City of Waxahachie v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 19 January 1955
• Docket Number: No. A-4647,A-4647
• Citation: 154 Tex. 206,275 S.W.2d 477
• Parties: CITY OF WAXAHACHIE, Texas, Petitioner, v. Milton WATKINS et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 477

275 S.W.2d 477

154 Tex. 206

CITY OF WAXAHACHIE, Texas, Petitioner, v. Milton WATKINS et al., Respondents.

No. A-4647.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Jan. 19, 1955.

Rehearing Denied March 9, 1955.

Warwich H. Jenkins, Waxahachie, for petitioner.

Stuart B. Lumpkins and J. C. Lumplins, Waxahachie, for respondents.

BREWSTER, Justice.

This suit was filed by Milton Watkins et al., respondents, against the City of Waxahachie, petitioner, and Eldon Berry, to annul two ordinances passed by the city designed to amend its basic zoning ordinance adopted on April 6, 1937, and to enjoin Berry from taking advantage of the amendatory ordinances. The trial court rendered judgment as prayed by Watkins et al.; and the Court of Civil Appeals has affirmed. 265 S.W.2d 843. Berry did not appeal.

These ordinances were passed under the power granted the legislative bodies of cities by Art. 1011a, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats.

The original zoning ordinances were passed as 'a comprehensive plan for the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals and the general welfare of the community'; and 'with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district, and its peculiar suitability for the particular uses'; with 'the view of conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the community.'

On basis of use, the city was divided into four classes, namely, dwelling, local retail, commercial and manufacturing, 'all as shown on the zoning map which accompanies this ordinance' and which map 'is hereby declared to be a part (of the ordinance) for all intents and purposes.'

On Feb. 28, 1952, petitioner's city council passed an ordinance by which it changed 'part of Block 28A, Williams Addition, and part of Lot 5, Block 9, University Annex Addition,' from its designation under the original zoning ordinance as in a dwelling district to a local retail district. That action resulted in this lawsuit.

To aid in a better understanding of this case, we insert the following plat, drawn to a scale of 1 inch to 100 feet:

The area sought to be re-zoned (less than 1/2 acre) is marked 'Subject Property' and is heavily outlined in black. It faces south on Sycamore Street for a distance of 139.6 feet; its western boundary of 200 feet coincides with the eastern boundary of plaintiff Watkins' property; its northern boundary parallels its southern boundary but is only 54 feet long, with the consequence that its eastern boundary is not parallel with its western boundary but extends obliquely 222.3 feet to the point of beginning, thus excluding the small northeast corner of Lot 5, Block 9, but including a larger southwest corner of Block 28A.

As for the remainder of the area shown on the map to be local retail property, only the small northern tip of Block 28A facing on Highway 77 and the lots facing west on Ferris Avenue and shown to be in Ferris Second Addition were given such designation by the over-all ordinance of 1937. (They are marked '1937 Zoning Map'.) All the other lots shown black were designated for building use under the 1937 ordinance and later became local retail property by numerous spot-zoning ordinances. For example, the property joining 'Subject Property' on the ease and not included in the 1937 ordinance and being the larger part of Block 28A was so zoned by ordinance passed June 3, 1941. The lots to the southeast of 'Subject Property' and facing north on Sycamore Street and east on Ferris Avenue were re-zoned on Nov. 1, 1938, and are now occupied by a filling station and a tourist court. On the same date the triangular lot on the northwest corner of the plat, across Ovilla Road from the property of plaintiff Lockman, was changed to local business use.

The main issue here is whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding the amendatory ordinance void. Petitioner says it is not void because (1) 'there is ample evidence to support the decision of the City Council in re-zoning the property'; (2) the ordinance is not arbitrary and unreasonable, since 'the findings of fact of the trial court and the undisputed evidence show that such amendment was justified'; and (3) the action of the council 'was a valid exercise of the police power of the City, supported by disputable facts, and the courts may not lawfully substitute their discretion for that of the appropriate legislative body, in a purely legislative matter.'

One authority notes that comprehensive zoning laws are of relatively modern origin; that in late years a veritable flood of zoning legislation has swept the country; that in the many decisions of state and federal courts dealing with such ordinances, there has been some conflict and confusion; that the tendency, however, is in the direction of extending the power of restriction in aid of city planning. 58 Am.Jur., p. 942, sec. 5.

With the recent rapid growth of urban centers in Texas spot-zoning cases have come to court much more frequently and many of them have got into the books. Candor compels the admission that not all of these decisions have been either enlightening or convincing. However, that situation can be explained in part, at least by the fact that the controlling considerations are seldom, if ever, the same in any two cases. Hence final determination of the validity of the ordinance must turn on the circumstances of each case and the character of the regulations involved. See Annotation in 149 A.L.R., pp. 292, 293.

Of course, there are basic principles which must be considered in determining the validity of any zoning ordinance.

Since it is an exercise of the legislative power of the city's council, the ordinance must be presumed to be valid.

The courts cannot interfere unless it appears that the ordinance represents a clear abuse of municipal discretion. And the 'extraordinary burden' rests on one attacking the ordinance 'to show that no conclusive, or even controversial or issuable, facts or conditions existed which would authorize the governing board of the municipality to exercise the discretion confided to it.' City of Dallas v. Lively, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W.2d 895, 898, error refused, quoting from King v. Guerra, Tex.Civ.App., 1 S.W.2d 373, error refused.

The presumption of validity accorded original comprehensive zoning applies as well to an amendatory ordinance. Weaver v. Ham, 149 Tex. 309, 232 S.W.2d 704. In either case the courts have no authority to interfere unless the change is clearly unreasonable and arbitary. Clesi v. Northwest Dallas Imporvement Ass'n, Tex.Civ.App., 263 S.W.2d 820, 827, error refused, N.R.E., quoting 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 228, p. 561.

If reasonable minds may differ as to whether or not a particular zoning restriction has a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, no clear abuse of discretion is shown and the restriction must stand as a valid exercise of the city's police power. City of Corpus Christi v. Jones, Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W.2d 388, error dism., correct judgt. Otherwise expressed by the court in the case just cited, if the issue of validity is fairly debatable courts will not interfere.

Have Watkins et al. met their 'extraordinary' burden to show that there were no controversial or issuable facts which would authorize the city council of...