Claflin v. Claflin

• Decision Date: 02 March 1889
• Citation: 149 Mass. 19,20 N.E. 454
• Parties: CLAFLIN v. CLAFLIN et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

149 Mass. 19

20 N.E. 454

CLAFLIN v. CLAFLIN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 2, 1889

COUNSEL S.N. Aldrich and E.G. McInnes, for appellant.

Henry Baldwin, for appellees.

OPINION

FIELD J.

By the eleventh article of his will, as modified by a codicil Wilbur F. Claflin gave all the residue of his personal estate to trustees, "to sell and dispose of the same, and to pay to my wife, Mary A. Claflin, one-third part of the proceeds thereof, and to pay to my son Clarence A. Claflin one-third part of the proceeds thereof, and to pay the remaining one-third part thereof to my son Adelbert E Claflin, in the manner following, viz.: Ten thousand dollars when he is of the age of twenty-one years, ten thousand dollars when he is of the age of twenty-five years, and the balance when he is of the age of thirty years." Apparently, Adelbert E. Claflin was not quite 21 years old when his father died, but he some time ago reached that age, and received $10,000 from the trust. He has not yet reached the age of 25 years, and he brings this bill to compel the trustees to pay to him the remainder of the trust fund. His contention is, in effect, that the provisions of the will postponing the payment of the money beyond the time when he is 21 years old are void. There is no doubt that his interest in the trust fund is vested and absolute, and that no other person has any interest in it; and the authority is undisputed that the provisions postponing payment to him until some time after he reaches the age of 21 years would be treated as void by those courts which hold that restrictions against the alienation of absolute interests in the income of trust property are void. There has indeed, been no decision of this question in England by the house of lords, and but one by a chancellor, but there are several decisions to this effect by masters of the rolls, and by vice-chancellors. The cases are collected in Gray, Rest.Alien. §§ 106-112, and appendix II. See Josselyn v. Josselyn, 9 Sim. 63; Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, on appeal, Craig. & P. 240; Rocke v. Rocke, 9 Beav. 66; In re Young's Settlement, 18 Beav. 199; In re Jacob's Will, 29 Beav. 402; Gosling v. Gosling, Johns.V.C. 265; Turnage v. Greene, 2 Jones, Eq. 63; Battle v. Petway, 5 Ired. 576. These decisions do not proceed on the ground that it was the intention of the testator that the property should be conveyed to the beneficiary on his reaching the age of 21 years, because in each case it was clear that such was not his intention, but on the ground that the direction to withhold the possession of the property from the beneficiary after he reached his majority was inconsistent with the absolute rights of property given him by the will. This court has ordered trust property conveyed by the trustee to the beneficiary when there was a dry trust, or when the purposes of the trust had been accomplished, or when no good reason was shown why the trust should continue, and all the persons interested in it were sui juris, and desired that it be terminated; but we have found no expression of any opinion in our reports that provisions requiring a trustee to hold and manage the trust property until the beneficiary reached an age beyond that of 21 years are void if the interest of the beneficiary is vested and absolute. See Smith v. Harrington, 4 Allen, 566; Bowditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen, 339; Russell v. Grinnell, 105 Mass. 425; Inches v. Hill, 106 Mass. 575; Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395, 15 N.E. 786. This is not a dry trust, nor have the purposes of the trust been accomplished, if the intention of the testator is to be carried out.

In Sears v. Choate it is said: "Where property is given to certain persons for their benefit, and in such a manner that no other person has or can have any interest in it, they are in effect the absolute owners of it; and it is reasonable and just that they should have the control and disposal of it unless some good cause appears to the contrary." In that case the plaintiff was the absolute owner of the whole property, subject to an annuity of $10,000, payable to himself. The whole of the principal of the trust fund, and all of the income not expressly made payable to the plaintiff, had become vested in him when he reached the age of 21 years by way of resulting trust as property undisposed of by the will. Apparently the testator had not contemplated such a result, and had made no provision for it, and the court...