Claim of LaRocca

• Citation: 463 N.Y.S.2d 414,59 N.Y.2d 683,450 N.E.2d 220
• Parties: , 450 N.E.2d 220 In the Matter of the Claim of Vincent A. LaROCCA, Appellant. New York City Department of Transportation, Respondent; Lillian Roberts, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 03 May 1983
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 414

463 N.Y.S.2d 414

59 N.Y.2d 683, 450 N.E.2d 220

In the Matter of the Claim of Vincent A. LaROCCA, Appellant.

New York City Department of Transportation, Respondent;

Lillian Roberts, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 3, 1983.

James W. Cooper, Glens Falls, for appellant

Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Corp. Counsel, New York City (Dody Schorr, New York City, of counsel), for New York City Dept. of Transp., respondent.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., for Lillian Roberts, Com'r of Labor, respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 90 A.D.2d 947, 457 N.Y.S.2d 901, should be reversed, with costs, and the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board reinstated.

Claimant was charged by his employer with falsely reporting mileage traveled during the course of his employment as a motor vehicle operator for the New York City Department of Transportation. An informal conference was held by his employer, after which claimant was found guilty and suspended for 30 days.

Thereupon, claimant applied for unemployment benefits but was determined to be ineligible by the local board on the ground that he had been suspended from his job for misconduct. At a hearing before the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, the administrative law judge overruled the local board's determination, finding that claimant did not voluntarily leave his job and that claimant's actions did not amount to misconduct for purposes of qualifying for unemployment benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board affirmed and the employer appealed. The Appellate Division reversed and remitted for further proceedings, ^* holding that claimant voluntarily left his employment.

Section 593 (subd. 1, par. ) of the Labor Law provides that, for a limited period measured by his subsequent employment, a claimant is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits if he voluntarily leaves his employment without good cause. Whether a claimant has voluntarily left his employment is usually a question of fact for the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board to decide. (Matter of Fisher 36 N.Y.2d 146, 150, 365 N.Y.S.2d 828, 325 N.E.2d 151.) This is so where, as here, different inferences can be drawn from the evidence presented. In such cases, the appeal board's decision concerning the voluntariness of a claimant's separation from employment is conclusive upon the courts if supported by substantial evidence. (Matter of Fisher at p. 150, 365 N.Y.S.2d 828, 325 N.E.2d 151.)

In the case on appeal, claimant presented evidence showing that he vigorously disputed the charges filed against him and did not leave his job until ordered to do so by his employer. Even then claimant did not accept the 30-day suspension until he was advised by his union representative that if he pursued the matter further he could lose his job permanently. Faced with this unwelcome prospect, claimant decided to accept the suspension, rather than proceed further in accordance with his union's grievance procedures or the procedures available under sections 75 and 76 of the Civil Service Law. Upon this record, we believe that the board's determination that claimant did not voluntarily leave his job is supported by substantial evidence.

The Appellate Division, in reaching a different conclusion, erroneously...