Guns Save Life, Inc. v. Raoul

• Citation: 2019 IL App (4th) 190334,146 N.E.3d 254,438 Ill.Dec. 500
• Decision Date: 03 December 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 4-19-0334,4-19-0334
• Parties: GUNS SAVE LIFE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kwame RAOUL, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Illinois; and Brendan Kelly, in His Official Capacity as Acting Director of the Illinois State Police, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (4th) 190334

146 N.E.3d 254

438 Ill.Dec. 500

GUNS SAVE LIFE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Kwame RAOUL, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Illinois; and Brendan Kelly, in His Official Capacity as Acting Director of the Illinois State Police, Defendants-Appellees.

NO. 4-19-0334

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

FILED December 3, 2019

Christian D. Ambler, of Stone & Johnson, Chtrd., of Chicago, and David H. Thompson and Peter A. Patterson, of Cooper & Kirk, PLLC, of Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Sarah A. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In May 2019, plaintiff, Guns Save Life, Inc. (hereinafter "GSL"), filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, on behalf of its members, against defendants, Kwame Raoul and Brendan Kelly, in their official capacities, alleging the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Act) ( 430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 2018)) is unconstitutional as a violation of the federal and state constitutional right to bear arms. Plaintiff claims the FOID Act charges a tax on the rights of Illinois's citizens provided by the second and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amends. II, XIV ) and article I, sections 2 and 22, of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 22 ) and violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by improperly requiring one to pay for a license to own a firearm. Additionally, plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction seeking to restrain enforcement of the FOID Act as a clear violation of the right to keep and bear arms. In a hearing on the motion, the trial court found plaintiff had not met its burden, and plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal.

¶ 2 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In May 2019, plaintiff, GSL, an organization which describes itself as "an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to defending the Second Amendment rights of Illinois residents," filed a four-count complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants on behalf of its members, identifying two members in particular—Harold Meyer and an unnamed 84-year-old United States Marine Corps (Marine) veteran. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged Meyer, a Cook County resident and member of its organization, was denied the ability to renew his Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card because the Illinois State Police erroneously determined he had been convicted of battery in 1983. His license was revoked, and he was forced to turn his guns over to his wife. The complaint further alleged the unnamed veteran lost his license when he forgot to renew his FOID card; as a result, the police confiscated his guns and expired FOID card. In count I, plaintiff contends the FOID Act is unconstitutional on its face as directly violative of the second amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiff further alleges the FOID Act's licensing fee places a tax upon the free exercise of a constitutional right and is violative of the second amendment as well as the fourteenth amendment (see U.S. Const., amends. II, XIV ). Count II repeats the same claims, alleging they are also violative of Illinois's version of the second amendment found in article I, section 22, of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22 ). Count III alleges a violation of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. XIV ), claiming the FOID Act, in effect, creates different classes of people, who may or may not exercise their second amendment right to possess a firearm based solely on paying a fee, which is unrelated to the statute's expressed purpose, i.e. , the promotion of public safety. Count IV is a similar allegation under the Illinois Constitution's version of the equal protection clause ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2 ).

¶ 5 In conjunction with its complaint, plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, claiming the FOID Act violated the second amendment and Illinois's version thereof and it was entitled to injunctive relief. In May 2019, defendants filed an objection to the motion, alleging plaintiff failed to establish the elements for a preliminary injunction and that plaintiff lacked associational standing. Later that month, the trial court held a hearing on the motion and denied the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, finding plaintiff failed to meet its burden.

¶ 6 This appeal followed.

¶ 7 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 8 A. Sufficiency of Complaint

¶ 9 We first address defendants' contention plaintiff's complaint failed to assert a claim that would entitle it to a preliminary injunction. Defendants argue the complaint addressed only the unconstitutional nature of the FOID card fees but its motion for injunctive relief raised for the first time a claim the act itself was unconstitutional. As a result, defendants contend the motion "depart[ed] significantly from the allegations in [the] complaint" and did not support enjoining enforcement of the entire FOID Act. We disagree.

¶ 10 "The right to injunctive relief necessarily brings into question the sufficiency of the complaint * * *." Olympic Federal v. Witney Development Co. , 113 Ill. App. 3d 981, 984, 69 Ill.Dec. 684, 447 N.E.2d 1371, 1373 (1983). "Where a statute is attacked as unconstitutional in its entirety * * *, equitable relief may be sought." Ron Smith Trucking, Inc. v. Jackson , 196 Ill. App. 3d 59, 64, 142 Ill.Dec. 530, 552 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (1990). Even so, "[a] complaint for injunctive relief must contain on its face a clear right to relief and state facts which establish the right to such relief in a positive, certain and precise manner." Heerey v. Berke , 179 Ill. App. 3d 927, 939, 128 Ill.Dec. 672, 534 N.E.2d 1277, 1284 (1989). While the complaint must show "the relief sought is warranted" ( McErlean v. Harvey Area Community Organization , 9 Ill. App. 3d 527, 529, 292 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1972) ), the complaint does "not have to make out a case which would entitle the plaintiff" to a final judgment ( H.K.H. Development Corp. v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago , 47 Ill. App. 2d 46, 51, 196 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1964) ). The plaintiff must only "raise[ ] a fair question as to the existence of the right claimed." H.K.H. Development Corp. , 47 Ill. App. 2d at 51, 196 N.E.2d 494. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure the defendant " ‘be informed of the injunction proposed against him so that he may be present, if he wishes, to defend himself.’ " Miollis v. Schneider , 77 Ill. App. 2d 420, 427, 222 N.E.2d 715, 719 (1966) (quoting Streamwood Home Builders, Inc. v. Brolin , 25 Ill. App. 2d 39, 44, 165 N.E.2d 531, 534 (1960) ). "Where the defendant answers or responds to the plaintiff's complaint, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine the legal sufficiency of that complaint and to resolve any questions of material fact." Russell v. Howe , 293 Ill. App. 3d 293, 296, 227 Ill.Dec. 894, 688 N.E.2d 375, 378 (1997).

¶ 11 In viewing the complaint in its entirety, plaintiff raised its claims against the FOID Act as well as the fees attached thereto. Plaintiff began its factual allegations by outlining the FOID Act's requirements, including the various restrictions on possession and ownership of firearms and/or ammunition without a FOID card, as well as the requirements for obtaining or renewing a FOID card. It noted how the FOID Act requires all residents to obtain a FOID card in order to "keep or bear firearms anywhere, including their own homes," or to possess ammunition. In bold type, on the fifth page of a 12-page complaint, plaintiffs asserted, "The FOID Act Infringes on the Rights of Guns Save Life Members." Plaintiff noted further how, but for the FOID Act's requirements, GSL members "would not be subject to these restrictions on their right to possess firearms." The restrictions to which it referred were not merely the payment of the fee, but the acquisition, maintenance, and renewal of the card. Repeatedly throughout the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff references how the FOID Act infringes on its members' right to possess firearms for their personal defense. As defendants correctly note, plaintiff's complaint unquestionably references the unconstitutional nature of the FOID card fees, frequently referring to them as an unconstitutional tax. However, the complaint also states in each count "[t]he FOID act is unconstitutional on its face because it directly burdens the exercise of Second Amendment rights" and provides a factual basis for the conclusion by describing how the act has been interpreted. All four counts of the complaint reference the unconstitutionality of the FOID Act "on its face," and in each prayer for relief, plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment finding the FOID Act "violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution," as well as injunctive relief from enforcement of the FOID Act. Nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff request only the removal of an unconstitutional fee.

¶ 12 Counts I and II include allegations of fact regarding Meyer and the 84-year-old Marine veteran—who are ostensibly prevented from exercising their second amendment rights because the FOID Act—and defendants' enforcement of the FOID Act, which required them to surrender their firearms for failing to possess a valid FOID card. In both counts, the plaintiff also unmistakably requested a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the FOID Act. In light of all the above, we find it puzzling defendants began their objection...