City of Williston v. Roadlander
| Decision Date | 14 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. AM-260,AM-260 |
| Citation | 425 So.2d 1175 |
| Parties | CITY OF WILLISTON, d/b/a Williston Memorial Hospital, Petitioner, v. Roy ROADLANDER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ruby I. Roadlander, deceased, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Edwin C. Cluster, of Ayres, Cluster, Curry, McCall & Briggs, Ocala, for petitioner.
Patrick H. Perry, of Avera & Stripling, Gainesville, for respondent.
Petitioner seeks to invoke our certiorari jurisdiction to review an order denying petitioner's motion for a protective order limiting discovery. We find that the court below departed from the essential requirements of law and that relief by appeal from a final judgment would be inadequate, 1 and we therefore grant certiorari review pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(2)(A).
Petitioner is a health care facility owned and operated by the City of Williston; respondent is the personal representative of a deceased patient who had received treatment in the hospital. Respondent brought a negligence action against the hospital and two treating physicians, and sought to discover various documents within the hospital files. Petitioner moved for a protective order, alleging, among other contentions, that respondent's discovery request embraces confidential materials privileged by § 768.40(4), Florida Statutes. This enactment provides that the proceedings and records of medical review committees
shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a provider of professional health services arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee ....
The trial court recognized that § 768.40(4) prohibits the discovery of medical review committee proceedings and records, but reasoned that when the hospital is a public health care facility such materials are nevertheless available to the general public pursuant to Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, the Public Records Act. The trial court therefore denied the motion for a protective order since respondent is "a citizen ... of the general public ...."
Chapter 119 provides for inspection and examination of public records except that records "which are presently provided by law to be confidential or which are prohibited from being inspected by the public, whether by general or special law, shall be exempt ..." from inspection. See § 119.07(3). Section 768.40(4), Florida Statutes, expressly exempts medical review committee records from discovery, and while respondent is indeed a member of the general public, which has been held entitled to inspection of such records pursuant to Chapter 119, 2 we construe § 768.40(4) as precluding discovery made under the guise of a public records act inspection by one who has come within the prohibition of § 768.40(4) against discovery "in any civil action against a provider ...." The specific enactment is, by this construction, given its expressed effect to preclude all "discovery" of the records by respondent while he is involved in such an action. We therefore conclude that the lower court erred in failing to grant petitioner's motion for a protective order insofar as respondent's discovery request encompasses medical review committee records.
Petitioner also contends that respondent's discovery request includes "work product" embraced within the attorney-client privilege of § 90.502, Florida Statutes, and thereby exempted from inspection under the Public Records Act. The trial court relied on Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So.2d 420 (Fla.1979), and ruled that work product is not an exception to inspection under Chapter 119. Wait established that exemption from Chapter 119 inspection is dependent upon statutory privilege, rather than common law or judicially created doctrines. Section 90.502, Florida Statutes, enacted subsequent to the decision in Wait, provides an attorney-client privilege as to "confidential communications" between lawyer and client. However, confidentiality of work product is a separate doctrine based on public policy considerations, and is not strictly within the ambit of the attorney-client privilege. See generally, Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co. v. Allen, 40 So.2d 115 (Fla.1949); also see Surf Drugs Inc. v. Vermentte, 236 So.2d 108 (Fla....
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...by writ of certiorari. See, e.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jackson, 445 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); City of Williston v. Roadlander, 425 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Marine Investment Co. v. Van Voorhis, 162 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). As stated in Boucher v. Pure Oil Co., 101 So.......
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Somer v. Johnson
...the confidentiality of such records when sought in a medical malpractice action. 412 So.2d at 896; see also City of Williston v. Roadlander, 425 So.2d 1175, 1177 (Fla.Dist.App.1983). Moreover, contrary to Gadd, the court in City of Williston raised the possibility, without deciding the ques......
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Corry v. Meggs
...may invoke this court's certiorari jurisdiction based on a departure from the essential requirements of law. City of Williston v. Roadlander, 425 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).2 The assistant state attorney in charge of preparing the grand jury for the homicide investigation testified at t......
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Florida House of Representatives ex rel. Kriseman v. Expedia, Inc., CASE NO. 1D11-6545
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