City of Waukee v. City Development Bd., 97-1251
| Decision Date | 24 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-1251,97-1251 |
| Citation | 590 N.W.2d 712 |
| Parties | CITY OF WAUKEE, Alice Nizzi, Joseph Nizzi, Donna Nizzi, Mary Ceretti, Perry Lounsbury, Deleana Lounsbury, Marvin W. Jamison, Frances M. Jamison, George Stanich, and Patricia Stanich, Appellees, v. CITY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, Appellant, City of Clive, Iowa, Intervenor-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Heather Adams and Christine Scase, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant City Development Board.
L.R. Voigts, James C. Wine, and Thomas H. Walton of Nyemaster, Goode, Voigts, West, Hansell & O'Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for intervenor-appellant city of Clive.
Paul E. Huscher, Des Moines, for appellees.
Considered by LARSON, P.J., and LAVORATO, SNELL, TERNUS, and CADY, JJ.
This appeal arises out of a dispute between the cities of Clive and Waukee and involves the annexation of certain land in Dallas County, Iowa. The City Development Board (Board) approved Clive's voluntary annexation application over Waukee's voluntary annexation application. Waukee and owners of property included in Waukee's application petitioned the district court for judicial review. Clive intervened in the proceeding. The district court reversed, concluding Clive's application did not comply with the annexation statute, Iowa Code § 368.7(1) (1995), and remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration and determination consistent with its ruling. Clive and the Board appealed, contending Clive's voluntary annexation application did comply with the statute. We agree and reverse and remand with directions.
Iowa Code chapter 368 governs the annexation of land in Iowa. The Board, a state administrative agency, oversees the annexation of property in Iowa if the land is in an urbanized area. See Iowa Code §§ 368.9, 368.7(3). An "urbanized area" means any area of land within two miles of the boundaries of a city. See Iowa Code § 368.1(15). The Board has five members, four of whom are drawn from cities and counties throughout the state, and one of whom is appointed to represent the general public. See Iowa Code § 368.9.
During the past several years, Clive and Waukee have been involved in annexation proceedings before the Board. See City of Waukee v. City Dev. Bd., 514 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa 1994). Though those proceedings dealt with different applications for annexation, those applications did include annexation of some land in the same area involved here, notably land that is the center of this dispute--the Knapp/Koethe and Nizzi properties.
On July 27, 1995, Clive filed an application for approval of voluntary annexation of land (approximately 538.5 acres) located in Dallas County. The owners of 89.8 percent of the property in this area requested annexation; the remaining 10.2 percent did not. The Knapp/Koethe property and the Croci/Van Dorn properties are the largest voluntary parcels. The Knapp/Koethe property is contiguous to the largest involuntary parcel--the Nizzi property. Clive included in its application the Nizzi property, which is contiguous to the Croci/Van Dorn property, which in turn, is contiguous to the west/northwest Clive boundary line.
Without the Nizzi property, Clive could not annex the Knapp/Koethe property under its proposed annexation application. This is because without the Nizzi property, the Knapp/Koethe property would be an island. See Iowa Code § 368.7(1) (), § 368.7(2) ().
On August 1, 1995, Waukee filed a voluntary annexation application for a smaller area (about eighty acres). Waukee included the Nizzi property in this voluntary annexation application. Later, Waukee filed an involuntary annexation application for a much larger area that included most of the land that was within Clive's voluntary annexation application. Waukee's involuntary annexation application is not involved in this appeal.
On October 11, 1996, following a public hearing, the Board determined that Clive's voluntary annexation application was in the public interest and approved it for the most part. (Those parcels of land not approved are not an issue in this appeal.) Because of the Clive annexation, the Board then approved only a small portion of Waukee's voluntary annexation application.
Waukee and the owners of property included in Waukee's application petitioned the district court for judicial review. Clive intervened. The district court reversed the Board's decision. The court determined that Clive's application did not comply with Iowa Code section 368.7(1) because the voluntary property Clive sought to annex was not "adjoining" to Clive pursuant to the statute's requirement. The court also determined that the Board's decision to include nonconsenting landowners in the Clive application to make a more uniform boundary was not supported by substantial evidence.
The Board and Clive appeal. They contend Clive's application complied with section 368.7(1) and that the annexation would make a more uniform boundary. For convenience, in the balance of this opinion, we shall refer to the Board and Clive collectively as Clive, unless otherwise indicated.
Iowa Code section 368.22 governs our scope of review. That provision and those of Iowa Code chapter 17A () are the "exclusive means by which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial review of that agency action." Iowa Code § 368.22. Section 368.22 limits our review to questions "relating to jurisdiction, regularity of proceedings, and whether the decision appealed from is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without substantial supporting evidence." Id.
Under chapter 17A, when we review a district court decision, we ask only whether the district court correctly applied the law. If our conclusions are the same as the district court's, we affirm. If our conclusions are different, reversal may be required. Dickinson County v. City Dev. Comm., 521 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1994).
Here, Clive challenges the district court's interpretation of a statute and the court's conclusion that substantial evidence did not support a finding of the Board. Thus, we need to decide whether the district court correctly applied the law and whether substantial evidence supported the Board's finding. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate to reach the same finding. Id.
Clive contends the district court erred when it determined that the city of Clive's application for voluntary annexation did not comply with the requirements of section 368.7(1). This section pertinently provides:
All of the owners of land in a territory adjoining a city may apply in writing to the council of the adjoining city requesting annexation of the territory. Territory comprising railway right-of-way or territory comprising not more than twenty percent of the land area may be included in the application without the consent of the owner to avoid creating an island or to create more uniform boundaries.
Id. (emphasis added).
Subsections 4 and 14 of Iowa Code section 368.1 define "adjoining" and "territory" respectively:
1. "Adjoining" means having a common boundary for not less than fifty feet. Land areas may be adjoining although separated by a roadway or waterway.
14. "Territory" means the land area or areas proposed to be incorporated, annexed, or severed, whether or not contiguous to all other areas proposed to be incorporated, annexed, or severed. Except as provided for by an agreement pursuant to chapter 28E, "territory" having a common boundary with the right-of-way of a secondary road extends to the center line of the road.
Id. (emphasis added).
A. District court's requirement that the Knapp/Koethe property adjoin the city of Clive. Interpreting the first sentence of section 368.7(1), the district court concluded:
The first sentence of section 368.7(1) requires that a voluntary annexation be requested by adjoining property owners. The property owners of Section 22 [the Knapp/Koethe property] who petitioned for incorporation into Clive were not owners of territory adjoining Clive. A factual finding to the contrary doesn't change the obvious physical fact. The petition did not meet the requirements of the Code and the Board did not have jurisdiction to consider it.
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Clive that the district court incorrectly considered the issue as a matter of the Board's jurisdiction. We have made it abundantly clear that whether an annexation application complies with the statute is not a matter of jurisdiction:
The Board clearly has jurisdiction over voluntary annexation proceedings. Iowa Code chapter 368 created the Board for the express purpose of handling city development proceedings, including annexations.... Before it can approve an annexation application, the Board must determine whether there is substantial compliance with the statute. It can only do this by exercising its jurisdiction and examining the application. If the application does not substantially comply with statutory requirements, the Board must deny the application.
Gorman v. City Dev. Bd., 565 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Iowa 1997) (citation omitted).
Thus, the decisive issue is whether the city of Clive's voluntary application substantially complied with section 368.7(1). The Board has and must in fact exercise jurisdiction to make this determination. Substantial compliance means "compliance in respect to...
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