took the erroneous position that a liquidated, rather than a to be calculated, amount to be raised and paid was fixed by that judgment. Their present claim that they do not know to whom the money should be paid does not appear to be advanced in good faith. Indeed, as will hereafter appear, their chief objection to the injunction appears to be not so much that it is uncertain but that notwithstanding the finality of the judgment, it is erroneous. The judgment, of course, makes abatement of the nuisance an absolute requirement not dependent on the cost thereof.

Sufficiency of Affidavit

Petitioners urge that the affidavit by which this proceeding was begun is fatally defective because it does not allege the date when they should have complied with the January, 1946, judgment. As stated, that judgment required that Vernon make its financial arrangements 'within ninety days after the entry of this decree.' The mandatory provisions of the judgment were stayed by the appeal (City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1946), 75 Cal.App.2d 91, 95, 170 P.2d 499) and the District Court of Appeal further stayed enforcement of the judgment until final decision of the United States Supreme Court on the petition for certiorari. Thus the 90 days after entry of the decree had long since passed when the judgment became final. The trial court did not fix, and Vernon did not ask it to fix, a new date for performance.

In the contempt proceeding the trial judge took the position that the 90 days commenced to run when the judgment became final. This view is supported by Fenton v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank (1901, 27 Tex.Civ.App. 231), 65 S.W. 199, 201. There a decree awarded land to plaintiff on condition that it pay a certain sum 'within 90 days from the date of said decree'; the judgment was stayed pending appeal. It was held that the 90-day period began to run when the judgment became final after disposition of the appeal. In accord are Southern Oil Co. v. Scales (Tex.Civ.App.1902), 69 S.W. 1033, Norris v. Kelsey (1915), 60 Colo. 297, 300, 152 P. 1167, and Uthoff v. Thompson (1933), 176 La. 599, 146 So....