Ciudadana v. Gracia-Morales

• Decision Date: 22 February 2005
• Docket Number: Civil No. 02-2191(DRD).
• Citation: 359 F.Supp.2d 38
• Parties: Limpieza CIUDADANA et al., Plaintiffs, v. Aurelio GRACIA-MORALES et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

359 F.Supp.2d 38

Limpieza CIUDADANA et al., Plaintiffs, v. Aurelio GRACIA-MORALES et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 02-2191(DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

February 22, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Salvador Tio-Fernandez, Santurce, PR, Jose R. Ortiz-Velez, San Juan, PR, Roberto A. Fernandez-Quiles, Hato Rey, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Ramon L. Walker-Merino, Rene Arrillaga-Belendez, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are defendants' Motion to Request Opinion and Order as to Attorneys' Fees (Docket No. 111), and plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Entry of Judgment as to Attorneys' fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Docket No. 112). Both parties are essentially requesting that the Opinion and Order read in open Court on September 29, 2004, (as transcribed in Docket No. 100) be entered but adjusted by agreement of the parties to the amount of $100,000.00 in attorneys' fees including costs. All parties affirm that the Court's decision is final and unappealable.

Thus, the Court GRANTS both parties requests and enters the Opinion and Order as transcribed by the Court Reporter, but adjusted to the agreed upon amount of $100,000.00.

OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' Petition for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses and Memorandum in Support Thereof (Docket No. 59); Plaintiffs' Supplemental Petition of Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Filing Documents in its Support (Docket No. 61); Plaintiffs' Motion Requesting the Court to Entertain Petition For Statutory Attorneys' Fees and to Grant the Same as Requested (Docket No. 71); Plaintiffs' Motion Submitting Addendum of their Motion Reiterating Petition for Attorneys' Fees (Docket No. 72) and; Plaintiffs' Motion Reiterating Request to Entertain Petition for Attorneys' Fees in View of Mandate of the Court of Appeals (Docket No. 78).

In their petition for attorneys' fees (Docket No. 59) and (Docket No. 61)¹ plaintiffs request the Court to grant attorneys' fees and related litigation expenses for the professional work carried out by plaintiffs' counsel in the instant case. Defendants duly filed their Response to Request For Attorney's Fees and Expenses (Docket No. 65) opposing said request for attorneys' fees. Defendants sustain that plaintiffs are not a "prevailing party". In the alternative, even if plaintiff is considered as a prevailing party the fees and expenses requested by the three attorneys² is disproportionate to the ultimate result of the litigation because they only prevailed on one of the constitutional challenges. Further, the request is exaggerated to the point that it should be denied in its entirety. Plaintiffs filed their Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Petition for Attorney's Fees (Docket No. 69)where Plaintiffs avers that defendants' objections should be dismissed and the attorneys' fees requested should be granted.³ On September 17, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a Motion Submitting Revised Time Slips Using the Task Performance Method per Court's Order of September 3, 2004 (Docket No. 94). On September 24, 2004 the defendants filed their Opposition (Docket No. 96) and on September 27, 2004 the plaintiffs filed their reply (Docket No. 97). The Court is ready to rule.

I. Background

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on August 9, 2002. On September 23, 2003 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 8) to which Plaintiffs were compelled to respond (Docket No. 9). This Court then denied (Docket No. 15) defendants' Motion for Consolidation of the instant case with Pérez Guzmán (Docket No. 4) and allowed the intervention of the local Secretary of Justice who requested to defend the challenged constitutional validity of the questioned challenged statutes (Docket No. 12). Plaintiffs then timely opposed (Docket No. 14).

On March 10, 2003 then Chief Judge Laffitte issued an Opinion and Order declaring unconstitutional requirements that new political parties were required the use of notary publics to register individual party affiliates as set forth under the local Electoral Law. Perez Guzman v. Gracia, 260 F. Supp 2d 389 (D.P.R.2003) Two days later, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction in the instant case (Docket No. 17). A hearing was scheduled for April 9, 2003. On said hearing the Secretary of Justice's argument prompted the Court to instruct the plaintiffs to amend the complaint (Docket No. 24). An Amended Complaint was submitted (Docket No. 28).

On June 19, 2003 at the Initial Scheduling Conference, the Court set the preliminary injunction for hearing (Docket No. 34).⁴ The preliminary injunction hearing was held on July 11 and 14, and after the parties filed their post hearing briefs an Opinion and Order was issued on July 21, 2003 (Docket No. 46). Defendants and Intervener filed Rule 59 Motions (Docket No. 47 and 48). Further, Defendants informed the Court that they opposed the issuance of a permanent injunction and that they might have additional evidence opposing the final relief. The Court provided defendants three weeks to inform the Court whether they had additional facts, otherwise the Court was ready to issue the permanent injunction following the case of Pérez Guzmán v. Aurelio Gracia, 346 F.3d 229 (1st Cir., 2003)(Docket Nos. 53 and 54). Said evidence was never produced and on December 16, 2003 the Court issued a final Order and Judgment (Docket No. 58).

On July 21st, 2003 the Court held that the lawyer-notary public requirement to register individual voters contained in Article 3.001(3) of the Puerto Rico Electoral Act was unconstitutional and violated plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights (Opinion and Order Docket No. 46 p. 30). On December 16, 2003, the Court granted plaintiffs' request of permanent injunctive relief. (Docket No. 58).

Plaintiff timely requested compensation at hourly rates for all attorneys that participated in the present litigation, as follows:

a. José R. Ortiz Vélez is an experienced litigator, who has been practicing before the Commonwealth for 19 years and in this federal forum since 1986. Attorney Ortiz Vélez charges at a rate of $250.00 per hour in Court time and $200.00 per hour out of Court time.⁵ In the instant case, said attorney sustains that he worked for 293.75 hours out of Court for a total compensation of $58,750.00 and 20 hours in Court for a total of $5,000. For a ground total amount of $63,750.00.

b. Roberto A. Fernández has been involved, since 1990, in numerous civil rights and constitutional cases mainly representing governmental officials from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Attorney Fernández charges at a rate of $225.00 per hour in Court time and $200.00 per hour out of Court time. In the present case, said attorney affirms he worked for 117.75 hours out of Court for a total compensation of $23,550 and 14.5 hours in Court for a total compensation of $3,262.50. For a grand total amount of $26,812.50.

c. Salvador Tió Fernández is a former director of ACLU's New York Office, former director of litigation at the Puerto Rico Office of Legal Services and a former professor on the University of Puerto Rico Law School. His legal practice includes constitutional and civil rights litigations as well as appellate practice. Attorney Tió charges at a rate of $250.00 per hour in Court time and $200.00 per hour out of Court time. For out of Court work he requested compensation in the amount of $43,300.00 and $5,250.00 as compensation for in Court work. A total compensation of $48,550.00 is requested.

Further, Plaintiffs submitted a Bill of Costs for $1,472.38 for costs authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920.⁶ Furthermore counsel incurred in additional expenses which are not authorized under Section 1920 but which allegedly must be covered in accordance with the fee-shifting statute.⁷

II. Right to Attorney's Fees

In Civil Rights cases a prevailing party is entitled to statutory costs and reimbursement for litigation expenses and attorneys fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Accordingly, courts are in the obligation to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The laws as to civil rights compensation of attorneys' fees is that "[u]nless special circumstances would render such award unjust attorney's fees must be awarded." Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 89 n. 1, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968); de Jesus v. Banco Popular, 918 F.2d 232 (1st Cir.1990). Gay Officers Action League v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir., 2001) ("awards in favor of prevailing civil rights plaintiffs are virtually obligatory.") Plaintiff's are also entitled to litigation costs beyond those statutorily allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

A plaintiff prevails when actual relief on the merits of his claim "materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Gay Officers Action League v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d at 293. The fact that the plaintiffs did not prevail on every single theory that they brought before the Court is no impediment to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs. Hensley v. Eckerhart 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) When the claims are interrelated the fact that plaintiff did not prevail in every single claim does not justify the reduction of the award. Lipsett v. Blanco 975 F.2d 934, 941 (1st Cir.1992).

On the other hand, obtaining equitable relief does not automatically confer a prevailing party status for purposes of the Fees Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1988, see also Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep Sch Dist, 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988). "Plaintiffs may be...