City of West Palm Beach v. Amos

• Decision Date: 17 October 1930
• Citation: 100 Fla. 891,130 So. 710
• Parties: CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH v. AMOS, State Comptroller.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

130 So. 710

100 Fla. 891

CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH v. AMOS, State Comptroller.

Florida Supreme Court

October 17, 1930

En Banc.

Suit by the City of West Palm Beach against Ernest Amos, as State Comptroller. From an order sustaining defendant's demurrer to the bill, complainant appeals.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Leon County; E. C Love, Judge.

COUNSEL

J. Mark Wilcox and Winters, Foskett & Wilcox, all of West Palm Beach for appellant.

Fred H Davis, Atty. Gen., and H. E. Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

OPINION

STRUM J.

The question here presented is whether or not the tax imposed by chapter 13756, Act of 1929 (page 456), upon the storage of gasoline and other petroleum products applies to the storage of gasoline by municipalities for their own public use.

Complainant below, a municipal corporation, sought an injunction against collection of the tax. A demurrer to the bill of complaint was sustained, and the injunction denied, from which order this appeal is taken.

Complainant presents three major contentions: First, that the tax, in its general application, is repugnant to constitutional limitations and void. Second, that the act does not by its terms extend to municipal corporations. Third, that, if the tax be valid generally, and even if it purports to apply to municipal corporations, the tax as to such corporations is void as an attempt to tax property held and used exclusively for municipal purposes, contrary to the Constitution of Florida, art. 9, § 1, and article 16, § 16.

The first contention is largely disposed of by what was said in Jerome H. Sheip Co. v. Amos (Fla.) 130 So. 699, this day filed, in which the tax is held to be an excise upon the privilege of storage, and valid as against the objections therein raised.

The further objection is here made that, because this tax is payable only on account of the storage of gasoline and like petroleum products 'imported into this State from any other State or foreign Country, or received by any means into this State,' the tax constitutes an obnoxious discrimination based solely upon origin. See Ex parte Smith (Fla.) 128 So. 864. That contention is untenable. Excises may be imposed by the state upon the use of property in this state, particularly of certain classes, when the property is not in interstate commerce. See Askren v. Cont. Oil Co., 252 U.S. 444, 40 S.Ct. 355, 64 L.Ed. 654; Wagner v. Covington, 251 U.S. 95, 104, 40 S.Ct. 93, 64 L.Ed. 157, 168. Under this statute, the origin of the property is not the criterion of the tax. The tax is imposed upon a taxable privilege exercised wholly within this state at the election of the owner. Liability for the tax arises, not by reason of its origin, but by reason of the storage of the gasoline in this state after it has been severed from interstate commerce. Under this statute, gasoline may be imported and freely subjected to any of its common uses, so long as it is not stored longer than twenty-four hours. Storage, as contemplated by this statute, is not essential to free importation. If there is no storage in this state, there is no liability for this tax. As stated in Sheip Co. v. Amos, supra, this statute is complementary to the sales tax statutes, for the purpose of effectuating the state's public policy as to the revenue to be derived from the use of gasoline in this state, and to forestall the evasion of that policy.

That the effect of this tax is not to work an injurious discrimination, solely on the basis of origin, against commodities produced in other states, contrary to section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or to section 2, art. 4, of the Federal Constitution, is conclusively demonstrated by the fact, of which we take judicial notice, that no gasoline or other petroleum products are produced in this state. All such products used here are imported from other states or countries. On account of that fact, this tax necessarily applies alike to the storage of all such products used in this state notwithstanding their origin, save those for which a sales tax has been paid; the latter being exonerated from the storage tax by virtue of the expressed legislative intent not to exact both a sales tax and a storage tax with reference to the same products. The circumstances attending this tax are therefore not within the purposes of the constitutional inhibitions last referred to.

Complainant's second contention is that the statute does not extend to the storage of gasoline by municipal corporations, when such gasoline is to be used and consumed for public use, because the latter part of section 1 of the statute refers only to gasoline kept in storage to be used and consumed in this state 'by any person, firm or corporation.'

It has been held by this court that a city or county is a governmental as well as a corporate entity, and ordinarily is not, in its governmental capacity, a 'person or corporation.' State v. Peninsular Tel. Co., 73 Fla. 913, 75 So. 201, 10 A. L. R. 501. It is therefore contended that storage of gasoline by the complainant city for use in its governmental capacity is not within the exaction of the statute, since such gasoline is not to be used or consumed 'by any person, firm or corporation.'

The intent of the Legislature is the essence of a statute. That intent may be evidenced by clear implication and intendment as well as by express words. State v. Patterson, 67 Fla. 499, 65 So. 659; Getzen v. Sumter County, 89 Fla. 45, 103 So. 104. When that intent harmonizes with constitutional limitations, it controls. The intent of the Legislature in this instance is strikingly illuminated by the legislative history of the statute.

As originally introduced in the House of Representatives as House Bill 170 (H. J. p. 41), the exactions of section 1 applied only to 'any person, firm or corporation' who shall import and store petroleum products etc. Section 6 carried an express provision that the tax should not apply to the storage of petroleum products 'received and stored in this State to be used solely and exclusively for State, County, or municipal purposes.' The bill passed the House in that form, after the proviso constituting the last...