Clancy v. McCabe, No. SJC-09097 (Mass. 3/26/2004)
| Decision Date | 26 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. SJC-09097,SJC-09097 |
| Citation | 441 Mass. 311 |
| Parties | MARY JANE CLANCY v. WILLIAM McCABE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Sosman, & Cordy, JJ.
Civil Rights, Supervisory liability, Immunity of public official. Public Officer.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 22, 1995.
The case was heard by Mitchell J. Sikora, J., on a motion for summary judgment.
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
Rosemary Connolly, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.
James E. Riley, Jr., & Michael J. Traft (Rebecca L. Andrews with them) for the plaintiff.
In November, 1992, State Trooper Ramon L. Rivera, Jr., stopped the plaintiff's motor vehicle on Route 495 in Middleborough. During the course of the stop, Rivera illegally strip searched the plaintiff, Mary Jane Clancy, and made lewd and suggestive remarks to her.1 Five years prior to this incident, internal affairs had launched an investigation into Rivera's inappropriate and unprofessional conduct with four other female motorists. In 1988, as a result of the investigation, McCabe, who was then Commissioner of Public Safety and superintendent of State police, suspended Rivera without pay for six months and ordered him to report to the department's "stress unit" following his return to active duty.
The plaintiff's supervisory liability complaint against McCabe asserts a single count of civil rights violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). She alleges McCabe acted with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of female motorists by not recommending that Rivera be terminated in 1988. McCabe moved for summary judgment, claiming he was entitled to qualified immunity. McCabe further argued that the plaintiff could not prove that his allegedly negligent supervision of Rivera proximately caused her to be abused by Rivera.2
A Superior Court judge determined that there was "sufficient evidence" to reach a jury on the question whether McCabe's discipline of Rivera amounted to deliberate indifference, and denied McCabe's motion.3 McCabe filed an interlocutory appeal with the Appeals Court, see Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 30-31 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. Forastiere v. Breault, 485 U.S. 906 (1988), arguing, inter alia, that there were no material facts in dispute on the issue of qualified immunity. In affirming the order denying summary judgment, the Appeals Court concluded that "it can be reasonably inferred that McCabe's supervisory response to Rivera's behavior was grossly inadequate." Clancy v. McCabe, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 498, 508 (2003). We granted McCabe's application for further appellate review. Because we hold that the disciplinary action taken by McCabe was not deliberately indifferent as a matter of law, and thus he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit under § 1983, see Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of Springfield, supra at 31, we reverse the order of the Superior Court.
1. Facts. The background facts are set out at length in the Appeals Court decision, Clancy v. McCabe, supra at 500-502, and need not be repeated here. We recite only those facts on which the motion judge relied to support his denial of summary judgment on the question of qualified immunity, supplemented by uncontroverted evidence from the record below.
On February 22, 1988, Captain Wayne Harding of the State police internal affairs unit reported the results of the unit's investigation of Rivera.4 The report detailed complaints by four female motorists against Rivera for improper behavior during traffic stops, all of which occurred in 1987.5 The allegations ranged from Rivera's inviting female motorists to join him for a drink, to touching their arms, to detaining them for prolonged periods of time, to threatening them with a citation or arrest if they did not agree to go out with him. In addition to the verified complaints, the report also noted unsubstantiated "stories and rumors" about Rivera's activities. Opining that Rivera's actions toward female motorists were "totally inappropriate and unprofessional," Harding recommended that "Rivera be de[a]lt with in a manner that will show the victims of these incidents and the general public, that the Massachusetts State police will not tolerate these types of activities."
Colonel Thomas J. Fitzgerald, then deputy superintendent of the State police, reviewed the report and submitted it to McCabe.6 Fitzgerald recommended that Rivera be terminated, and McCabe agreed.7 McCabe instructed Fitzgerald to draft a letter advising Rivera of the contemplated charges against him (i.e., conduct unbecoming an officer), and his options of either resigning or proceeding with a court martial, known as a special trial board.8 Fitzgerald's letter also stated Rivera "may be placed on permanent desk duty." McCabe testified at his deposition that such desk duty was not a disciplinary measure but a protective measure for the public, the department, and the officer, apparently while the charges were pending.9
McCabe did not have the authority to terminate Rivera directly, only to recommend to the trial board that such action be taken. See Clancy v. McCabe, supra at 501 n.10. The three-member trial board would have decided the accused trooper's guilt or innocence, and could recommend punishment up to and including discharge. If found guilty and terminated, Rivera could have appealed from the board's decision to the District Court. G. L. c. 22, § 9A (see St. 1971, c. 521), repealed by St. 1991, c. 412, § 19.
Rivera's attorney contacted McCabe and "a plea bargaining session" ensued. They discussed the fact — uncovered during a civil rights suit brought by a minority officer against McCabe's predecessor — that in the past thirty years, no white person had been discharged from the State police for conduct unbecoming an officer.10 After a "great deal of conversation and consideration," according to McCabe, the parties agreed that Rivera would be suspended without pay for six months and thereafter report to the State police stress unit for counselling, for a period of time to be determined by the deputy superintendent.
McCabe testified at his deposition that he thought the punishment imposed "would be in the best interest of the department [and] the public, and give the officer an opportunity to straighten out his life." He acknowledged that the fact that Rivera was Cape Verdean weighed in his decision not to recommend termination, based on the department's previous experience with a civil rights suit by a minority officer.11 Contrary to the motion judge's determination, however, McCabe's deposition testimony indicated that he "was not . . . in fear of any threat of a lawsuit."12 What he feared, according to his testimony, was having an appellate court overturn any decision to terminate Rivera, resulting in Rivera's returning to work and "get[ting] a big reward of money for not having worked [which] would have had a debilitating effect on the department." Furthermore, McCabe testified that Rivera's ethnicity was only one consideration. McCabe also kept in mind that he had
Rivera waived his right to a trial board hearing and was suspended from duty from August 1, 1988, through January 31, 1989. The suspension resulted in a loss to Rivera of about $ 25,000, based on an average trooper's salary plus overtime, court time and details. After returning to duty, Rivera received counselling, as ordered, from the State police department's psychological services unit, commonly known as "the stress unit."
The stress unit assisted employees with personal problems such as emotional or mental illness, alcohol abuse, or domestic problems. The members of the stress unit, including one who possessed a master's degree in social work, functioned as a "crisis intervention team" and provided counselling to State police employees. If the members were unqualified to handle an employee's particular issue, they referred the employee to outside professionals such as psychologists or psychiatrists.
Following his return to work, Rivera saw Richard Kelly, a member of the stress unit. Kelly possessed a bachelor of science degree in psychology and a master's degree in counselor education. Kelly estimated he counselled more than 1,200 people during his twelve years working in the stress unit.
McCabe acknowledged in his deposition that he believed the stress unit was inadequate to address Rivera's needs, but he believed the unit had "outsourced" Rivera for appropriate treatment. McCabe, however, did not order the unit to do so. Once McCabe had approved the six-month suspension and the order for Rivera to report to the stress unit, it became the deputy superintendent's responsibility to see that the punishment was carried out. McCabe himself did not follow up with the stress unit or otherwise monitor Rivera's behavior after Rivera returned to active duty.
Rivera was reassigned as a "road trooper" after his suspension ended. There were no restrictions placed on his duties. After returning to work in 1989, Rivera did not come before McCabe for any further disciplinary action. McCabe retired from State service in February, 1992.
2. Discussion. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials, in the course of performing discretionary tasks, from liability for civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "On a motion for summary judgment, 'the relevant question is whether a reasonable...
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