Claiborne v. Chesapeake
| Decision Date | 15 April 1899 |
| Citation | 46 W.Va. 363 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Claiborne v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. |
1. Instructions Error.
It is error to give an abstract proposition, as an instruction to a jury, which is calculated to mislead them, (p. 366)
2.Instructions Damages Punitive Damages Error.
If the compensatory damages are sufficiently punitive, it is improper to instruct the jury to allow an additional sum as punitive damages (p. 368).
3.Instructions Error.
An instruction which sets forth the evidence as to part of the facts in issue, and ignores certain other facts proven, and on the former directs a finding in favor of the plaintiff, is erroneous. (p. 368).
4.Instructions Railroads Arrest on Train Error.
An instruction that a proper officer of the state has the right to enter a train of cars, within the limits of his jurisdiction, and arrest a perpose guilty of a known breach of the laws of this State, and that the railroad company would not be liable for such arrest, is good, and it is error not to give it. (p. 369).
5.Criminal Law Deadly Weapon.
It is unlawful for any person to carry about his person a razor for any purpose except for self-defense against the known and threatening danger of death or great bodily harm from some other person. (p. 370).
6. Railroads Conductor Arrest Damages.
If a conductor as a conservator of the peace, causes the arrest of a person on justifiable probable cause of his guilt of an offense against the laws of the "State, neither he nor the company he serves is liable for damages by reason thereof, (p. 371).
7. Railroads Conductor Arrest Damages Punitive Damages.
If such an arrest is made without probable cause, and by reason of an honest mistake without actual malice, or a design to injure or oppress, the liability is only for compensatory damages, and no additional sum can be added thereto as exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages. [p. 373]
Error to Circuit Court, Greenbrier County.
Action by George Claiborne against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Reversed.
Simms & Enslow, for plaintiff in error.
J. W. Arbuckle and J. C. Canfield, for defendant in error.
Dent, President:
George Claiborne sued the Chesapeake & Ghio Railway Company in the circuit court of Greenbrier County for false imprisonment, and recovered a judgment for four hundred dollars. Defendant appeals.
The first error assigned is as to the court permitting the evidence of William B. McWhorter, R. B. Jennings, W. P. Camp, J. T. Leslie, and A. M. Nelson, as to the previous good character of the plaintiff, to go to the jury, as his character was not attacked in any manner by the defendant. The plaintiff insists that this evidence was competent, for the reason the defendant "had really attacked the character of Claiborne, or rather his race, and expected, as it did to rely on that to prejudice the jury." This is hardly a good excuse, as the law presumes in favor of good character of either white or black, unless the contrary is shown; and although African blood is given the preference over white, to the exclusion of the Indian, Mongolian, and Filipino, under the naturalization laws of the United States, and although the children of the three latter classes, unless one of their parents was an African, and not a white person, cannot be admitted to citizenship in this country , yet all the races are entitled to the same presumption of good character, in civil trials, in the courts of this State, and therefore evidence of good character is inadmissible. Even in civil actions, in which character is in issue, the plaintiff cannot introduce evidence of his good character until it has been assailed by the defendant. 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 852. On page 866, the law is stated to be that, in actions for malicious prosecution, it is generally held that evidence of the bad character of the plaintiff is admissible for either of two purposes: First, in mitigation of damages; second, in rebuttal of evidence showing want of probable cause, in case the defendant thus assails the plaintiff's character, he has the right to sustain it, but not otherwise. The mere fact that the plaintiff is of African descent, and as a citizen of the United States, under the naturalization laws aforesaid, enjoys a distinction over his white neighbor, does not make it necessary for him to prove his good character before it is assailed. It is hard to see, however, how the defendant could be injured thereby, as the evidence could not make plaintiff's character any better than the law presumes it, unless he wished to take advantage of prejudice against plaintiff's race to offset the prejudice against the defendant's character as a corporation. This would hardly be permissible. The evidence, however, was improperly admitted, for the reason that it tended to mislead the jury from the issue they were trying. It was not a question of the defendant's good character, but whether the conductor was sustained, by probable cause, in directing his arrest and detention.
The second ground of error is the defendant's overruled objection to the following instructions: "The court instructs the jury that in actions of tort, where gross fraud, malice, oppression, or wanton, willful, or reckless conduct, or criminal indifference to civil obligations, affecting the rights of others, appear, or where legislative enactment authorizes it, the jury may assess 'exemplary, ' 'punitive, ' or 'vindictive' damages, these terms being synonymous." Mayer v. Probe, 40 W. Va. 427, (22 S. E. 58). This instruction propounds the law in a proper case, but it is abstract, and makes no reference to the evidence or facts proven. The giving of such instructions, if calculated to mislead the jury, is reversible error. Sheppard v. Insurance Co., 21 W. Va. 368 Pasley v. English, 10 Grat. 236. The instruction tells the jury in what cases punitive damages are recoverable, and leaves them to infer that the case which they are considering belongs to such class, or the court would not have given it to them. It thus becomes the means of indirectly conveying to the jury the opinion of the judge as to the character of the case being tried, which is error. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. A trial judge should' exercise great care not to intimate in any manner his opinion upon the facts at issue. "He cannot do so directly or indirectly, neither explicitly nor by innuendo." State v. Dick, 60 N. C. 440; State v. Ah Tong, 7 Nev. 152; Neill v. Produce Co. 38 W. Va. 228, (18 S. E. 563); State v. Staley 45 W. Va. 792, (32 S. E. 198). Nor is such an instruction proper in cases of this character, unless properly qualified. Corporations generally are not liable for the grossly fraudulent, malicious, oppressive, wanton, willful, reckless, or illegal conduct of their employes, affecting the rights of others, unless such acts are expressly or impliedly authorized or ratified by them, or are a breach of the duty of the protection owed to persons intrusting themselves to the care of such corporations, at their solicitation and for compensation. Downey v. Railway Co., 28 W. Va. 742; Ricketts v.Railway Co., 33 W. Va. 433, (10 S. E. 801); Turner v. Railroad Co., 40 W.Va. 693, (22 S. E. 83); Gilling-ham v. Railroad Co., 35 W. Va. 588, (14 S. E. 243). The attention of the profession is directed to the difference in the syllabus in the last case, as reported in 35 W. Va. 588, (14 S. E. 243), and 29 Am. St. Rep. 827. In the latter, the following syllabus appears: "A common carrier of passengers is liable in exemplary damages for the arrest and false imprisonment of a passenger without reasonable or probable cause, made or caused to be made by its conductor in charge of the train during the execution of the contract to carry, although such act on the part of the conductor was entirely unauthorized by the company, and was purely personal to himself." This appears to be a compilation from the points of the original syllabus and opinion made by the reporter, and not by the Court It prob- ably states the law correctly (except as to the use of the word "exemplary," which should be "compensatory"), as showing the duty of protection which the common carrier owes to its passengers against the willful, wanton, or malicious conduct of its (servants. The conductor is placed in charge of the train, as the representative of the carrier, and therefore, if, instead of properly discharging the duty imposed upon him, he willfully, wantonly, or maliciously injures a passenger, the law will not hear the carrier deny responsibility for his conduct for the reason that, through its authorized agent, it has been guilty of violating the duty it owed to the passenger to protect him from the misconduct of its agents in charge and of fellow passcngers. When the "agent steps aside from his employment to gratify some personal animosity, or give" vent to some private feeling, of his own," the principal is not generally liable, unless such acts were expressly authorized or ratified. For acts done within the scope of the agent's employment, the principal is liable.
In all cases where a corporation is liable for the willful, wanton, malicious, or illegal conduct of its employes, it is subject to exemplary or punitive damages. Indeed, in so far as the defendant is concerned in actions of tort sounding in damages, all damages are in their nature punitive, although as to the plaintiff, they may be merely compensatory. The defendant receives nothing for which he is made to compensate, but he is punished for the wrong committed by him in being compelled to make recompense to the plaintiff. If, therefore, the compensatory damages are sufhcintly punitive, the defendant should not be punished twice, by being compelled to pay another sum, as so-called "punitive" damages. But if the...
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