City of Washington Court House v. McStowe
| Decision Date | 03 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-614,75-614 |
| Citation | 343 N.E.2d 109,45 Ohio St.2d 228 |
| Parties | , 74 O.O.2d 333 . McSTOWE, Appellant. Supreme Court of Ohio |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
James A. Kiger, Pros. Atty., John H. Roszmann and Gary D. Smith, Washington C. H., for appellee.
Hapner & Hapner and Jon C. Hapner, Hillsboro, for appellant.
Due process of law protects an accused against conviction except upon 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.' In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368. A penal statute or ordinance, pursuant to which one is charged, must be interpreted and applied strictly against the accuser, and liberally in favor of the accused. Mentor v. Giordano (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 140, 224 N.E.2d 343; State v. Conley (1947), 147 Ohio St. 351, 71 N.E.2d 275; State v. Meyers (1897), 56 Ohio St. 340, 47 N.E. 138. *
Ordinance No. 45-72 proscribes a person's being 'found in' a 'home, place, room or establishment' where narcotic drugs or hallucinogens are 'sold or used.' In explicit language, the ordinance requires proof of the sale or use of a narcotic drug or hallucinogen as an essential element of the crime. Proof of possession alone is not sufficient to support a conviction. Because the record herein discloses no evidence that narcotic drugs or hallucinogens were sold or used on the subject premises, appellant's conviction for violating ordinance No. 45-72 must be reversed.
Appellant asserts that ordinance No. 45-72 is unconstitutional, in that it 'lacks ascertainable standards of guilt, does not require intent or guilty knowledge, and is so vague, imprecise, and indefinite that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning and differ as to its application.' We need not reach that issue to decide the present appeal. 'It is well established that courts will refrain from declaring legislation unconstitutional unless the posture of the cause leaves no logical alternative thereto.' Bedford Hts. v. Tallarico (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 211, 212, 267 N.E.2d 802, 803; Greenhills Home Owners Corp. v. Greenhills (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 207, 215 N.E.2d 403; Strongsville v. McPhee (1944), 142 Ohio St. 534, 53 N.E.2d 522; Rucker v. State (1928), 119 Ohio St. 189, 162 N.E. 802.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of the Municipal Court, is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. English
...doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime" with which defendant is charged. Washington Court House v. McStowe (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 228, 229, 74 O.O.2d 333, 334, 343 N.E.2d 109, 110 (quoting In re Winship [1970], 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375). Howeve......
-
State v. Wilson
...unconstitutional unless the posture of the cause leaves no logical alternative thereto.' " Washington Court House v. McStowe (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 228, 230, 343 N.E.2d 109, 110, quoting Bedford Hts. v. Tallarico (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 211, 212, 267 N.E.2d 802. See, also, R.C. 1.47, 1.49 and ......
-
State v. Chuckie Rutherford, William Darby, and Kenneth Jones, 81-LW-4222
...Conclusive evidence that the defendants used drugs is inadequate to prove Count II of the indictment. Cf. Washington Courthouse v. McStowe, 45 Ohio St. 2d 228 (1976); State v. Reese, 56 Ohio App. 2d 278 (1978). Even drug sales or general drug selling is inadequate to prove the state's consp......
-
State v. Wilson
...legislation unconstitutional unless the posture of the cause leaves no logical alternative thereto." Washington Court House v. McStowe (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 228, 230, 343 N.E.2d 109, 110, quoting Bedford Hts. v. Tallarico (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 211, 212, 267 N.E.2d 802. See also R.C. 1.47, R......