Clair v. State, 24515
Decision Date | 04 November 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 24515,24515 |
Citation | 478 S.E.2d 54,324 S.C. 144 |
Parties | Rodney CLAIR, Respondent, v. STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Tara Dawn Shurling, Columbia, for respondent.
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the grant of post-conviction relief (PCR) in this case. We now affirm.
Respondent was indicted for trafficking in cocaine weighing more than 100 grams and less than 200 grams. Before the jury was sworn, the solicitor moved to amend the indictment to an amount more than 200 grams and less than 400 grams. Defense counsel consented to the amendment based on his understanding that the amount did not change the nature of the charges against his client. Respondent was convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years without parole and fined $100,000.
Respondent filed a direct appeal which he then withdrew. Thereafter, he filed this application for PCR. On motion for summary judgment, the PCR judge granted respondent relief on the ground the amendment of the indictment without presentment by the grand jury deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Did the amendment of the indictment change the nature of the offense?
Respondent was indicted for trafficking in cocaine. The indictment originally alleged that respondent trafficked in more than 100 but less than 200 grams of cocaine. Before the jury was sworn, however, the State moved to amend the indictment on the ground that the amount of cocaine alleged was incorrect. With respondent's consent, the trial court permitted the State to amend the indictment to allege an amount of more than 200 but less than 400 grams of cocaine. 1 Respondent was subsequently convicted of trafficking, sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment, and fined $100,000.
Respondent filed a direct appeal which he later withdrew. Thereafter, respondent filed an application for post-conviction relief (PCR). Respondent argued that without a written waiver of presentment, the amendment to his trafficking indictment deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction because the amendment increased the maximum penalty for a conviction. After hearing oral arguments, the PCR court agreed and vacated respondent's conviction.
Did the amendment to respondent's trafficking indictment deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction?
An amendment to an indictment is permissible if the amendment does not change the nature of the offense charged. S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-100 (1985); see also State v. Myers, 313 S.C. 391, 438 S.E.2d 236 (1993). Here, respondent was charged with "trafficking in cocaine," an offense defined in S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-370(e)(2) (Supp.1995) as the sale, purchase, possession, etc., of "ten grams or more of cocaine or any mixtures containing cocaine." Although the amendment to respondent's indictment increased the potential punishment he faced if convicted of trafficking, the offense charged remained the same. Consequently, the amendment in this case was permissible under § 17-19-100.
Respondent argues (and the majority holds) that this Court's decision in Hopkins v. State, 317 S.C. 7, 451 S.E.2d 389 (1994), mandates a different result. I disagree.
In Hopkins, the petitioner was originally indicted for two counts of felony DUI causing great bodily injury. His indictment was subsequently amended to allege two counts of felony DUI causing death. See S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-2945 (Supp.1995). Consequently, unlike the case at hand, the amendment at issue in Hopkins actually changed the original offense charged, not merely the potential punishment.
Further, in holding that an amendment to an indictment which increases the maximum penalty for an offense exceeds the terms of § 17-19-100, the Hopkins Court relied solely on State v. (Bruce Eugene) Riddle, 301 S.C. 211, 391 S.E.2d 253...
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...the classification from nonviolent to violent), overruled on other grounds, Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494; Clair v. State, 324 S.C. 144, 478 S.E.2d 54 (1996) (affirming grant of post-conviction relief where defendant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine weighing more than 100 grams......
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...an increased sentencing level because to do so changes the nature of the offense by increasing the penalty involved. Clair v. State, 324 S.C. 144, 478 S.E.2d 54 (1996). In reaching this decision, the court interpreted its holding in Hopkins v. State, 317 S.C. 7, 451 S.E.2d 389 (1994) to dec......
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