Civetti v. Turner
Decision Date | 30 December 2022 |
Docket Number | 22-AP-079 |
Citation | 2022 VT 64 |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Parties | Paul Civetti v. Shelby Turner & Town of Isle La Motte |
2022 VT 64
Paul Civetti
v.
Shelby Turner & Town of Isle La Motte
No. 22-AP-079
Supreme Court of Vermont
December 30, 2022
On Appeal from Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division David A. Barra, J.
Pietro J. Lynn of Lynn, Lynn, Blackman & Manitsky, P.C., Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Brian P. Monaghan and Zachary J. Chen of Monaghan Safar Ducham PLLC, Burlington, for Defendants-Appellees.
Present: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll, Cohen and Waples, JJ.
WAPLES, J.
¶ 1. The primary issue in this appeal is whether the Town of Isle La Motte and its road commissioner, Shelby Turner, are entitled to qualified immunity as a defense to plaintiff Paul Civetti's negligence claims. The trial court determined that both the Town and the road commissioner were entitled to qualified immunity and granted their motions for summary judgment after concluding that decisions regarding road alterations were discretionary, "involv[ing] an element of judgment or choice," rather than ministerial, meaning "prescribe[d]." Searles v. Agency of Transp., 171 Vt. 562, 563, 762 A.2d 812, 814 (2000) (mem.) (quotation omitted). We agree with the trial court that deciding whether to widen Main Street was discretionary, thus entitling both the Town and the road commissioner to qualified immunity. We therefore affirm.
¶ 2. The underlying tort action in this appeal followed an August 2016 motor vehicle accident in the Town of Isle La Motte. Plaintiff was driving a propane truck on Main Street when he lost control of the vehicle causing it to roll over and come to rest on its roof. Plaintiff asserts that defendants were negligent in failing to widen Main Street in accordance with Vermont Town Road and Bridge Standards, causing his accident. The State of Vermont promulgates Town Road and Bridge Standards to serve as guidance for municipalities when they decide to construct or alter a town highway. Plaintiff filed a negligence claim against defendants the Town of Isle La Motte and Shelby Turner, in his capacity as road commissioner, seeking damages for plaintiff's injuries. The parties dispute what authority, if any, the Town Selectboard delegated to the road commissioner to construct, lay out, and alter Town roadways.
¶ 3. Plaintiff's original complaint was dismissed by the trial court based on municipal immunity, culminating in the parties' first appearance before this Court. See Civetti v. Turner, 2020 VT 23, ¶ 1, 212 Vt. 185, 233 A.3d 1056 (Civetti I). In Civetti I, we held that the statutory framework amounts to a waiver of municipal immunity, placing the Town in the shoes of its municipal officers, and entitling it only to the defenses available to those officers. Id. ¶ 15; see also 24 V.S.A. § 901(a) (governing actions by or against municipal officers and employees). We did not foreclose a qualified-immunity defense, however, and remanded the case to the trial court to consider "a host of factors not evident from the bare pleadings" in deciding whether such a defense was available to defendants. Civetti I, 2020 VT 23, ¶¶ 32, 37.
¶ 4. After further development of the record, the Town moved for summary judgment on several bases, including qualified immunity, and the trial court granted the motion. The trial court applied the two-part test established by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991), and adopted by this Court in Searles, 171 Vt. at 563-64, 762 A.2d at 813-14, to determine whether the omission at issue was discretionary or ministerial in nature. The first part of the test asks whether the act or omission employed an element of judgment or choice
and, if the act contained such an element, the second part asks whether that act was of the type that the discretionary-function exception was designed to shield from liability. Id., 171 Vt. at 563, 762 A.2d at 814. This exception is designed to protect public officers from suffering legal consequences for making the kind of difficult decisions that officials are often required to make. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323 ("[T]he purpose of the exception is to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort . . . ." (quotation omitted)).
¶ 5. In analyzing the first prong, the trial court determined that deciding whether to alter town roads was discretionary in nature because there was no explicit policy mandating such action. It noted that the Town had not adopted any policy that would require the widening of Main Street, and further, the Town Road and Bridge Standards did not require municipalities to alter their existing infrastructure. Turning to the second prong, the trial court determined that deciding whether to widen Main Street was necessarily grounded in the kinds of public-policy considerations that the qualified-immunity doctrine was designed to protect. It noted that the road commissioner must weigh factors such as safety and cost in making decisions about highway projects, considerations often steeped in public policy.
¶ 6. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the road commissioner's duty to maintain Main Street in compliance with the Town's adopted road standards was ministerial in nature and thus defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff further argues that the road commissioner had a ministerial duty to widen Main Street that flowed from his duty to maintain the town roads, a duty delegated...
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