Clampitt v. DJ Spencer Sales

• Decision Date: 10 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. SC92603.,SC92603.
• Citation: 786 So.2d 570
• Parties: Colletta P. CLAMPITT, Petitioner, v. D.J. SPENCER SALES, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

786 So.2d 570

Colletta P. CLAMPITT, Petitioner, v. D.J. SPENCER SALES, et al., Respondents.

No. SC92603.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 10, 2001.

Eric C. White of Johnson, Vipperman & White, P.A., Gainesville, FL, for Petitioner.

Christopher C. Coleman and Monica C. Sanders of Cameron, Marriott, Walsh, Hodges & Coleman, P.A., Ocala, FL, for Respondent.

SHAW, J.

We have for review D.J. Spencer Sales v. Clampitt, 704 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), based on conflict with Pierce v. Progressive American Insurance Co., 582 So.2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash D.J. Spencer Sales.

I. FACTS

During the morning of August 30, 1993, three vehicles were following one another in the southbound lane of Alternate U.S. 27 south of Bronson, Florida. The lead vehicle, which was driven by Charles Huguley, was a pickup truck hauling a small trailer; the second vehicle, driven by Colletta Clampitt, was an automobile; and the third vehicle, driven by Carl Hetz, was a commercial tractor-trailer rig owned by D.J. Spencer Sales ("Spencer Sales" or "Spencer"). The posted speed limit was fifty-five miles per hour; the weather was clear. The three vehicles were involved in an accident about a mile south of the Bronson city limits and Clampitt was seriously injured. She sued Spencer Sales.¹ Prior to trial, she moved for summary judgment on the issue of fault, contending that Spencer had failed to rebut the presumption of negligence that attaches to the rear driver in a rear-end collision. She submitted Huguley's and Hetz's deposition testimony and Hetz's answers to interrogatories. Spencer submitted no evidence on the issue.

Huguley testified in his deposition as follows: He was traveling south at forty-five to fifty-five miles an hour; he activated his turn signal and began braking one hundred and fifty yards prior to entering the driveway of his place of business; his pickup truck and trailer had turned almost completely off the highway when the trailer was struck from behind by Clampitt's auto. Hetz testified as follows: He was traveling at forty-five to fifty miles per hour; he was following Clampitt's auto by approximately one hundred and twenty feet; although he had an unobstructed view of Huguley's vehicle, he did not know that Huguley was turning until he saw Clampitt's auto strike Huguley's trailer and push the pickup truck and trailer off the road; at that point, he saw Clampitt's auto come to a "dead-stop" on the highway; he slammed on his brakes, left one hundred feet of skid marks, and struck Clampitt's auto; he did not see Huguley's turn signal or brake lights illuminate at any time prior to the accident (although he did testify that the trooper at the scene confirmed that Huguley's turn signals and brake lights were operational); he did not see Clampitt's brake lights illuminate at any time.²

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Clampitt on the issue of fault. The case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages and the jury returned a verdict of $857,997 for Clampitt.³ The district court reversed on the summary judgment issue, ruling that the evidence in favor of Spencer Sales was sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence. This Court granted review based on conflict with Pierce v. Progressive American Insurance Co., 582 So.2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), wherein the district court held that an abrupt stop, by itself, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence that attaches to a rear driver.⁴

II. THE APPLICABLE LAW

The rebuttable presumption of negligence that attaches to the rear driver in a rear-end collision in Florida arises out of necessity in cases where the lead driver sues the rear driver. The presumption bears only upon the causal negligence of the rear driver:

The usefulness of the rule is obvious. A plaintiff ordinarily bears the burden of proof of all four elements of negligence-duty of care, breach of that duty, causation and damages. Yet, obtaining proof of two of those elements, breach and causation, is difficult when a plaintiff driver who has been rear-ended knows that the defendant driver rear-ended him but usually does not know why. Beginning with McNulty, therefore, the law presumed that the driver of the rear vehicle was negligent unless that driver provided a substantial and reasonable explanation as to why he was not negligent, in which case the presumption would vanish and the case could go to the jury on its merits.

Jefferies v. Amery Leasing, Inc., 698 So.2d 368, 370-71 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (citations omitted).

This Court in Guile v. Boggs, 174 So.2d 26 (Fla.1965), endorsed the rebuttable presumption established in McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So.2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958), and held that the burden is on the defendant to come forward with evidence that "fairly and reasonably tends to show" that the presumption of negligence is misplaced:

We have stated that the presumption announced in McNulty, and subsequently followed, is rebuttable. It is constructed by the law to give particular effect to a certain group of facts in the absence of further evidence. The presumption provides a prima facie case which shifts to the defendant the burden to go forward with evidence to contradict or rebut the fact presumed. When the defendant produces evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the impact of "the presumption is dissipated". Whether the ultimate fact has been established must then be decided by the jury from all of the evidence before it without the aid of the presumption. At this point the entire matter should be deposited with the trier of facts to reconcile the conflicts and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.

Guile v. Boggs, 174 So.2d at 28-29 (emphasis added).

The Court recently revisited this issue in Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc., 752 So.2d 592 (Fla.2000). There, Eppler was stopped in a line of vehicles at a red light and when the light turned green all the vehicles accelerated and proceeded forward in a routine fashion for several seconds. Eppler then suddenly-without warning and for no apparent reasonslammed on her brakes and was struck from behind by the defendant's cement-mixer truck. The Court held that under those circumstances the presumption of negligence was overcome:

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the decisions of both the trial and district courts below. Abrupt and arbitrary braking in bumper-to-bumper, accelerating traffic is an irresponsible and dangerous act that invites a collision. Cases involving allegations of such an act are properly submitted to the jury, for the crucible of cross-examination is well-suited for gleaning meritorious from non-meritorious claims. In the present case, the trial court properly denied Eppler's motion for a directed verdict.

Eppler, 752 So.2d at 595-96.

III. THE PRESENT CASE

In the present case, the district court ruled that the presumption of negligence was overcome by the following alleged facts: Clampitt "dead-stopped" in front of Hetz; and Clampitt failed to use her brakes prior to colliding with Huguley's trailer.⁵ From these facts, the court reasoned that a jury could infer that Clampitt negligently failed to decelerate gradually as Huguley's vehicle pulled off the highway.⁶ This was error.

The present case differs from Eppler wherein the forward driver allegedly made an abrupt and arbitrary stop in bumper-to-bumper accelerating traffic, i.e., a "gotcha" stop. Rather, this case is similar to Pierce v. Progressive American Insurance Co., 582 So.2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), and other "sudden stop" cases wherein the forward driver merely stopped abruptly. The court in Pierce explained that a sudden stop standing alone is insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence:

It is not merely an "abrupt stop" by a preceding vehicle (if it is in its proper place on the highway) that rebuts or dissipates the presumption that the negligence of the rear driver was the sole proximate cause of a rear-end collision. It is a sudden stop by the preceding driver at a time and place where it could not reasonably be expected by the following driver that creates the factual issue.

Pierce, 582 So.2d at 714 (citations omitted). The court in Pierce also rejected the notion that the rear driver can benefit from a claim that the forward driver was negligent in rear-ending the vehicle in front of him or her.⁷ In the present case, the accident took place at midmorning on a clear day on a level stretch of two-lane roadway just outside the Bronson city limits. In the area of the accident, the roadway is bordered by a farm supply store and several other commercial establishments, several apartment complexes and a residential development, and the campus of Central Florida Junior College, all of which maintain entrances and exits on the roadway. Hetz testified that, in spite of his vantage point in the cab (from where he had a clear view of both vehicles in front of him), he did not see Huguley activate his turn signal; he did not see Huguley illuminate his brake lights; he did not see Huguley slow down; and he did not see Huguley turn into his driveway. Nor did he see Clampitt slow down or activate her brake lights. At best, according to Hetz's own testimony, Clampitt made a sudden stop on the roadway ahead and Hetz did not see her until the last minute.

It is well settled that a sudden stop, without more, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence. We also know that-in spite of Hetz's testimony otherwise —some of the aforementioned events probably did take place. We know, for instance, that Huguley turned off the highway, that he probably slowed down (from fifty miles per hour) in order to do so, that his brake lights (which were in working order) probably illuminated, and that Clampitt probably slowed down before striking the trailer (she did only...