City of Waverly v. Hedrick
| Decision Date | 09 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. S–11–333.,S–11–333. |
| Citation | 283 Neb. 464,810 N.W.2d 706 |
| Parties | CITY OF WAVERLY, Nebraska, appellee, v. Richard M. HEDRICK, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the trial court.
2. Jurisdiction: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from a trial court.
3. Courts: Eminent Domain. The powers conferred upon the county court judge by the condemnation statutes are not judicial powers or duties, but are instead purely ministerial in character.
4. Eminent Domain: Words and Phrases: Appeal and Error. Only when the appraiser's report is appealed to the district court do condemnation proceedings become judicial.
5. Eminent Domain: Pleadings: Statutes. The statutes relating to condemnation proceedings contemplate the filing of pleadings and the framing of any issues—other than damages to the condemnee—for the first time in the judicial proceeding in district court.
6. Judgments: Evidence. Determination of questions of fact upon evidence, or the exercise of discretion in ascertaining or fixing an amount to be allowed, generally involves judicial rather than ministerial acts.
7. Eminent Domain: Liens: Interest. The existence and amount of a lien, the amount of accrued interest, and whether there should be a setoff from the condemnation award involve judicial, rather than ministerial, determinations.
8. Eminent Domain: Courts: Jurisdiction. Because the eminent domain statutes do not confer upon county courts the power to hear motions for setoff, they lack jurisdiction to do so.
9. Eminent Domain: Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In condemnation proceedings, the district court has original as well as appellate jurisdiction over the subject matter and can determine matters beyond the question of the valuation of the land or interests taken.
10. Courts: Equity: Judgments. District courts have the inherent power in the administration of justice and, governed by the principles of equity, to order setoff from an award or judgment.
11. Eminent Domain. The general eminent domain statutes prescribe the manner and method by which condemnors may exercise the power of eminent domain.
12. Eminent Domain: Parties. It is generally true that failure to designate in the petition and to make a party respondent the owner of any interest in the land taken whose title appears of record or is otherwise ascertainable on reasonable inquiry renders the proceedings ineffectual to transfer such interest to the condemning party.
13. Eminent Domain. A condemnor cannot condemn its own property interest.
14. Eminent Domain: Liens. Condemnation money stands in place of the land, and belongs to a lienholder, to the extent of the value of the lien.
Donald J. Pepperl, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Mark A. Fahleson and David J.A. Bargen, of Rembolt Ludtke, L.L.P., Lincoln, for appellee.
This case concerns a city's preexisting lien on land eventually condemned and whether the city can file a motion in either county or district court for setoff of the lien amount from the condemnation award. The landowner argues that the city must condemn the lien, as well as the subject property, in order to claim the land in condemnation proceedings. The landowner also argues that it was error for the county court in this case to grant such a setoff, because county courts lack jurisdiction to make judicial determinations in condemnation proceedings.
The City of Waverly, Nebraska (City), as condemnor, filed a petition in the Lancaster County Court for appointment of appraisers to assess damages that the condemnee, Richard M. Hedrick, would sustain when the City condemned a fee simple interest in 5.504 acres of Hedrick's land. The petition stated that the site was selected for construction of a park, public grounds, public emergency services buildings, a municipal maintenance shop, and other public buildings near several recently approved residential developments. The petition stated that the City was unable to reach an agreement with Hedrick concerning acquisition of the property. The City sent notice to Hedrick, and the county court issued an order appointing three appraisers.
On December 14, 2005, the appraisers returned a “fee taking” valuation of $86,000. This valuation was filed in county court as a “Return of Appraisers” and signed by a county court judge. In its assessment of damages, the return did not consider any outstanding liens on the property.
On December 21, 2005, the City filed a motion in the county court requesting that the county court deduct a preexisting statutory lien against the property from the appraisers' return. According to the motion, the City had a lien which was filed with the Lancaster County register of deeds in 2004. The lien was in the amount of $8,500 and represented the cost the City incurred abating a nuisance on Hedrick's property as of March 27, 1997. Hedrick never paid the lien, and it incurred interest at the rate of 14 percent per annum, pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45–104.01 (Reissue 2010). The City alleged that as of December 14, 2005, the lien amount, including interest, was $18,874.12.
The county court had not yet ruled on the City's December 21, 2005, setoff motion when, on December 29, Hedrick filed a notice of appeal to the district court on the ground that the $86,000 valuation was inadequate. The City filed another motion in district court to set off the statutory lien, and Hedrick filed a motion to deny the setoff.
On March 26, 2010, the district court ordered that any setoff would be made by the county court following a jury trial in the district court to determine the proper valuation of Hedrick's land. The district court explained that the county court would address the City's setoff motion in the course of disbursing the condemnation proceeds. The district court accordingly found that Hedrick's motion to deny the setoff was moot.
The jury valued the taking at $117,400, and the district court entered judgment in favor of Hedrick in that amount. On May 4, 2010, the district court further awarded Hedrick interest on the condemnation award in the amount of $37,092.07. The district court then remanded the matter to the county court to determine what amount of the condemnation award, if any, should be reduced to account for the City's lien interest.
At hearings before the county court, the City introduced an affidavit of the city administrator, who testified as to the events leading up to the City's lien against Hedrick. The administrator further testified that as of June 4, 2010, the amount of the lien plus interest equaled $48,029.87. The lien, as recorded, was attached to the affidavit. The City entered into evidence numerous additional exhibits pertaining to the validity of the 1997 lien.
Hedrick argued that Nebraska law did not allow setoff. Hedrick pointed out that under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 77–209 (Reissue 2009), a lien is on the real estate and is not a personal liability. According to Hedrick, the City should have listed itself as a condemnee in order to condemn the lien and make it part of the appraisers' valuation. Otherwise, the City's only remedy was to bring a separate foreclosure action on the lien. The City responded that condemnation money stands in place of the land and belongs to the lienholder to the extent of the value of the lien. The City also pointed out that any right to foreclose after condemnation was illusory because it could not foreclose against itself as the owner of both the property and the lien.
On September 20, 2010, the county court granted the City's motion for setoff. The court concluded that the City did not have to name itself as a party condemnee in order to have its interest in the lien on the condemned property ascertained. The court set off the condemnation award by $24,547.07. That amount represented the original $8,500 lien plus $16,047.07 in interest pursuant to § 45–104.01.
Hedrick appealed the September 20, 2010, setoff order to the district court. In addition to the arguments Hedrick presented in county court, Hedrick asserted that the county court lacked jurisdiction to grant the City's setoff motion because a county court has no jurisdictional authority to hear motions or enter orders. The district court rejected Hedrick's arguments and affirmed the order of the county court.
Hedrick asserts, summarized and restated, that the district court erred in failing to conclude that (1) the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the City's motion for setoff and (2) the City waived recovery of its lien interest by failing to condemn the lien as part of the condemnation proceedings.
Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the trial court.1
Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from a trial court.2
Hedrick makes two arguments as to why we must reverse the judgment below. First, he asserts that the county court, being a court of limited jurisdiction, lacked the power to determine a setoff. Second, Hedrick asserts that the City is procedurally barred from obtaining compensation for its interest in the land, because the City failed to name itself as condemnee in the petition for appointment of...
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