Clairmont Development Co. v. Morgan

Decision Date09 June 1966
Docket NumberNos. 23470,23473,s. 23470
Citation149 S.E.2d 489,222 Ga. 255
PartiesCLAIRMONT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Inc. v. W. Ray MORGAN et al. CLAIRMONT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Inc. v. W. Grady HOLT et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Duncan & Wall, R. F. Duncan, J. J. Wall, Lawrenceville, for appellant.

Stark & Stark, Hope D. Stark, Homer M. Stark, Lawrenceville, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

CANDLER, Presiding Justice.

These are cases respecting zoning. The petition in case No. 23470 was filed by Clairmont Development Company, Inc. against the three members of the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Gwinnett County, Georgia. It alleges: Petioner is the 'optionee and holder and obligee of a contract to purchase a described tract of land in Gwinnett County' if and when rezoned from residential to commercial use. On August 17, 1965, such board of commissioners on petitioner's application therefor, and after the board had complied with all zoning requirements, rezoned it for commercial use. Relying on the board's rezoning action, petitioner has expended a great deal of time, effort and money to plan and develop it as a shopping center and may have become liable to the owners to purchase it for $50,000 under a contract of sale with them. On October 14, 1965, the Board issued an order for all interested parties to show cause why its rezoning ordinance of August 17, 1965 should not be declared void because of applicant's failure to comply with all of its regulations for rezoning property; and that petitioner responded to such order and on the hearing it was shown without contradiction that its application for the rezoning of such property was fully in compliance with all applicable rezoning regulations. The petition further alleges that petitioner received a notice from the board on November 17, 1965, that it had decided to initiate a rezoning of the subject property from a commercial use back to a residential use since it had concluded there were sufficient areas in that section of the county already zoned for shopping centers. The petition further alleges that the proposed rezoning of the subject land is not for the purpose of bringing it within compliance with any comprehensive zoning plans of the area or of the county, but is proposed arbitrarily and capriciously as a matter of political expediency to satisfy some of the citizens in the area; that the land is worth $50,000 for commercial uses but would not be worth that amount as residential property; and that if such property is rezoned for residential use, petitioner will have no need for it and will suffer an irreparable injury and loss unless the board is restrained and enjoined from rezoning it from commercial to residential use. The petition contains a prayer for such relief.

Case No. 23473 is a mandamus proceeding which Clairmont Development Company, Inc., brought against W. Grady Holt, as Zoning Administrator (Chief Building Official) and Secretary for the Gwinnett County Zoning and Planning Board and also against three named persons as members of the Gwinnett County Board of Zoning Appeals. (This case relates to the same land which the Gwinnett County Board of Commissioners rezoned from residential to commercial use on August 17, 1965, on an application therefor by Clairmont Development Company, Inc.). The amended petition in this case alleges: Article 21, Section B. Subparagraph 2 of the zoning ordinance of Gwinnett County provides: 'The Zoning Administrator (Chief Building Official) shall have the duty and authority to administer the provisions of this zoning resolution and this duty and authority shall include but not be limited to the following: (a) To issue certificates of zoning compliance for all uses listed as permitted or conditional uses in this resolution and to deny such certificates to any person permitted use which does not conform to the requirements of this resolution.' The amended petition further alleges that petitioner, after complying with all provisions of law and of the Gwinnett County Zoning and Planning Ordinance, filed with the defendant W. Grady Holt, Zoning Administrator (Chief Building Official) of Gwinnett County an application for a certificate of Zoning Compliance, a prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit; that it attached to its application for the certificate, as it was required to do, an accurate plat of the property showing the proposed structures and their relationship to all property lines; that the defendant Holt on September 23, 1965, refused to issue to it the applied for certificate of zoning compliance;...

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16 cases
  • Goldrush II v. City of Marietta
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1997
    ...had a constitutionally-protected interest in obtaining a renewal of a liquor license. 10. Relying on Clairmont Development Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255, 149 S.E.2d 489 (1966), appellants claim they acquired vested rights to the continued re-issuance of alcohol and adult entertainment licenses......
  • Quarters Decatur, LLC v. City of Decatur
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 23, 2018
    ...any state of provable facts." Ewing v. City of Atlanta , 281 Ga. 652, 654 (2), 642 S.E.2d 100 (2007). See Clairmont Dev. Co. v. Morgan , 222 Ga. 255, 258-259 (2), 149 S.E.2d 489 (1966) (where mandamus petition alleged that applicant for certificate of zoning compliance had complied with zon......
  • Cooper v. UNIFIED GOVT. OF ATHENS CLARKE COUNTY
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 17, 2003
    ...Justices concur. 1.Cooper v. Unified Govt. of Athens-Clarke County, 275 Ga. 433, 569 S.E.2d 855 (2002). 2. Clairmont Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255, 258, 149 S.E.2d 489 (1966). 3. 4 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, § 70:29[94] 4. Barker v. Forsyth County, 248 Ga. 73, 75, 281 S.E.2d 54......
  • Barker v. Forsyth County, 37539
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • September 8, 1981
    ...§ 57-3; See, 49 A.L.R.3rd 13, § 3. We pronounced this general rule a "sound principle of law" in Clairmont Development Company, Inc., v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255, 258, 149 S.E.2d 489 (1966). A different rule was implied in Keenan v. Acker, 226 Ga. 896, 178 S.E.2d 196 (1970). There we said a vali......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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