City Sch. Dist. of the New York v. McGraham

• Decision Date: 17 November 2011
• Citation: 33 IER Cases 51,958 N.E.2d 897,934 N.Y.S.2d 768,17 N.Y.3d 917,274 Ed. Law Rep. 695,2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 08228
• Parties: CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. Colleen McGRAHAM, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

17 N.Y.3d 917

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 08228

274 Ed. Law Rep. 695

33 IER Cases 51

934 N.Y.S.2d 768

958 N.E.2d 897

CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant,

v.Colleen McGRAHAM, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 17, 2011.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Stephen J. McGrath, Cheryl Payer and Leonard Koerner of counsel), for appellant.

Maria Elena Gonzalez, New York City, and Richard E. Casagrande for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURTMEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Respondent, a 36–year–old tenured high school teacher, was the subject of disciplinary charges pursuant to Education Law § 3020–a as a result of her improper conduct with respect to a 15–year–old male student. Respondent corresponded with the student electronically outside of school hours—sometimes late at night—about a variety of personal matters and tried to discuss with him the nature of their relationship, which, in her view, was potentially romantic. There was, however, no physical contact, let alone a physical relationship, between the two and none of her communications were of a sexual nature. They never met outside of school grounds.

The hearing officer found respondent guilty of three of the five specifications preferred against her and determined that she engaged in inappropriate communications of an intimate nature with the student, constituting conduct unbecoming her position as a teacher. In determining the appropriate penalty, the hearing officer considered that respondent was remorseful for her conduct and that she sought therapy soon after her behavior came to light. The hearing officer did not believe that respondent would repeat such conduct and imposed a penalty of a 90–day suspension without pay and reassignment to a different school upon her reinstatement. Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7511 to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the penalty imposed was irrational and contrary to the public policy of protecting children.^*

Education Law § 3020–a (5) limits judicial review of a hearing officer's determination to the grounds set forth in CPLR 7511. Where, as here, parties are subject to compulsory arbitration, the award must satisfy an additional layer of judicial scrutiny—it “must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious” ( Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214, 223, 652 N.Y.S.2d 584, 674 N.E.2d 1349 [1996] ).

Contrary to petitioner's argument, the arbitration award does not violate public policy. Courts will only intervene in the arbitration process in those “cases in which public policy considerations, embodied in statute or decisional law, prohibit, in an absolute sense, particular matters being decided or certain relief being granted by an arbitrator” ( Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 N.Y.2d 623, 631, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 389 N.E.2d 456 [1979] ). It cannot be disputed that the State has a public policy in favor of protecting children , but this broad, well-settled principle is not the type of absolute prohibition from arbitrating a “partic...