Clancy v. Mobil Oil Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 October 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 93-11922-RCL.
• Citation: 906 F. Supp. 42
• Parties: Dean CLANCY, Stacey S. Clancy and Dylan S. Clancy, a Minor, by his Next Friend, Stacey S. Clancy, Plaintiffs, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

906 F. Supp. 42

Dean CLANCY, Stacey S. Clancy and Dylan S. Clancy, a Minor, by his Next Friend, Stacey S. Clancy, Plaintiffs, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 93-11922-RCL.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

October 30, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Terance P. Perry, Brendan J. Perry, Holliston, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Norman A. Peloquin II, F. Dore Hunter, Flanagan & Hunter, Boston, MA, Geoffrey A. Smith, Mobil Corporation, Fairfax, VA, for Defendant.

LINDSAY, District Judge.

Report and Recommendation accepted.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND LOSS OF CONSORTIUM/SOCIETY (DOCKET ENTRY # 24)

September 20, 1995.

BOWLER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before this court is a motion to partially dismiss certain counts in the complaint seeking recovery of punitive damages and loss of consortium. (Docket Entry #24). After conducting a hearing (Docket Entry # 38), this court took the motion under advisement.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Dean E. Clancy ("Dean Clancy"), an injured seaman, Stacey S. Clancy ("Stacey Clancy"), his wife, and Dylan S. Clancy ("Dylan Clancy"), the Clancy's minor son (collectively: "plaintiffs"), filed this personal injury action against defendant Mobil Oil Corporation ("defendant") on the basis of diversity and federal question jurisdiction, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688 and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 seeking recompense due to injuries suffered by Dean Clancy in March 1992 as the result of a fall while on board the Tamaha, a vessel operated and controlled by defendant.

For purposes of resolving the instant motion, this court need not summarize the facts at length. Taking the facts in the complaint as true and reasonable inferences therefrom, Vartanian v. Monsanto Company, 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1st Cir.1994) (stating standard of review applicable to motion to dismiss), Dean Clancy was a seaman and in March 1992, after the conception of his son, suffered an injury while employed as a member of the crew aboard the Tamaha. Specifically, on March 25, 1992, the Tamaha, a tugboat, was in the process of transporting a barge from one slip to another slip in Port Mobil, Staten Island, New York. Hydraulic oil began leaking in large quantities in the engine room and, upon viewing this problem, Dean Clancy, Chief Engineer at the time, proceeded to repair the leak and wash down the area. During the performance of these employment related duties, Dean Clancy slipped and fell due to an accumulation of oil on one of the ladder well stairs leading to the engine room.

Plaintiffs' 21 count complaint alleges liability for: (1) negligence and breach of contract under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688 ("the Jones Act") (counts I-IX, XIII, XIV and XV); (2) maintenance and cure under general maritime law (Count X); (3) breach of the warranty of unseaworthiness under general maritime law (Count XI); and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress under general maritime law (Count XII). In addition to the foregoing counts, plaintiffs bring the following counts which are the subject of the motion to dismiss: (1) Count XVI for punitive damages under general maritime law by Dean Clancy; (2) Count XVII for punitive damages under the Jones Act by Dean Clancy; (3) Count XVIII for loss of consortium under New Hampshire law by Stacey Clancy; (4) Count XIX for loss of consortium under general maritime law by Stacey Clancy; (5) Count XX for loss of consortium under New Hampshire law by Dylan Clancy; and (6) Count XXI for loss of consortium under general maritime law by Dylan Clancy.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs do not oppose the dismissal of the counts for punitive damages under general maritime law and the Jones Act brought by Dean Clancy (counts XVI and XVII) and the counts for loss of consortium under general maritime law brought by Stacey and Dylan Clancy (counts XIX and XXI). Indeed, the weight of authority and direct precedent in this circuit, Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 15 F.3d 200, 201-202 (1st Cir.1994) (general maritime law makes punitive damages unavailable to injured seaman and loss of parental and spousal society damages unavailable to minor child and spouse of injured seaman), compel the finding that an injured seaman cannot recover nonpecuniary losses such as punitive damages under the Jones Act or under general maritime law and that the spouse and children of an injured seaman cannot recover for loss of consortium under general maritime law. Miles v. Apex Marine Corporation, 498 U.S. 19, 31, 111 S.Ct. 317, 325, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990) ("Miles") (damages recoverable to nondependent parent in wrongful death action under general maritime law do not include nonpecuniary losses such as loss of society);¹Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corporation, 59 F.3d 1496, 1513 (5th Cir. 1995) (in light of Miles, punitive damages unavailable to injured seaman for wilful nonpayment of maintenance and cure under general maritime law); Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Management Corporation, 57 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir.1995) (punitive damages unavailable in action for maintenance and cure by nonfatally injured seaman); Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1314, 131 L.Ed.2d 196 (1995) (recognizing that loss of society damages are unavailable in connection with injury of Jones Act seaman); Lollie v. Brown Marine Service, Inc., 995 F.2d 1565, 1565 (11th Cir.1993) ("neither the Jones Act nor general maritime law authorizes recovery for loss of society or consortium in personal injury cases"); Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1457-1459 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 304, 126 L.Ed.2d 252 (1993) (Jones Act, which incorporates damages recovery provision of Federal Employers' Liability Act, bars recovery of nonpecuniary damages thereby precluding punitive damages award in unseaworthiness action for wrongful death); Michel v. Total Transportation, Inc., 957 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir.1992) (reversing lower court's award of loss of consortium under general maritime law to spouse of injured seaman); Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc., 761 F.Supp. 943, 948-950 (D.R.I.1991) (striking punitive damages claim in wrongful death action brought by parents under general maritime law).

The Jones Act explicitly covers nonfatal actions for personal injuries suffered by seaman, Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corporation, 59 F.3d 1496, 1506-1507 (5th Cir. 1995), but limits such relief to pecuniary losses. Murray v. Bertucci Construction Company, 958 F.2d 127, 131-132 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 865, 113 S.Ct. 190, 121 L.Ed.2d 134 (1992) ("Jones Act limits a seaman's recovery for injury to pecuniary losses and precludes recovery for nonpecuniary losses"). Extending relief under general maritime law to permit an injured seaman to recover nonpecuniary losses such as punitive damages or allowing a spouse and/or minor child of an injured seaman to recover nonpecuniary losses such as loss of consortium results in more expansive remedies in a judicially created cause of action where liability is without fault than Congress provided in a federal statutory cause of action premised on negligence. Murray v. Bertucci Construction Company, 958 F.2d at 131-132 (discussing Miles and vacating jury award to spouse and children of injured seaman for loss of society).

Following the holdings of the aforementioned cases and in light of plaintiffs' lack of objection (Docket Entry # 26, p. 2), counts XVI, XVII, XIX and XXI are subject to dismissal. Plaintiffs strenuously object, however, to the dismissal of the loss of consortium claims brought by Stacey and Dylan Clancy under state law.² Plaintiffs theorize that because state law remedies implicate an area of state concern and supplement general maritime law, they are not preempted. Plaintiffs also assert that precluding the state law causes of action violates the Tenth Amendment. Finally, they argue that preserving such causes of action balances state sovereignty and federalism and allows states to craft their own consortium claims tailored to the individual needs of their citizens. (Docket Entry # 26).

Stacey and Dylan Clancy's loss of consortium claims arise by virtue of state law. N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 507:8-a. Nevertheless, the injury, which occurred to a Jones Act seaman on navigable waters, is maritime in nature and implicates the admiralty jurisdiction of this court.³ Thus, although plaintiffs filed this action, in part, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, maritime law displaces state law even where the underlying cause of action is created by state statute "and federal court jurisdiction happens to be based on diversity." Southworth Machinery Company, Inc. v. F/V Corey Pride, 994 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir.1993) (citing Templeman v. Chris Craft Corporation, 770 F.2d 245, 250 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 571, 88 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985)).

"`The extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called "reverse-Erie" doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing federal maritime standards.'" Ballard Shipping Company v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 626 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986)); see also Southworth Machinery Company, Inc., 994 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir.1993) (also quoting this statement in Tallentire). Although "the line separating permissible from impermissible state regulation" is oftentimes not readily ascertainable or "consistent within our admiralty jurisprudence," American Dredging Company v. Miller, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 981, 987, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994), state law is generally preempted where "`it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the...