Claiborne v. State

• Decision Date: 17 November 1888
• Citation: 9 S.W. 851
• Parties: CLAIBORNE <I>v.</I> STATE.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

9 S.W. 851

CLAIBORNE

v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

November 17, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, White county; M. T. SANDERS, Judge.

Indictment for forgery. Defendant appeals. Mansf. Ark. Dig. § 6221, provides that "they [the directors of each school-district] shall draw orders on the treasurer of the county for the payment of wages due teachers, or for any lawful purpose; and they shall state in every such order the services or consideration for which the order is drawn, and the name of the person rendering such service. * * *" Section 6205 provides for three directors for each district.

J. W. House, for appellant. D. W. Jones, Atty. Gen., for the State.

COCKRILL, C. J.

1. In the case of Crain v. State, 45 Ark. 450, it was held to be forgery to make a false school warrant in the name of only two school directors, and the court did not err in refusing to instruct otherwise.

2. It is well settled that when the intention to give effect to a forged document is established, the intent to defraud is conclusively presumed. It is therefore no defense for a creditor who executes a forgery upon his debtor to show that he intended to devote the money thus raised to the payment of the debt due him. 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 598; 1 Whart. Crim. Law, § 718; Reg. v. Wilson, 1 Denison, Cr. Cas. *284, 2 Car. & K. *531; Bush v. State, 77 Ala. 83; State v. Kimball, 50 Me. 409; Com. v. Squires, 97 Mass. 59. Several of the prisoner's requests to charge the jury were not consistent with this principle, and the court did not err in rejecting them.

3. One of his requests, which was denied by the court, was as follows: "The jury are instructed that, if they believe from the testimony that the defendant was not authorized to sign the names of the other directors to the order alleged to have been forged, yet, if they believe from the evidence that he was acting on a fair ground of reason, without fault or carelessness, believing himself authorized to sign their names, then he is not guilty, and they must acquit." This is an enunciation, in the abstract, of a principle of the common law. It is not necessary that one who signs the name of another should have express authority to do so to relieve him of the penalties of forgery. If it appears from the proof that he had reasonable ground for considering that he had authority, and acted upon that belief, the intent to commit the offense would be wanting, and he would not be guilty. Reg. v. Parish, 8 Car. & P. 94; Parmelee v. People, 8 Hun, 623. But the request makes the application of the principle too narrow for the facts of this case; for one may have authority to sign the name of another to an instrument for the payment of money in a stated amount, or for a legal purpose, and yet commit forgery by signing for a larger amount, or for an illegal purpose, with intent to defraud. Rex v. Hart, 1 Moody, Cr. Cas. 486; Reg. v. Wilson, and cases cited supra. The request should have been so framed as to leave the jury at liberty to convict the prisoner, notwithstanding they might find that he had reasonable ground upon which to base a belief in his authority to act for the other directors, if it was also found that he signed their names to the warrant with the fraudulent purpose of paying an amount the school-district did not owe. The legal question whether the instrument was forged or not would be the same whether the demand for the payment of which the warrant was drawn was held by the prisoner or another. Upon the phase of the case...