City of Windsor v. Bast

• Citation: 199 S.W. 722
• Decision Date: 31 December 1917
• Docket Number: No. 12648.,12648.
• Parties: CITY OF WINDSOR v. BAST.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

199 S.W. 722

CITY OF WINDSOR v. BAST.

No. 12648.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 31, 1917.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Henry County; C. A. Calvird, Judge.

"Not to be officially published."

Sam Bast was convicted in police court of violating an ordinance of the City of Windsor. On appeal to the circuit court the cause was submitted on agreed statement of facts, and accused was found guilty, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Ross E. Feaster, of Windsor, for appellant. W. G. Davis, of Windsor, and W. E. Owen, of Clinton, for respondent.

TRIMBLE, J.

This was a prosecution originating in the police court of Windsor, a city of the fourth class, wherein defendant was charged with violating an ordinance of said city making it an offense, punishable by a fine of not less than $1 nor more than $25, for any person operating a motor vehicle on the streets of Windsor to approach and drive over a street intersection at a speed in excess of eight miles per hour, or to approach same without sounding a bell, horn, or other signaling device to give warning of such approach. Upon conviction, defendant appealed to the circuit court where the cause was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts and the ordinance in question. These facts were that Windsor was a city of the fourth class; that the ordinance in question was duly and legally passed and approved; and that defendant on the date charged did drive an automobile toward and across the intersection of Main and Benton streets in said city at a rate of speed greater than eight miles per hour and did fail to sound his horn, bell, or any other signal device upon his approach to said intersection. The ordinance was offered in evidence, but no other evidence was tendered or heard. The cause was then submitted to the court sitting as a jury, and the defendant was found guilty and his punishment assessed at a fine of $1. He appealed to this court.

The contentions of appellant are: (1) That the ordinance is void because it conflicts with, or rather fixes a less rate of speed than, the state law on the subject of motor vehicles (section 9, p. 327, Laws of 1911, and section 3, p. 322, Laws of 1911, as amended by section 1, p. 412, Laws of 1913); (2) that the ordinance was void because no authority is given cities of the fourth class to regulate the speed of automobiles; (3) that the ordinance was unreasonable; (4) that the ordinance was discriminative in character.

The ordinance in question was passed by the city in the exercise of the general police power given to such cities by section 9422, R. S. Mo. 1909, reading, in part, as follows:

"And they shall also have power to enact and make all such ordinances and rules, not inconsistent with the laws of the state, as may be expedient for maintaining the peace and good government and welfare of the city and its trade and commerce."

Such cities have control of their streets and public places, and can make all reasonable and needful regulations as to travel and traffic thereon which are not only necessary for the expedition of business, but also for the protection of the lives and the preservation of the safety of the people traveling thereon. Municipal corporations are prima facie the sole judges of the necessity of their ordinances, and courts will not ordinarily review their reasonableness when passed in compliance with authority given them by the state. Hannibal v. Missouri & Kansas Tel. Co., 31 Mo. App. 23; City of St. Louis v. Green, 70 Mo....