CJ v. Department of Human Services

• Decision Date: 24 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 1-00-2108., No. 1-99-4248
• Citation: 264 Ill.Dec. 835,331 Ill. App.3d 871,771 N.E.2d 539
• Parties: C.J., K.M., and Thomas Juresic, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

771 N.E.2d 539

331 Ill. App.3d 871

264 Ill.Dec. 835

C.J., K.M., and Thomas Juresic, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 1-99-4248, 1-00-2108.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

May 24, 2002.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, Chicago (Jan E. Hughes, of counsel), for Appellant.

Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, Chicago (Mark J. Heyrman, of counsel), for Appellees.

Justice FROSSARD delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs C.J., K.M., and Thomas Juresic filed this class action lawsuit seeking injunctive relief against defendant, the Illinois Department of Human Services (Department). Plaintiffs are criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRIs) who were involuntarily committed to the Elgin Mental Health Center (Elgin). Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Department's policy that did not allow any NGRI patient at Elgin to be considered or recommended by Elgin staff for an unsupervised on-grounds pass. Plaintiffs contend that the Department policy deprived plaintiffs of their liberty interest in freedom of bodily movement without the exercise of professional judgment in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV).

The trial court initially granted the Department's motion under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. On appeal this court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs' Illinois statutory claims in counts I, II, III, IV and V. C.J. v. Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 296 Ill.App.3d 17, 23-27, 230 Ill.Dec. 458, 693 N.E.2d 1209 (1998). However, we reversed and remanded plaintiffs' constitutional claims. We found, as to counts VI, VII, and VIII, that plaintiffs "adequately pled a constitutionally protected liberty interest in freedom of bodily movement, challenging the Department's alleged policy preventing the facility director of Elgin from considering unsupervised on-grounds passes for the plaintiffs." C.J. v. Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 296 Ill.App.3d 17, 29, 230 Ill.Dec. 458, 693 N.E.2d 1209 (1998). In the counts that survived the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs alleged that the Department's policy restricting grounds passes violated due process because it was not based on professional judgment (count VI); it restricted plaintiffs' liberty interest in freedom of bodily movement (count VII); and it was unrelated to a reasonable expectation that any NGRI patient will inflict physical harm to others if considered for a grounds pass (count VIII).

On remand, we indicated that various questions of fact needed to be addressed by the trial court before it determined whether the Department violated due process by depriving plaintiffs of their liberty interest in freedom of bodily movement without the exercise of professional judgment. Based on plaintiffs' surviving allegations, we asked the trial court to resolve the factual issues raised by the pleadings by addressing what constitutes an unsupervised on-grounds pass, the nature of the plaintiffs' liberty interest in freedom of movement, plaintiffs' conditions of confinement, whether the Department adopted a policy prohibiting the exercise of professional judgment regarding considering and recommending passes, and the Department's justification in terms of due process for restricting the plaintiffs' liberty. C.J., 296 Ill.App.3d at 31-32,230 Ill.Dec. 458,693 N.E.2d 1209.

The trial court on remand conducted a hearing during which it considered testimony including oral and written submissions from the parties. Plaintiffs called Department employees Dr. Dinwiddie, medical director at Elgin, Dennis Headley, forensic program administrator at Elgin, and Michael Howie, the forensic network manager for the Department, as adverse witnesses. Lorenzo Turner, a former NGRI patient who was discharged from Elgin in 1997, testified for the plaintiffs.

After considering the evidence and addressing the factual issues we previously identified, the court granted class action relief in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered its injunction to apply to all similarly situated current or future NGRI patients at Elgin. On November 8, 1999, the trial court entered a written order consistent with its oral findings granting plaintiffs relief from the pass policy directed at all NGRI patients at Elgin, which restricted their freedom of movement without the exercise of professional judgment. The trial court, applying the principles articulated in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), found the Department deprived plaintiffs of their liberty interest in freedom of bodily movement without the exercise of professional judgment and found that this deprivation of liberty violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The trial court found that no legitimate interest of the Department would be harmed by the injunction and that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if a permanent injunction were not issued. The court in granting plaintiffs injunctive relief regarding the on-grounds passes ordered that the Department exercise "individualized professional judgment in considering, reviewing, recommending and approving such passes." Plaintiffs' motion for costs and fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) was granted.

The facts have been outlined in our previous opinion, C.J., 296 Ill.App.3d 17, 230 Ill.Dec. 458, 693 N.E.2d 1209, and will only be repeated here as necessary in resolving the issues raised by this appeal. The Department argues that the trial court erred in granting an injunction because the lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Department did exercise professional judgment, and the trial court erred in awarding fees to plaintiffs' counsel. We affirm.

I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The Department claims that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue an injunction. Although the Department did not raise this defense in the trial court, it did not waive appellate review because a party cannot waive the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill.2d 151, 157, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977 (1992). Article XIII, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution abolished sovereign immunity but, gave the General Assembly the power to provide for immunity by law. Ill. Const.1970, art. XIII, § 4. Thereafter, the General Assembly enacted the State Lawsuit Immunity Act (745 ILCS 5/1 (West 1998)). This Act reasserted the doctrine of sovereign immunity in favor of the State except where the State has expressly consented to be sued or where the suit is brought pursuant to the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1998)) or the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1998)). 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 1998).

The Illinois Supreme Court has determined that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to actions against the State where plaintiff "seeks to enjoin the defendant from taking actions in excess of his delegated authority and in violation of plaintiff's protectible legal interests." Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill.2d 540, 548, 12 Ill.Dec. 600, 370 N.E.2d 223 (1977). In Rockford Memorial Hospital v. Department of Human Rights, 272 Ill.App.3d 751, 755, 209 Ill.Dec. 471, 651 N.E.2d 649 (1995), the court labeled this exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity as the "prospective injunctive relief exception" and stated that it applies "where a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a State agency or official from taking actions in excess of his statutory or constitutional authority." Rockford Memorial Hospital, 272 Ill.App.3d at 755, 209 Ill.Dec. 471, 651 N.E.2d 649. In Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 74 Ill.2d 541, 552, 25 Ill. Dec. 602, 387 N.E.2d 258 (1978), the Illinois Supreme Court found that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar an action in the circuit court seeking a declaration that a state agency was acting beyond its delegated authority. Landfill, Inc., 74 Ill.2d at 552, 25 Ill.Dec. 602, 387 N.E.2d 258.

Here, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to prevent the Department and its officials from violating their due process rights. Plaintiffs asserted that the Department, through Elgin staff officials, acted in excess of their constitutional authority. Plaintiffs asked the circuit court to enter an injunction requiring Elgin staff officials to comply with plaintiffs' due process rights.

The Department, however, counters that plaintiffs did not sue a specific state official but a state agency. The Department correctly points out that the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to lawsuits against agencies of the State, which are considered arms of the State, because these lawsuits could deplete state funds and interfere with governmental functions. Ellis v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 102 Ill.2d 387, 393-94, 80 Ill.Dec. 750, 466 N.E.2d 202 (1984); People ex rel. Manning v. Nickerson, 184 Ill.2d 245, 248, 234 Ill.Dec. 375, 702 N.E.2d 1278 (1998). However, this court has explained that sovereign immunity exists only if (1) the defendant is an arm of the State; (2) plaintiff's action constitutes a "present claim" which could subject the State to liability; and (3) no exception to the doctrine exists. City of Chicago v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 293 Ill.App.3d 897, 900, 228 Ill. Dec. 253, 689 N.E.2d 125 (1997). In City of Chicago, the court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiff's action, even though it sued an arm of the State, because the lawsuit constituted a declaratory action and not a present claim. City of Chicago, 293 Ill.App.3d at 902, 228 Ill.Dec. 253, 689 N.E.2d 125.

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